Roman Britain 39 to 84 A.D.

A Study of the Source Material Contained in Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio.

by

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I hereby declare that this work being submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy is entirely the work of its author except where specific reference is made within the text.

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Abstract

This thesis covers the period of Romano-British history from 39 to 84 A.D. as seen through the works of the ancient historians, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius. The work has been conceived in a chronological manner and each chapter covers a successive period of the history of Roman Britain, commencing in 39 with the abortive expedition of the Emperor Gaius to the Channel shore. The topics discussed in succeeding chapters are the Claudian conquest, the formation of the Roman province, Suetonius Paulinus and the Boudican revolt, its aftermath and, finally, the governorship of Agricola. The main sources are studied where they are relevant to the historical period. Although basically an historical survey, the emphasis is on how the ancient authors present their facts, the language they use and how the listener would have been moved by their representation of events. The views of the pertinent secondary sources with regard to the original sources form an important secondary level of study. Archaeological details, however, are only considered where they are of interest or of importance since the work is primarily a study of literature and as such they do not come within the scope of this study.

Contents

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Abbreviations

The following is a list of abbreviations used within the references to each chapter which are not readily identifiable. Other abbreviations may be easily recognised by using the bibliography.

AJPh	*American Journal of Philology*
Aesch *Prom*	Aeschylus, *Prometheus Vinctus*
Aesch *Sept*	Aeschylus, *Septem Contra Thebas*
AntJ	*Antiquaries Journal*
Anth Lat	*Anthologia Latina*
App *Mith*	Appian, *Mithridates*
ArchJ	*Archaeological Journal*
Bagendon	E.M. Clifford (ed.), *Bagendon: a Belgic oppidum*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
U. Boissevain	U.P. Boussevain, *Cassii Dionis Cocceiani Historiarum Romanorum quae supersunt*
Brit	*Britannia*
Caes *BGall*	Caesar, *De bello Gallico*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*
Cat *Carm*	Catullus, *Carmina*
Cels	Celsus
Cic *De orat*	Cicero, *De oratore*
Cic *Phil*	Cicero, *Philippic*
Cic *Verr*	Cicero, *Verrine Oration*
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin, 1863-
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CIPh	*Classical Philology*
R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*	R.G. Collingwood and J.N.L. Myres, *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
Dem *De cor*	Demosthenes, *De corona*
EMC	*Echo du Monde Classique*
S. Frere (1978)	S. Frere, *Britannia*, 2nd ed., 1978
S. Frere (1987)	S. Frere, *Britannia*, 3rd ed., 1987
G&R	*Greece and Rome*
Geogr Rav	*Geographica Ravennis*
Gerber and Greef	A. Gerber and A. Greef (eds.), *Lexicon Taciteum*
ILS	H. Dessau (ed.), *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Berlin, 1892-1902
Jos *Bell Iud*	Josephus, *De bello Iudaeum*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
Juv	Juvenal, *Satires*
LCM	*Liverpool Classical Monthly*
Lewis and Short	C. Lewis and C. Short, *A Latin Dictionary*
Liddell and Scott	H. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*
Luc	Lucan, *Pharsalia*
Nep *Alc*	Cornelius Nepos, *Alcibiades*
OCD	*The Oxford Classical Dictionary*
OLD	*The Oxford Latin Dictionary*
PBSR	*Papers of the British School at Rome*
Plato *Rep*	Plato, *Republic*

Plautus *Am*	Plautus, *Amphitruo*
Plautus *Cist*	Plautus, *Cistellaria*
Plautus *Mil Gl*	Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus*
Plautus *Ps*	Plautus, *Pseudolus*
Pliny *NH*	Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*
Polyb	Polybius, *Histories*
PSAS	*Proceedings of the Society for Antiquities, Scotland*
RE	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (eds.), *Real Encyclopaedie*, 1893-
RevArch	*Revue Archaeologique*
RIB	R.G. Collingwood and R.P. Wright (eds.), *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*
A. Rivet and C. Smith	A. Rivet and C. Smith, *The Place-names of Roman Britain*
RSA	*Rivista Storica dell'Antichita*
SAF	*Scottish Archaeological Forum*
Sall *Cat*	Sallust, *Bellum Catilinum*
Sall *Hist*	Sallust, *Histories*
Sall *Iug*	Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*
SCI	*Scripta Classica Israelica*
Sen *Suas*	Seneca the Elder, *Suasoriae*
Sen *Ag*	Seneca the Younger, *Agamemnon*
Sen *Apoc*	Seneca the Younger, *Apocolocyntosis*
Sen *De benef*	Seneca the Younger, *De beneficiis*
Sen *Ep*	Seneca the Younger, *Epistulae*
Statius *Silv*	Statius, *Silvae*
Suet *Aug*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Augustus*
Suet *Cal*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Caligula*
Suet *Cl*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Claudius*
Suet *DivJ*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Julius Caesar*
Suet *Gal*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Galba*
Suet *Nero*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Nero*
Suet *Tit*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Titus*
Suet *Vesp*	Suetonius Tranquillus, *Vespasian*
Tac *Agr*	Cornelius Tacitus, *Agricola*
Tac *Ann*	Cornelius Tacitus, *Annals*
Tac *Dial*	Cornelius Tacitus, *Dialogus*
Tac *Germ*	Cornelius Tacitus, *Germanicus*
Tac *Hist*	Cornelius Tacitus, *Histories*
TAMS	*Transactions of the Ancient Monuments Society*
UBHJ	*University of Birmingham Historical Journal*
Val Flacc *Argon*	Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica*
VDI	*Vestnick Devres Istorii*
Veg	Vegetius, *De re militari*
Verg *Aen*	Vergil, *Aeneid*
Verg *Georg*	Vergil, *Georgics*
Xiph	Xiphilinus, *Epitome of Dio*

Introduction

It may be argued that a work on Roman Britain without extensive archaeological references is incomplete, for the accumulating evidence from the ground and from the air is creating an ever clearer picture of the history of Roman Britain. However, this thesis concentrates on the literary evidence for without the evidence of literature, there would be no characters, events or places around which to base the archaeology. Furthermore, there is a growing tendency to rely on the finds and to pass over the literature when, in fact, this is the primary source of evidence and archaeology often has no meaning until related to an event in literature. Here then we focus attention on the three main sources for Roman Britain between 39 and 84, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius. The investigation considers how they portray the history of the province, the type of language they use, the effect that this would have had upon the listener and its accuracy. Where necessary the sources are compared and contrasted within the work's chronological framework. An important secondary level of enquiry is the work of modern historians which relates to the relevant passages. To aid the reader through the text there is a series of maps, the first of which displays the tribes of Roman Britain and their known or probable tribal capitals and the remainder showing the movements of the Roman army and the main sites (including the position of forts) under successive governors. Since these are not of prime importance to the thesis, they are included in Appendix 4.

The first author, Publius Cornelius Tacitus, is our most important source for Roman Britain. This is largely due to his first work, the *Agricola*, which was composed between late 97 and early 98 A.D. The work is basically a biography of his father-in-law, Iulius Agricola, a governor of Britain, probably from 77 to 84. The bulk of the work, however, concerns Britain and the governorship of Agricola and for this reason is a crucial source. The *Agricola* was followed a few years later by the *Histories*, written around 105-108, a work which contains several references to Britain but is not as important as the *Annals* which may have been

left unfinished at the death of Tacitus in 117. This work holds two essential passages concerning events in Britain between 47 and 58;[1] the governorship of Suetonius Paulinus, and the revolt of Boudica,[2] undoubtedly the missing books (six to ten) referred to the Claudian invasion and the early history of the province. The work of Tacitus is concerned with grand themes, in particular that of *libertas*,[3] which finds scope for display in his British sections. He also concerns himself with the motives, intentions and states of mind of his leading characters in a way that our second source, Suetonius, does not.[4]

As a source for Roman Britain, Suetonius is probably the least important of the three here. He was a contemporary of Tacitus and composed *The Lives of the Twelve Caesars*, biographies of the rulers of Rome from Julius Caesar to Titus, probably around 119 to 122. Suetonius is far more forthcoming in his *Lives* than Tacitus regarding the more picturesque details of character.[5] He does not narrate in an annalistic manner but by heading with examples, so there is no clear chronology but by this method he is able to create clear character sketches of his leading players. The style of his narrative is similar to the modern day 'gossip' columns and as such his anecdotal stories add colourful details to the history of Roman Britain.

The third ancient author, Dio Cassius Cocceianus, unlike Tacitus and Suetonius, wrote in Greek. He commenced research for his *History* in 197, almost a century later. It took him ten years to collect his material before he went through it once more and began writing, which took another twelve years. This, as F. Millar states, probably accounts for much of the vagueness of his work and 'for his failure to achieve any effective analysis of events'.[6] Dio, like Tacitus, wrote annalistically but without the same insight. His work, for the most part, is a collection of facts and for this reason he found favour with the Byzantine

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1 Tac *Ann*, 12.31-40.
2 *Ibid.*, 14.29-39.
3 A. Cook, 'Scale and psychological stereotyping in Tacitus' *Annals*', *Maia* n.s. 38 (1986), 238.
4 See M. Grant, *The Twelve Caesars*, 11; A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Suetonius*, Preface.
5 *Ibid.*
6 F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio*, 32.

historians who used him as a source book,[7] but his epitomators of this period, such as Xiphilinus, left out much of what Dio considered to be important, concentrating on the more colourful episodes in his work.[8] It is important to bear in mind when considering Dio that missing or jumbled facts may be the fault of his epitomator rather than his own. However, Dio does have a tendency to descend to 'puerile anecdotes and catalogues of omens'.[9] His speeches are often lengthy (as in the instance of Boudica) and his battle scenes are often totally rhetorical. The historian is thus susceptible to criticism[10] and any consideration of his work has to be undertaken with care. One of the aims of this thesis, therefore, is to show that Dio, who is not valued highly enough by modern historians, has a major role at least in providing essential facts relating to Romano-British history.

7 *Ibid.*, 72.

8 N. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium*, 179.

9 *CAH* 10.876.

10 M. Rheinhold, 'In praise of Cassius Dio', *L'Antiquité Classique* 55 (1986), 213.

Chapter 1: Prelude: The Emperor Gaius' 'British Expedition'

The Emperor Gaius, or Caligula as he is sometimes known from the military boots that he used to wear as a boy,[1] came to power in March 37 A.D. on the death of his adoptive father, Tiberius. His accession was greeted with joy by the Roman people,[2] who believed that, after the final tyrannical years of the reign of Tiberius, Gaius would breathe fresh life into Rome. However, Gaius was only twenty-five when he gained the supremacy, and soon showed a youthful extravagance, squandering the 2700 million sesterces bequeathed to him by Tiberius within one year.[3] Also during this first year Gaius suffered a serious illness, after which his behaviour became increasingly erratic, until in January 41 Gaius was murdered in a coup supported by his own praetorian guard.[4]

As was customary with an emperor who had been murdered, there arose a significant anti-Gaian tradition, and the positive points of his reign are frequently overshadowed by its negative side. For instance, the principal source, Suetonius, devotes nine chapters to 'Gaius as Emperor',[5] and thirty-nine to 'Gaius as monster'.[6] The account of Gaius' life found in Dio Cassius is equally harsh, for he, too, concentrates on Gaius' negative points.[7] However, as Philo's *Embassy to Gaius* clearly shows, there was ample truth in the criticisms made of Gaius. It is evident, even to Gaius' most ardent apologist, that his reign was marked by irresponsibility, perhaps due to the megalomania arising from the corruption of power assumed at too early an age; or, more radically, to the madness caused by his debilitating illness. Certainly care must be taken with the stories that are found in the anti-Gaian tradition, since they are liable to fabrication and alteration in order to create a more

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1 Tac *Ann*, 1.41; Suet *Cal*, 9.
2 Suet *Cal*, 13.
3 *Ibid.*, 37.
4 *Ibid.*, 58.
5 *Ibid.*, 13-21.
6 *Ibid.*, 22-49.
7 Dio, 59 *passim*.

adverse picture of the man. One such tale is that concerning Gaius' so-called 'British Expedition'.

In his *Life of Caligula*, Suetonius relates: *quasi perpetraturus bellum, directa acie in litore Oceani ac ballistis machinisque dispositis, nemine gnaro aut opinante quidam coepturus esset.*[8] The 'war' referred to here would seem to apply to the activities of Gaius in Germany narrated in chapters 44-45. Dio supports this view: ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐκεῖσε τῶν μὲν πολεμίων οὐδένα ἐκάκωσεν (εὐθύς τε γὰρ ὀλίγον ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ῥήνου προχωρήσας ὑπέστρεψε, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁρμήσας ὡς καὶ ἐς τὴν βρεττανίαν στρατεύσων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ ἀνεκομίσθη ...[9] Unlike Suetonius, Dio refers directly to Britain and considers that Gaius was considering an invasion of Britain. He reiterates this idea at 59.25.2: ἐς δὲ τὸν ὠκεανὸν ἐλθὼν ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ βρεττανίᾳ στρατεύσων.

Importantly, Tacitus supports the proposal that Gaius was intending to invade Britain: *agitasse Gaium Caesarem de intranda Britannia satis constat.*[10] This view, however, has been disputed. R. Davies dismisses the evidence of Tacitus: 'That statement, however, comes in the *Agricola* where Tacitus is not renowned for telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth'.[11] He considers that Gaius' activities indicate a continuation of his manoeuvres in Germany and that an invasion of Britain was never envisaged.[12] This is possible, but to understand the scenario there must first be a review of the factors which would have influenced Gaius to consider an invasion and, also, of the circumstances surrounding his arrival at the coast.

In 39 Gaius found himself becoming increasingly unpopular with the Senate and people of Rome as he attempted to establish himself as an absolute monarch. Therefore, he needed something that would boost his waning popularity and, ultimately, ensure his survival.

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8 Suet *Cal*, 46.1.
9 Dio, 59.21.3.
10 Tac *Agr*, 13.2.
11 R. Davies, 'The "abortive invasion" of Britain by Gaius', *Historia* 15 (1966), 125.
12 *Ibid.*, 128.

The simplest way to achieve this would be by way of military glory. As the son of Germanicus and possessing the Julian name, there was a need for him to emulate his father and to rival the great Julius Caesar. One area in which this glory could be gained was in Britain.

There were distinct advantages in attacking this remote island. Britain was closely linked with Druidism,[13] a movement which exerted considerable influence amongst the Gallic tribes and which caused affront to Roman civilisation, since its barbaric rites included human sacrifice. Britain also provided a safe haven for Gallic and German dissidents.[14] Moreover, there was now a strong trade link between Britain and Rome, and the opportunities for wealth (gold, silver, lead, tin, pearls and other commodities were to be found there[15]) provided an admirable pretext to invade. In addition, the flight of British kings to Rome, like clients seeking protection from their patron, could justify Roman interference.[16]

In September 39, however, Suetonius records that Gaius suddenly conceived the idea of a German 'expedition'.[17] Levies were held *ubique acerbissime*, and the march north was so rapid (*tam festinanter et rapide*) that the praetorian cohorts had to lay their standards on their pack animals. At times Gaius had to be carried in a litter, and he required the inhabitants of the towns through which he passed to sweep the dusty roads and sprinkle them with water. These were procedures designed to make the journey swifter and more comfortable. A march to Germany is not surprising, since this had been the scene of Germanicus' exploits and it was there that Gaius had been reared, amongst the legions of the Rhine garrison. He might expect to find unswerving loyalty from the troops there. The urgency of Gaius' journey, following the anti-Gaian tradition, might be put down to the

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13 Caes *BGall*, 6.13.
14 *Ibid.*, 2.14; 3.8.
15 Strabo, 4.5.1.
16 Augustus, *Res Gestae*, 32. Cf. Adminius, Suet *Cal*, 44; Verica, Dio, 60.19.1.
17 Suet *Cal*, 43: *expeditionis Germanicae impetum cepit*.

workings of an irrational mind. Closer inspection of the ancient sources, however, reveals a rather different story.

At this time the legate of Lower Germany was Gaius' brother-in-law, Lepidus. His opposite number in Upper Germany was Gnaeus Lentulus Gaetulicus. In his *Life of Claudius* Suetonius refers to the mutiny of these two men on the Rhine.[18] Dio supports this by stating, under the events of the year 39, that Gaius put to death Gnaeus Lentulus Gaetulicus who had been legate of Upper Germany for ten years.[19] In the same chapter he also notes the death of Lepidus. Elsewhere, Suetonius mentions the proposal of Vespasian that the conspirators' bodies should be cast out unburied and that special games should be held in honour of the Emperor's victory[20] (where *victoria Germanica* refers not to a German victory but rather to victory over the conspiracy — another example of distortion due to the anti-Gaian tradition). If news of a conspiracy had arrived at Rome, this would explain Gaius' haste to reach Germany. His position at this time was very weak, and he would have wished to crush any resistance to his authority in the shortest time possible.

The evidence suggests, however, that an expedition had been planned some time before this. For Suetonius states that Gaius had assembled legionaries and auxiliaries from all quarters with the utmost strictness.[21] Dio claims that, in fact, some 200,000, or, as some maintained, 250,000 troops had been raised.[22] Despite this obvious exaggeration (more than double the number of men in the Rhine army), a vast conglomeration of soldiers is clearly implied. This then does not agree with the hastily-conceived plan that is found in Suetonius. Such a large force would have required some time to bring together. J. Balsdon has shown that it is likely that two new legions, the Fifteenth and Twenty-Second *Primigeniae*, were created by Gaius at this time.[23] This would suggest that Gaius had a

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18 Suet *Cl*, 9.1.
19 Dio, 59.22.5-6.
20 Suet *Vesp*, 2.
21 Suet *Cal*, 43.1.
22 Dio, 59.22.1.
23 J. Balsdon, 'Notes concerning the principate of Gaius', *JRS* 24 (1934), 13-16.

major expedition planned and that he had a well-formulated strategy. It would have been dangerous for an emperor in his precarious position to raise fresh troops if he had nothing for them to do. Since they would not have been required for the suppression of the mutiny, Gaius must have raised them for some other purpose.

In *Caligula* 44, Suetonius refers to the dismissal of generals and of a review of the legions on the Rhine during which some veterans and centurions were discharged. There is a sense of a new policy with regard to the legions situated in Germany. Gaetulicus had been replaced with Servius Sulpicius Galba (later emperor in 68), a man renowned for his strict discipline.[24] The new legate of Lower Germany was Publius Gabinius Secundus, also a harsh disciplinarian. The review of the legions and these appointments seem to demonstrate that discipline was poor amongst the Rhenish troops, as, indeed, a later passage of Suetonius referring to Galba's German command would appear to verify: *Disce miles militare: Galba est, non Gaetulicus.*[25] Certainly eight years later the excellent commander Corbulo also had difficulties with the soldiers of the Lower Army.[26]

It is possible that the amassing of a great number of troops meant that Gaius had intended to campaign in Germany in order to emulate his father, but on arrival in Germany he found an ill-disciplined and demoralised army. The veteran troops needed to be restored to a state of good discipline, and, furthermore, the new levies had to be thoroughly trained. Clearly he would not have planned to campaign until the following year, since his march north had been precipitated by the conspiracy of Lepidus and Gaetulicus. As it was now too late in the season to conduct a campaign anyway, Gaius may have decided to indulge in manoeuvres designed to restore the discipline of the army. This proposal may explain the peculiar events that Suetonius and Dio relate. Indeed, the former seems to contradict himself, for in his *Life of Galba*, Suetonius notes that Galba walked on foot beside the

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24 Tac *Hist*, 1.49; Suet *Gal*, 6.
25 Suet *Gal*, 6.
26 Tac *Ann*, 11.18; 13.35.

Emperor's chariot for twenty miles whilst directing *manoeuvres*,[27] which suggests something rather different to the story related in Suetonius, *Caligula* 44 and the implication of Tacitus: *ni et ingentes adversus Germaniam conatus frustra fuissent*.[28] It was perhaps during these manoeuvres that a permanent bridge was built across the Rhine.[29]

Shortly afterwards, in the spring of 40, Gaius turned his attention to the Channel shore. As already observed, he may have been thinking of an invasion of Britain and he may have felt that, after a winter engaged in training exercises, his men were ready for such an undertaking. Certainly, if he had not considered this possibility earlier while in Germany, Gaius had been given the perfect pretext as Suetonius records: *nihil autem amplius quam Adminio Cynobellini Britannorum regis filio, qui pulsus a patre cum exigua manu transfugerat, in deditionem recepto, quasi universa tradita insula, magnificas Romam litteras misit*.[30] The late D. Allen has shown that Adminius is to be identified with the Amminus whose name occurs on some coins of this period.[31] The surrender of a foreign chief was always a significant event, as may be observed from the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*[32] and the Arch of Claudius,[33] since it provided an opportunity to establish a pro-Roman power base in a foreign country, and diplomacy was preferable to war in order to extend the Roman Empire. The attack by Suetonius on the contents of the letter sent to Rome almost certainly arises from the anti-Gaian tradition. It may have been no more than a letter stating that Gaius had received the submission of a British prince and requesting that the Senate should recognise him as 'a friend and ally of Rome'.

Where Gaius actually assembled his men is not explicitly stated by any source. The usual assumption is that he must have marched south to Boulogne. This was where Julius Caesar

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27 Suet *Gal*, 6.
28 Tac *Agr*, 13.2
29 J. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, 81.
30 Suet *Cal*, 44.
31 D. Allen, 'Did Adminius strike coins?', *Brit* 7 (1976), 96-100.
32 Augustus, *Res Gestae*, 32.
33 *CIL* 6.920 (= *ILS* 216).

had launched his invasion[34] and from where Claudius would later sail.[35] At this time it was also an important point of departure for traders to Britain. One vital piece of evidence is found in Suetonius recording the construction of a lighthouse: *et in indicium victoriae altissimam turrem excitavit, ex qua ut Pharo noctibus ad regendos navium cursus ignes emicarent.*[36] F. d'Erce has shown that evidence of a pharos had existed at Boulogne up until the Seventeenth Century,[37] and indeed, the original Roman building[38] had been used as a lighthouse until the Sixteenth Century. It was originally considered to have been erected by Julius Caesar,[39] but the literary evidence would seem to point to its construction by Gaius.[40] P. Bicknell, however, rejects this suggestion.[41] He argues that the phrase *quasi perpetraturus bellum* found in Suetonius should refer to the German war and must mean that Gaius' theatre of operations was the coast of Lower Germany.[42] In support of this, he quotes Suetonius, *Caligula* 48, where he mentions that Gaius intended to put to death the legionaries who had besieged the headquarters of their general, Germanicus, on the death of Augustus. The legions involved had been the First, Fifth, Twentieth and Twenty-First.[43] In addition, Bicknell argues that the lighthouse would have been built at the mouth of the Rhine, at the end of a trade route from Britain.[44] There are flaws in these arguments, however.

E. Phillips has stated that if Gaius' intention was to invade Britain, then Suetonius' phrase *quasi perpetraturus bellum* would be based on a misconception, deliberate or otherwise, of Gaius' intentions, and 'his [Suetonius'] connection of the episode on the coast with a German "war" is erroneous',[45] since it would not make sense if Gaius' plan to invade

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34 Caes *BGall*, 5.2.
35 Suet *Cl*, 17.
36 Suet *Cal*, 46.
37 F. d'Erce, 'La tour de Caligula à Boulogne sur mer', *RevArch* 1 (1966), 95.
38 *Ibid.*, 94.
39 *Ibid.*, 89, quoting Wace, *Roman de Brut.*
40 *Ibid.*, 96.
41 P. Bicknell, 'The Emperor Gaius' military activities in A.D. 40', *Historia* 17 (1968), 502.
42 *Ibid.*, 503.
43 Tac *Ann*, 1.31 ff.
44 P. Bicknell, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 17 (1968), 503.
45 E. Phillips, 'The Emperor Gaius' abortive invasion of Britain', *Historia* 19 (1970), 370.

Britain were part of the German 'war'. Furthermore, only twelve ancient phari[46] are known, and evidence for these has, for the most part, survived into fairly recent times, even in the case of the more rudimentary examples such as the two at Dover. Obviously there is a temptation to equate the Boulogne pharos with the constructions of a Claudian date at Dover, but the literary evidence would seem to weigh against this. The Boulogne pharos could then be seen to have shown the way to Claudius. Lastly, the reference to the legions which had besieged Germanicus does not necessarily exclude Gaul. As Balsdon has argued,[47] it is probable that Gaius' invasion plans made use of the First, Second and Fifth legions, leaving legions Twenty to Twenty-Two in Lower Germany and Thirteen to Sixteen in Upper Germany. Since two of the four legions involved in 14 were with Gaius, this reference could be to them since Suetonius is very vague at this point. It must be concluded, therefore, that the evidence points towards Boulogne as the site of Gaius' strange activities.

On arrival at the coast Suetonius records what happened after the men arranged their siege weapons on the shore: *directa acie in litore Oceani ac ballistis machinisque dispositis, nemine gnaro aut opinante quidnam coepturus esset, repente ut conchas legerent galeasque et sinus replerent imperavit, 'spolia Oceani' vocans 'Capitolio Palatioque debita', et in indicium victoriae altissimam turrem excitavit, ex qua ut Pharo noctibus ad regendos navium cursus ignes emicarent.*[48] Dio's account differs slightly: καὶ πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἐν τῇ ἠόνι παρατάξας, τριήρους τε ἐπέβη καὶ ὀλίγον ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπάρας ἀνέπλευσε, και μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ βήματος ὑψηλοῦ ἱζήσας καὶ σύνθημα τοῖς στρατιώταις ὡς ἐς μάχην δούς, τοῖς τε σαλπικταῖς ἐξοτρύνας αὐτούς, εἶτ'ἐξαίφνης ἐκέλευσέ σφισι τὰ κογχύλια συλλέξασθαι. λαβών τε τὰ σκῦλα ταῦτα (καὶ γὰρ λαφύρων δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπινικίων πομπὴν ἐδεῖτο) μέγα τε ἐφρόνησεν ὡς καὶ τὸν ὠκεανὸν

46 F. d'Erce, *op. cit., RevArch* 1 (1966), 91.
47 J. Balsdon, *op. cit., JRS* 24 (1934), 15.
48 Suet *Cal*, 46.

αὐτὸν δεδουλωμένος, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις πολλὰ ἐδωρήσατο. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην τὰ κογχύλια ἀνεκόμισεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐκείνοις τὰ λάφυρα δείξῃ.[49]

Both authors refer to the marshalling of troops on the shore and to the picking up of sea-shells. The whole episode is a confused but intriguing one. The accounts are in keeping with the vision of a mad emperor who suddenly gives an order to pick up sea-shells. In Suetonius this order is abrupt. Dio, however, states that, immediately prior to this, Gaius gave the signal 'as if for battle' (ὡς ἐς μάχην). Balsdon offered an ingenious solution to these confused accounts.[50] He argued that the *conchae* referred to by Suetonius were in fact a misrepresentation of the *musculi* mentioned in his original source. These *musculi*, he argued, were 'sappers' huts',[51] and Suetonius had already referred to *ballistis machinisque dispositis*. This would then mean that the order given in Dio would, in fact, have been an order to the men to pack these up. Bicknell, however, rejects this argument.[52] He claims that these were minor siege weapons, and it was hardly likely that Gaius would give such an insignificant order personally.[53] In a later article he argues more convincingly that the common source for the sea-shell incident was 'in all probability the consular, Cluvius Rufus'[54] who would have had military experience and who would not make such a mistake. However, Cluvius Rufus need not have made the error. For *musculus* can also mean 'sea mussel',[55] a shell-fish commonly found on the beaches of Western Europe. Not knowing its technical usage, or deliberately distorting the truth, Suetonius used *concha* instead. Another explanation of this episode was offered by R. Davies who argued that the accounts of Gaius' activities on the coast indicate a continuation of his German manoeuvres.[56] He suggests that the shells were used in the same way as clods of earth were to simulate a

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49 Dio, 59.25.2-3.
50 J. Balsdon, *op. cit.*, *JRS* 24 (1934), 18; *The Emperor Gaius*, 92.
51 *Idem.*, following T. Rice-Holmes, *C. Iulii Commmentarii Rerum in Gallia Gestarum VII.*
52 P. Bicknell, 'Gaius and the seashells', *Acta Classica* 5 (1962), 73.
53 *Idem.*
54 P. Bicknell, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 17 (1968), 500.
55 Lewis and Short, 1179, *s.v. musculus* II.A.2.
56 R.Davies, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 15 (1966), 126.

missile attack.[57] However, as Phillips has pointed out, few shells would have been heavy enough to throw very far, and both sources clearly regard the shells as booty.[58] Bicknell in his conclusion argues that the version of events found in the sources should be accepted since Tacitus refers to the *ludibrium* of the German expedition,[59] and this *ludibrium* is clearly the sea-shell incident related by Suetonius and Dio. However, whether Gaius did this through madness or for another reason is not made clear.

Dio states that Gaius travelled a short way from the shore in a trireme. Suetonius does not directly attest this event but says in *Caligula* 47: *praecepit etiam triremis, quibus introierat Oceanum, magna ex parte itinere terrestri Romam devehi.* This does not seem to fit with any interpretation of the events as manoeuvres, unless the men were landing from the ships with the artillery on the shore firing over their heads. This is a nonsensical scenario, since the Britons would not have had this kind of artillery. One possibility, in keeping with Gaius' deranged mind, would be, as Bicknell suggests, that Gaius wanted to be seen as the conqueror of the Ocean.[60] Suetonius[61] and Dio[62] both state that he would sometimes regard himself as Jupiter, and, therefore, here he might wish to chastise the waters of his brother Neptune, just as Xerxes has once done.[63] This would have been in keeping with the elation that he is supposed to have shown, after riding over the 'Bridge of Baiae'.[64] Another, more rational, suggestion proposed by Balsdon was that the troops were arranged on the shore in preparation for departure[65] but they then refused to embark. In order to prove to them that there was nothing to be afraid of, Gaius himself sailed out into the sea. This is not an unlikely scenario, since the Romans had a great fear of the Ocean, and Britain was an island shrouded in myth, as a passage from Tacitus' *Annals* 2.24,

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57 *Ibid.*, 127; Onasander, 10.4.
58 E. Phillips, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 19 (1970), 373.
59 See Tac *Germ*, 37.5; *Hist.* 14.15.3.
60 P. Bicknell, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 5 (1962), 73.
61 Suet *Cal*, 52.
62 Dio, 59.26.5.
63 Herodotus, 7.35.
64 Suet *Cal*, 19; Dio, 59.17.
65 J. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, 90.

describing the vicissitudes of Germanicus' sailors, shows: *ut quis ex longinquo revenerat, miracula narrabant, vim turbinum et inauditas volucris, monstra maris, ambiguas hominum et beluarum formas, visa sive ex metu credita.*[66] Moreover, as seen above, the troops were ill-disciplined and demoralised. Even three years later, in 43, Aulus Plautius had difficulty in persuading his troops to embark and had to call on Claudius to send help.[67] If this argument is accepted, then the command to pick up shells could mean either of two things. Firstly, when the troops refused to embark they were ordered to pack up their equipment (if *conchae* = *musculi*), or, secondly, this might have been a means to humiliate the troops, either that they might be persuaded to embark, or heavily sarcastic, implying that this was the only booty that the men were likely to gain from this expedition. Dio's reference to a high dais would then be in keeping with a general's review of his troops before departure.

After this episode Suetonius states: *pronuntiatoque militi donativo centenis viritim denariis, quasi omne exemplum liberalitatis supergressus: 'abite,' inquit, 'laeti, abite locupletes'*.[68] He claims that Gaius gave the soldiers 'many presents'.[69] Suetonius then records that Gaius returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.[70] This was not actually true, as Suetonius, again contradicting himself, later reports that, in fact, Gaius celebrated an ovation[71] which was the normal manner for an emperor to celebrate the suppression of a conspiracy. With no foreign success, it seems unlikely that Gaius would have attempted to hold a triumph, considering his weak position at Rome. Once more there is evidence of the anti-Gaian tradition here. The donative given to the soldiers may have been a small reward for their successful completion of their manoeuvres, but it could also have been a

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66 A passage that may derive from a poem by Albinovanus Pedo, a friend of Ovid (see *ex Ponto*, 4.10). Cf. Sen *Suas*, 1.14 for the poem.

67 Dio, 60.19.

68 Suet *Cal*, 46.

69 Dio, 59.25.3.

70 Suet *Cal*, 47.

71 *Ibid.*, 49.

further insult because they had been too frightened to set sail. In support of this is the evidence of Dio: καὶ τοῖς ὑποστρατήγοις τοῖς κατορθοῦσι τι πάνυ ἤχθετο.[72]

The reason he became angry was because he had not been able to gain a triumph since the men would not set sail. He, therefore, vented his anger on the generals of the legions who had done well in Germany in partially restoring the discipline of the troops but who had then failed to persuade them to embark.

In conclusion, Gaius had wished to invade Britain, but on arrival at the coast, despite a period of manoeuvres in Germany, his men were still too demoralised to want to set sail for a foreign land. Therefore, he had insulted them with an order to pick up shells (or to pack up their equipment) and a very small donative. Importantly, however, Gaius had shown the way forward to an invasion of Britain. Two new legions had been raised, leaving a surplus of troops within the Empire. He had built an impressive pharos at Boulogne, marking it as a major port. The legions on the Rhine were being disciplined once more under two of the strictest taskmasters. The arrival of Adminius had provided the perfect pretext for intervention and set a precedent when three years later Verica approached Claudius. The plans had been laid. All that was needed was an emperor of sufficient calibre to carry them out.

72 Dio, 59.21.3.

Chapter 2: The Claudian Invasion

The only ancient source that recounts the invasion of Britain in 43 in full is Dio.[1] Added details, however, may be gleaned from Suetonius (whose main entry concerning the invasion is fairly dismissive),[2] and, also, from Tacitus, Josephus and Eutropius.

Dio's account commences with the reason for the invasion: Βέρικος γάρ τις ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κατὰ στάσιν ἔπεισε τὸν Κλαύδιον δύναμιν ἐς αὐτὴν πέμψαι.[3] Here, ἔπεισε is evidently the key word in the passage. Dio regards Berikos as the *main* reason for the invasion, and, if we take this sentence alone, as the *sole* reason.

Suetonius, on the other hand, presents alternative motives for Claudius' decision to invade: *Cum decretis sibi a senatu ornamentis triumphalibus leviorem maiestati principali titulum arbitraretur velletque iusti triumphi decus unde adquireret Britanniam potissimum elegit neque temptatam ulli post Divum Iulium et tunc tumultuantem ob non redditos transfugas.*[4] The thought uppermost in Suetonius' mind is that Claudius wished to invade purely for personal reasons — he desired his own honourable triumph. Secondary reasons are inherent in Suetonius' succeeding words. An invasion of Britain had not been attempted since Julius Caesar and, therefore, there was a desire to surpass the achievements of a great general. Also, at that time, Britain was in a 'disturbed' state (*tumultuantem*) because some deserters had not been returned.

It has been the practice of modern historians to incline towards Suetonius' suggestion that Claudius was primarily concerned with his own personal glory in order to consolidate his

1 Dio, 60.19-23.
2 Suet *Cl*, 17.
3 Dio, 60.19.1.
4 Suet *Cl*, 17.

position as emperor.[5] Claudius had only held one office of state — the consulship in 37 — and had been promoted to this position through the capricious whim of his nephew, Gaius, who sought to ridicule his uncle at every turn. Moreover, Claudius had a hunchback and spoke with a lisp. Affected by an illness in his youth, which had temporarily retarded his physical and mental growth, he had been shunned even by members of his own family. As a result, all his life to this point, he had spent reclusively in the imperial library. Furthermore, Claudius had suddenly and unexpectedly been launched into the position of emperor after the disturbed final years of Tiberius' reign and the débâcle of Gaius, even though the latter had possessed the 'magical' Julian name.

A. Momigliano has pointed out that Mauretania and Britain were the two possible areas in which Claudius could gain the military success which he so badly needed to ensure his survival,[6] and that, of these, Britain offered 'greater material rewards and greater glory'.[7] To accept Claudius' need for personal military glory as the only real reason for the invasion, and to dismiss Dio's reference to Berikos as a mere pretext, would be simplistic.[8]

Dio's Berikos is almost certainly to be identified with the Verica whose name appears on coins of the Atrebatic tribe (which occupied East Kent and Sussex).[9] For this character to be mentioned at all by Dio, considering the relatively poor knowledge displayed by Roman authors of outlying areas of the Empire, he must have figured quite prominently in the historian's source material.

Verica must have had a rôle of some importance to play in the events preceding the invasion, even if Dio's source here is an official one (e.g. the *acta senatus*). It would, thus, be very easy and convenient to accept that Dio's account represents the official version of

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5 R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 76; B. Levick, 'Antiquarian or revolutionary? Claudius Caesar's conception of his principate', *AJPh* 99 (1978), 99; S. Frere (1987), 45: 'the personal motive behind the invasion must not be underrated'; P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 71: 'this was almost certainly the prime motive'.

6 A. Momigliano, *Claudius*, 54f., followed by M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 63.

7 M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 63.

8 Cf. P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 70; A. Momigliano, *Claudius*, 56.

9 See G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 66; R. Mack, *The Coinage of Ancient Britain*, nos. 127, 131 and 134 especially.

events (which, perhaps, it does). Yet, it should not be supposed that a foreign king, a barbarian, would have been able to *persuade* the ruler of the mighty Roman Empire to do anything.

If Dio's motive is compared with Suetonius' statement: *et tunc tumultuantem ob non redditos transfugas* ('Britain was at that time in a state of upheaval because Rome had refused to send back some deserters'), a slightly different picture emerges. It has been shown that the coin evidence does not display a straightforward division of Britain into its various tribal regions.[10] Boundaries were constantly shifting and changing. This was particularly true at this time following the death of Cunobelinus c. 42. This caused a major upheaval since his sons, Caratacus and Togodumnus, implemented an aggressive anti-Roman strategy.[11] Verica clearly looked to Rome as his benefactor, and perhaps realising that, as a supporter of Rome, his days in Britain were numbered, and that he was being driven out of his kingdom by the imperialistic actions of Caratacus and Togodumnus, he fled to seek Roman protection as a *cliens*. It is probable that Verica took with him a number of pro-Romans, including members of the Catuvellauni tribe, who were no longer welcome under the rule of Cunobelinus' sons. It is, perhaps, to these men that Suetonius alludes in *transfugas*, and that the Catuvellauni wished their return so that they could exact their own punishment. Another possibility is that Caratacus and Togodumnus wanted their brother Adminius, who had fled four years earlier[12] with a small band of men, (*exigua manu*), to be returned. Another interpretation of *transfuga*, is 'one who has escaped from custody'[13] rather than just 'runaway' or 'deserter'. In which case, the Catuvellauni (presumably) wanted their captives returned, and these may have included Verica.

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10 D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 43ff.; C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 53ff.

11 This does not necessarily mean that Cunobelinus had been pro-Roman, only that his policy was rather more passive, adopting Roman culture in order to use it against them. See C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 54; R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 74-75 and 78.

12 Suet *Cal*, 44.3.

13 See *OLD*, 1964, s.v. *transfuga*.

In the event, Claudius refused to return the men in question. It is difficult to understand why this event should produce a state of 'upheaval' in Britain. *tumultuantem* can also have the meaning of 'being in a state of unrest' in the sense of a disturbance against public order. The implication then is that the Britons were at odds with each other because of the pro- and anti-Roman factions, and this would support Dio's use of στάσις (translated as 'internal revolt'). P. Salway seems to adopt this view, noting that this event 'pointed to an opportune moment for attack when the Britons were disunited'.[14] S. Frere, however, following I. Richmond, suggests that *tumultuantem* implies that there was some opposition to Rome, stating that 'the flight of Verica was followed by an impudent demand for his extradition; and when it was not complied with disturbances broke out'.[15] If *tumultuantem* does suggest a state of armed unrest directed against Rome, then a possible interpretation would be that the Britons replied to Claudius' refusal to return the hostages with a hostile message. Yet C. Hawkes' statement that 'the reply from Britain was a threat of armed reprisals'[16] seems too strong, and is, perhaps, influenced by the infamous extermination of Roman citizens by Jugurtha[17] or Mithridates.[18] The Catuvellauni were in no position to threaten Rome, and, surely, Caratacus would have been intelligent enough to realise this. It is possible, however, that trading was disrupted, perhaps even to the extent of forcing Roman traders out of Britain. It is unlikely that their execution was threatened,[19] because such an example of impudence would not have gone unpunished by the Romans and, after his capture in 52, Caratacus was pardoned and allowed to live.

Frere suggests that Verica's arrival in Rome at this time 'presented more than an excuse for intervention: failure to take action now would be damaging to Roman prestige already tarnished by the failure of Gaius'.[20] This is not altogether a convincing view. The Romans

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14 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 70.
15 S. Frere (1987), 45; I. Richmond, *Roman Britain*, 18, referring to raids on the Gallic coast.
16 C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 56.
17 Cf. Sall *Iug*, 26.
18 Cf. App *Mith*, 22.
19 R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 78.
20 S. Frere (1987), 45.

would not be swayed so easily. Gaius had already shown Claudius the way forward. Two new legions, the XV and XXII *Primigeniae*, had probably been raised by Gaius and, therefore, there was a surplus of troops within the Empire in 43 which either had to be disbanded (a risky proposition), or deployed elsewhere.

Modern historians have looked beyond the words of Dio and Suetonius for a more balanced view concerning Claudius' reasons for invading Britain, considering factors such as the economics of the time and pressure from influences not recorded by our sources.[21] These suggestions may be briefly noted.

Britain had become an important centre of trade, but, as Momigliano states, during the reign of Claudius there had been a hardening of British resistance to the domination of Rome. It is highly unlikely that the decline of trade with Britain was 'enough to determine Claudius to invade'.[22] For, although Britain was rich in gold and silver, timber, cattle and other commodities,[23] and the output of British silver was such that the Spanish mine-workers later became concerned that the island's output would surpass that of the Spanish mines,[24] it is unlikely that enough revenue was produced to support four legions and an equivalent number of auxiliaries.

V. Scramuzza has suggested that Druidism was instrumental in bringing about an inevitable invasion because of its baneful influence in Gaul and in Britain: 'It [Druidism] was the chief force thwarting Rome in Gaul'. Frere supports this view, and the emphasis placed on the later subjugation of Anglesey, along with Caesar's testimony to the Druids' origination in Britain,[25] seems to suggest that, at the very least, the Druids possessed considerable

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21 D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 48ff.; R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 76f.; I. Richmond, *Roman Britain*, 18-19; V. Scramuzza, *Claudius*, 200 ff.; S. Frere (1987), 44f.; A. Momigliano, *Claudius*, 54f. *et al.*

22 A. Momigliano, *Claudius*, 57.

23 Strabo, 4.1.2.

24 On Britain's raw metals, see R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, app. 4, 329-335.

25 Caes *BGall*, 6.13.

influence. Hence their eradication would ease the problems that Rome had with Gallic tribes and aid the conquest of Britain.[26]

On a more personal level, it is clear that, in requiring military glory to establish his position as head of the Roman Empire, Claudius, like Gaius before him, was driven by a real desire and need to emulate and to rival his ancestors: his father, Drusus, who had yearned to dominate the North Sea; his brother Germanicus' warlike exploits; and, most importantly, on the Julian side, Julius Caesar who, for all his achievements, had failed to gain a permanent foothold in Britain. Suetonius hints at this in his narrative but does not explicitly give this desire to emulate ancestors as a reason for the invasion,[27] possibly because by leaving the thought unsaid he draws attention to it. Levick emphasises the link with his famous ancestors to show how much Claudius wanted to surpass them, and even points out that Claudius took several elephants to Britain, whereas Caesar had only taken one.[28]

Other factors that influenced Claudius are possible. Salway refers to the problems of preventing British interference in Gallic affairs.[29] This would require a force to be established on the Gallic coast, a costly and, moreover, dangerous exercise, concentrating too many troops in this area and in the hands of one governor. Furthermore, he notes that the two extra legions raised by Gaius posed a problem. Since the concentration of a large number of troops under one man posed a threat to Claudius, it would be far safer to transport them out of harm's reach. Additionally, Scramuzza draws attention to the problem of Roman deserters seeking refuge in Britain and indicates that imperialistic expansion 'at best a secondary motive for the annexation of Britain' played a small part.[30] This, perhaps, underrates the Roman need to conquer, as, indeed, is the case with many modern writers.

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26 V. Scramuzza, *Claudius*, 206.
27 Suet *Cl*, 17.1: *neque temptatem ulli post Divum Iulium ...*
28 B. Levick, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 99 (1978), 99.
29 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 71.
30 V. Scramuzza, *Claudius*, 208-209.

The Roman race took great pride in the expansion of their empire as can be seen in the compositions of the court poets (for example, Horace and Vergil) and in the emphasis placed on Roman victories abroad in the works of historians such as Livy and Tacitus, as well as in the graphic splendour of their triumphs and ovations. Furthermore, the significant words of Vergil, expressing the aim of Roman foreign policy: *parcere subiectos, debellare superbos*,[31] where the *superbos* are comparable to the Greek βάρβαροι, should be considered. In conclusion, this quotation from Momigliano is significant: 'The task of a historian is to determine not why Rome conquered a province but how their pretensions to world rule were carried into effect'.[32]

There were, then, a number of factors which caused Claudius to invade Britain, and it need not be accepted that either Dio's or Suetonius' account, or even the combination of the two contains the definitive answer.

Claudius did desire both military glory and personal fame, as all Romans did. Verica did not *persuade* Claudius, but it is probable that he provided an official pretext for intervention in Britain. Claudius' reaction could well have been: 'Verica is a Roman ally and, therefore, must be protected by Roman arms'. Given that the actual reasons for the invasion were many and varied, it is impossible to pick out one reason and state that *this* was why Claudius invaded. The majority of the reasons would have held good for Gaius as well. The main difference was that in 39 there was no open anti-Roman feeling in Britain, and that the army then was far more demoralised than in 43. Even so, Claudius' men were reluctant to embark: καὶ οὕτως ὁ Πλαύτιος στρατηγήσας τὸ μὲν στράτευμα χαλεπῶς ἐκ τῆς Γαλατίας ἐξήγαγεν.[33] These two lines of Dio have often been cited to support the theory that Claudius had difficulty in persuading his troops to embark, just as Gaius may have had three years previously. That this is a possibility has been seen for the reasons

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31 Verg *Aen*, 6.853.

32 A. Momigliano, *Claudius*, 54.

33 Dio 60.19.2.

discussed previously. However, the fact that there should have been a parallel situation (if, indeed, it was) three years later is still somewhat surprising. Ever since Caesar had first crossed to Britain in 55 B.C., Roman traders had penetrated well into Britain and were exerting a considerable influence, in particular over the tribes of the South-East, as the example of Cunobelinus who styled himself *rex* shows. Yet the Roman troops still believed that they were going on campaign beyond the limits of the inhabited world: ὡς γὰρ ἔξω οἰκουμένης στρατεύσοντες ἠγανάκτουν.[34]

A reason for such an attitude may lie in the fact that they were still a demoralised, ill-disciplined army. The three years since the abortive attempt of Gaius to cross the Channel, without a real campaign, plus the added upheaval of a change of emperor, were probably not enough to discipline such a disordered group of men. As Salway notes, tales of the 'terrors of the Ocean and the mysterious island' had probably affected the troops.[35] Indeed, the importance attached to the 'conquest of the Ocean' may be inferred from Claudius' act of setting up a naval crown on the palace next to the civil crown, thus indicating that he had subdued the very sea.[36] Likewise, Caesar himself had hung up a breastplate studded with pearls in the temple of Venus Genetrix.[37] Further evidence testifying to the Romans' awe of the Ocean may be found in Tacitus[38] and in the *Anthologia Latina*.[39] Scramuzza considers whether the soldiers now felt that they 'had a superstitious belief that they were being pushed to the rim of the world.[40] He concludes that, rationally, the soldiers would not entertain this possibility, for the majority, based near the coast, would know that traders made the voyage to Britain frequently. It is more likely that the troops were testing the mettle of the new emperor. There may well have been a faction which opposed the expedition in principle, or even sought to discredit Claudius by

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34 *Ibid.*
35 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 82.
36 Suet *Cl*, 17.
37 Pliny *NH*, 9.57 (116).
38 Tac *Ann*, 2.24.
39 *Anth Lat*, nos. 419-426; cf. also Cat *Carm*, 29.4; 11.11.
40 V. Scramuzza, *Claudius*, 211.

thwarting his plans. But, doubtlessly, there were many who recalled the failure of Caesar to gain a foothold in Britain, and that, even Augustus, after some consideration, had rejected the idea of invasion. There was also the most recent débâcle of Gaius, at which some of these troops would have been present, Claudius' wisdom in undertaking a full-scale invasion must have been seriously doubted.

Only the arrival of Narcissus caused a change of heart: πρὶν τὸν Νάρκισσον ... ἀναβῆναί τε ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλαυτίου βῆμα καὶ δημηγορῆσαί τι ἐθελῆσαι· τότε γὰρ πολλῷ που μᾶλλον ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀχθεσθέντες οὔτε τι ἐκείνῳ εἰπεῖν ἐπέτρεψαν, συμβοήσαντες ἐξαίφνης τοῦτο δὴ τὸ θρυλούμενον 'ἰὼ σατουρνάλια' ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τοῖς Κρονίοις οἱ δοῦλοι τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν σχῆμα μεταλαμβάνοντες ἑορτάζουσι, καὶ τῷ Πλαυτίῳ εὐθὺς ἑκούσιοι συνέσποντο. The soldiers became much more angry with Narcissus. He was an ex-slave, a freedman, without the same rights as the troops, who were Roman citizens.[41] Yet, their angry attitude at being addressed by him soon subsided, according to Dio, into a chorus of 'ἰὼ σατουρνάλια'. The legions now regarded the whole situation as a joke. This abrupt volte-face — Narcissus is not reported to have said anything of note — may have been due to a number of reasons. The troops may have been overcome by a sense of embarrassment and shame because they have been scared of the Ocean and the 'mysterious' island of Britain. Narcissus could well have instilled these feelings in them, for it is probable that he already possessed some influence with the army. For example, it was through his efforts that Vespasian was appointed legate in Germany: *Claudio principe Narcissi gratia legatus legionis in Germaniam missus est.*[42]

Dio states that the expedition was forced to leave late in the season because of this incident. This would seem to imply that the narrative up to this point covers some weeks, and this would certainly have been the case if Narcissus had had to come from Rome. Furthermore, even prior to this, when the order to invade had been given, it would have

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41 Tacitus has a very low opinion of freedmen generally. His version of events may well have attacked Narcissus.

42 Suet *Vesp*, 4.1.

taken some while for all the legions and auxiliaries, plus all the equipment required for such an undertaking, to be assembled. Certainly, Frere's end of April[43] would seem too early when the sailing season did not finish until September; perhaps late June or July would be a more likely time of year if Dio can be trusted.

The advance was in three divisions: τριχῇ δὲ δὴ νεμηθέντες ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἕν περαιούμενοι κολυθῶσι ποι προσσχεῖν.[44] This has caused an enormous amount of controversy as to the exact landing places of the three sections of Plautius' force. Richborough has certainly been identified as suitable for one landing site.[45] The other sites, however, if in fact there was more than one harbour, cannot be identified specifically. Lympne, Dover and even Reculver have suitable sites but only the latter has shown traces of Claudian occupation.[46] Frere, following R. Collingwood and J. Myres, argues that a general would not split his force in the face of the enemy and suggests that other landing spots may point to feints.[47] However, as M. Todd has stated, even a third of, probably, c. 40000 men would have been a sizeable force.[48] Possible landing sites are not confined to Kent, however. Other possibilities are Bosham Harbour, Selsey Bill,[49] Hamworthy near Poole, and Fingringhoe Wick in Essex, and it has been suggested that the Romans could have landed in Hampshire under the friendly eye of Cogidubnus, from whence a force could have marched to Gloucestershire to receive the surrender of the Dobunni.[50] This suggestion has found favour most recently with J. Hind who takes it a step further, claiming that the whole of Plautius' force could have landed at harbours in the Fishbourne area. As he notes, the view that Kent 'was the theatre of operations is an assumption, based on the idea that it is the sole rational line of approach to the Thames

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43 S. Frere (1987), 48. Most authors omit to mention a month.

44 Dio, 60.19.4.

45 See J. Bushe-Fox, *Excavations at the Roman Fort at Richborough. Third Interim Report*, 10-13; *Excavations at the Roman Fort at Richborough. Fourth Interim Report*, 3-5, 11-36.

46 See M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 66.

47 S. Frere (1987), 48; R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 80.

48 See M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 66.

49 Cf. C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 64.

50 B. St. J. O'Neil and H. O'Neil, 'The Roman Conquest of the Cotswolds', *ArchJ* 109 (1952), 23-38; cf. also E. Hübner,'Das Romisches Heer in Britannien', *Hermes* 16 (1881), 527.

from some landing point on the South-East coast'.[51] He proceeds from this to give a plausible scenario of events occurring in Hampshire. Certainly, it would make sense if Verica was being restored to his kingdom, but this fails to take into account the fact that the Roman troops would then be landing in disaffected territory. The sensible commander would take the easy option, landing in the friendly zone of Kent to consolidate his foothold without any risk of supply lines being affected by hostile forces. Furthermore, Hind does not explain why the Romans should embark on a longer journey than necessary when perfectly adequate ports lay virtually opposite Boulogne (from where Suetonius tells us that Claudius set out for Britain),[52] of which Dover was later to be the headquarters of the *Classis Britannica*, and after Claudius had been to Britain a memorial was established at Richborough to commemorate the visit.

The phrase 'in three sections' has thus caused historians to wonder whether this implies landings at three different sites, or at one harbour but in three separate units. An army of 40,000 men would have posed difficulties if disembarkation occurred in the same place, but, on the other hand, there is the argument that Plautius would not split his forces so widely in the face of the enemy. This is a particularly strong argument if the problems that the Romans had previously faced when fighting the Britons, and other foreign foes.[53] It may have been that the troops were disembarked at harbours very close to one another, an argument which would support Hind's proposal for a landing in the Chichester area and would rule out separate landings at, for example, Richborough, Dover and Lympne, for they would be at least a day's march from the nearest assembly point (for example, Canterbury, an assumption based on the meeting of roads there). Another possibility is that a beachhead might have been established at Richborough, and then, the other sections of the invasion force would have followed. This argument is invalidated if we suppose that Kent at this time was friendly towards Rome. Furthermore, Caesar himself when in

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51 J. Hind, 'The invasion of Britain in A.D. 43 — an alternative strategy for Aulus Plautius', *Brit* 20 (1989), 9.

52 Suet *Cl*, 17.2.

53 Cf. Arausio, 105 B.C.; Carrhae, 53 B.C.; the long-lasting success of Mithridates; Caesar's problems in tackling the Britons; the defeat of Varus in A.D. 9.

Britain states *postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit*,[54] and Dio at 62.8.3 states τρίχῃ τε ἔνειμε τὸν στρατὸν, a remarkably parallel turn of phrase. This allusion, therefore, may merely be a rhetorical commonplace.

In his description of the crossing, Dio notes: κἀν τῷ διάπλω τὸ μέν τι δυσφορήσαντες ἐπειδὴ ἐπαλινδρόμησαν, τὸ δὲ ἀναθαρσήσαντες ὅτι λαμπὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν ἀρθεῖσα πρὸς τὰς δυσμὰς ἧπερ ἔπλεον διέδραμε ...[55] Dio's eye for the spectacular is clearly revealed here. Within the balance μέν and δὲ framework, he highlights the appearance of what was, possibly, a shooting star, passing auspiciously from right to left. Its similarity to the experience of William the Conqueror, a thousand years later, has not gone unnoticed.

The Britons, however, had not anticipated the arrival of the Romans. Misled by their information, they had not assembled in advance (οὐ προσυνελέγησαν). A. Burn and S. Frere take δι' ἅπερ ἐπυνθάνοντο to refer to the mutiny of the Roman army,[56] but if the Britons had been keeping such a close check on events on the Continent, then they would certainly have known that the invasion was to go ahead. The Britons would not have wished to meet 40000 trained Roman troops in a pitched battle, but would have preferred the guerrilla tactics which had worked so successfully in the past. Indeed, Dio almost implies this: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τότε ἐς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς ἦλθον, ἀλλ' ἔς τε τὰ ἕλη καὶ ἐς τὰς ὕλας κατέφυγον ...

Dio's narrative is emphatic with the strengthened negative and the force of κατέφυγον. But it is not uncommon for a Roman historian to give little credit to a barbarian race. Caesar had used the phrase *se abdiderant* for the Britons' withdrawal,[57] but the force of the verb is weakened by the words *in superiora loca*. For this reveals that the Britons had

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54 Caes *BGall*, 5.10.

55 Dio, 60.19.4.

56 A. Burn, 'The battle of the Medway in A.D. 43', *History* (June 1953), 105-106, followed by S. Frere (1987), 49.

57 Caes *BGall*, 5, 8.

chosen the most advantageous point. Likewise in 43 this was a deliberate strategy on the part of the Britons: ἐλπίσαντές σφας ἄλλως κατατρίψειν, ὥσθ' ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος τοῦ Ἰουλίου ἐγεγόνει, διὰ κενῆς αὐτοὺς ἀναπλεῦσαι. These words reinforce the conclusions above, although διὰ κενῆς is not strictly true, since Caesar had exacted a tribute.[58] More importantly, he had opened up the way for trade and diplomatic relations with Britain, and from that time British kings are to be found looking to Rome as their ally and guardian.[59]

Dio's account then proceeds: ὁ οὖν Πλαύτιος πολλὰ μὲν πράγματα ἀναζητῶν σφας ἔσχεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ εὗρέ ποτε (ἦσαν δὲ οὐκ αὐτόνομοι αλλ' <ἄλλοι> ἄλλοις βασιλεῦσι προστεταγμένοι), πρῶτον μεν Καράτακον ἔπειτα Τογόδουμνον, Κυνοβελλίνου παῖδας, ἐνίκησεν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐτεθνήκει. φυγόντων δὲ ἐκείνων προσεποιήσατο ὁμολογίᾳ μέρος τι τῶν Βοδούννων, ὧν ἐπῆρχον Κατουελλανοὶ ὄντες, κἀνταῦθα φρουρὰν καταλιπὼν πρόσω ᾔει.[60]

R. Collingwood related that 'Plautius spent the first steps of his campaign marching and countermarching in Kent, in search of an enemy whom he never found'.[61] Dio does not even appear to imply this. Rather Plautius would have sent out scouts, who may have been Britons from local friendly tribes, to seek out Caratacus and Togodumnus who would have concealed themselves either in the thickly forested areas of North and West Kent or, if Hind's version of events is accepted, in the valleys of the Arun, Lavant, Meon and Hamble.[62] Frere follows Burn in regarding these initial defeats as skirmishes before the Britons fell back to the Medway where a united stand had been agreed.[63] Salway suggests that one of these defeats may have been in Hampshire, basing his conjecture on a Roman

58 *Ibid.*, 22.

59 Cf. Dumnobellaunus and Tincommius, Aug *Res Gestae*, 32.1; Amminus (Adminius), Suet *Cal*, 44; Verica (Berikos), Dio, 60.19.

60 Dio, 60.20.1.

61 R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 81.

62 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989), 15.

63 S. Frere (1987), 49.

landing at Chichester.[64] Hind, following his own line of reasoning that the Romans were advancing from the Chichester area, places this action around Winchester and Silchester, the *oppida Venta* and *Calleva* which had been part of Verica's kingdom.[65] The phrase οὐκ αὐτόνομοι possibly describes the situation of the Atrebates (and, conceivably, the Belgae and Regini) better than the Kentish tribes who, as has been stated above, may have been friendly towards Rome, and, hence, not subject to the Catuvellauni, or at least not completely overrun by them.

Dio then relates the surrender of a tribe called the Bodunni. This again has caused much difficulty. For Dio is, apparently, referring to an otherwise unknown British tribe. This has led to the identification of the Bodunni with the Dobunni, a significant tribal group situated in Gloucestershire. Camden first proposed that Dio had made an error in transposing the letters b and d.[66] However, he also notes that the name may be derived from the words *duffen* ('sheep') and *bode* or *bodun* which, as Pliny noted, signified 'deep'.[67] Confusion over the derivation of the name could thus have resulted in a mistake. Another possibility is that a careless scribe transposed the b and d. In favour of the identification of Bodunni with Dobunni is the fact that no other ancient author mentions the former, whereas the latter is known.

However, the identification with the Dobunni brings with it an added complication. For it is difficult to understand why a tribe from Gloucestershire should be in Kent. C. Hawkes attempted to explain this problem, arguing that μέρος need not imply a military detachment of the Dobunni, but rather that a section of the tribe, subject to the Catuvellauni and present at the time, may have surrendered to the Romans.[68] ἐνταῦθα in this instance could be taken to mean 'thereupon' and not 'then' (temporal). However, Hind's hypothesis answers this problem very neatly. If the Romans were already in

64 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 83.
65 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989), 16.
66 W. Camden, *Britannia*, 231.
67 *Idem*.
68 C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 58-62, G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 97.

Hampshire, then a flying column could have dealt with the Dobunni, and a site is even suggested for the fort at Leaholme whose first construction was in the early years of Roman rule and whose approach may have been from Silchester. Hind feels that Dio's account leaves room for the whole army to have moved into this region, but this is unlikely as Plautius would have been primarily concerned with capitalising on his early successes, and probably only a part of his force was sent.[69]

Dio then goes on to report how, in the face of the Roman advance, the Britons had encamped by a certain river, confident that the enemy would not be able to cross: ὡς δ' ἐπὶ ποταμῷ τινι ἐγένοντο ὃν οὐκ ᾤοντο οἱ βάρβαροι δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἄνευ γεφύρας διαβῆναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀμελέστερόν πως ἐπὶ τῆς ὄχθης αὐτοῦ τῆς κατ' ἀντιπέραν ηὐλίζοντο ...[70] The river referred to in this passage must have been a fairly considerable landmark since the Britons believed that the Romans would require a bridge to cross. The consensus of opinion is that the river concerned was the Medway.[71] This could hardly not be the case if the advance was from the Kentish coast, yet Hind offers the River Arun as an alternative.[72] In support of his claim he notes that the River Stour is missing from Dio's account of the advance, although it does occur in Caesar's narrative.[73] Perhaps, too, Hind is influenced by the Arun's ancient name of Trisantona, for this might allow us to accept the reading of *Annals* 12.31 (*cunctaque castris [cis Tris]antonam et Sabrinam fluvios cohibere parat*) as a reference to this river and not necessarily the Trent, although the latter, as the greater river, is more likely. Furthermore, as Hind notes, the name *Trisantona* probably means 'widely flooding one'. Indeed, the Arun was prove to flooding with a flood-plain up to three-quarters of a mile wide. This would present a sufficient obstacle, but not an impossible one for the Romans, employing their Batavian cohorts, to overcome.

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69 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989), 16.
70 Dio, 60.20.2.
71 Only J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989) suggests an alternative to the Medway.
72 *Ibid.*, 17.
73 *Ibid.*

Dio's description of the Britons as encamped 'rather carelessly', although probably an accurate one, reveals the traditional Greek (and to some extent Roman) attitude towards οἱ βάρβαροι who are generally regarded as undisciplined and inferior. But Dio does not give Caratacus and Togodomnus adequate credit. They would have had some knowledge of the Roman army from both Gallic deserters and their own trade links with the Romans. The ability of the Romans to erect bridges in a short space of time was well known.[74]

Plautius, however, decided not to construct a bridge, possibly fearing that he would lose too much time, his efforts being hampered by the Britons. Instead, he sent some Celts (οἱ Κέλτοι) across the river. These were men who, Dio states, were able to swim the swiftest of rivers easily (διὰ τῶν ῥοωδεστάτων ῥᾳδίως) whilst holding onto their weapons. The alliteration combined with a superlative emphasises the point, that this river was one of the 'swiftest' and, hence, most difficult to cross.

M. Hassall has shown that the Celts mentioned here are to be identified with the Batavians,[75] who are specifically mentioned in other sources as possessing the ability to swim across rivers with their equipment.[76] There is no particular difficulty in Dio's use of Κέλτοι, because Germans, amongst whom the Batavi are generally classed,[77] are regularly called Celts by Dio. G. Webster, following Hassall, assigns eight Batavian cohorts to Plautius' army,[78] but Hassall himself makes clear that the evidence for eight cohorts comes from 67.[79] For Nero had sent eight cohorts to Britain after the revolt of Boudica and in 67 he withdrew precisely the same number of Batavian cohorts. Additionally, it is known that Batavians were linked with Legio XIV, one of the four legions that took part in the invasion.[80] Hassall concludes that there were Batavians present in Britain in 43,[81] but

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74 See Caes *BGall*, 4.17.
75 M. Hassall, 'Batavians and the Roman conquest of Britain', *Brit* 1 (1970), 131ff.
76 See Tac *Ann*, 2.8, 17; 4.12; *Agr*, 18.4; Dio, 49.9.6.
77 See Tac *Germ*, 29.
78 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 86, 99.
79 M. Hassall, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 1 (1970), 132-133.
80 See Tac *Hist*, 1.59.
81 M. Hassall, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 1 (1970), 135.

that it should not be assumed that the eight Batavian cohorts of 67 equate with the number of Batavians present in 43.

Dio describes the Roman attack in this way: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς ἐναντίοις προσπεσόντες τῶν μὲν ἀνδρῶν οὐδένα ἔβαλλον, τοὺς δ' ἵππους τοὺς τὰ ἅρματα αὐτῶν ἄγοντας ἐτίτρωσκον ... The phrase παρὰ δόξαν here is not convincing, for if this were the case, then the battle would have been over swiftly. In actual fact, it was to last for two days, an unusual event in ancient times, and reflects credit on the Britons, who, therefore, must have been fairly well-prepared, contrary to Dio's portrayal of them as a careless, inferior force. Clearly παρὰ δόξαν should be taken to mean 'contrary to their expectation', that is, the Britons were surprised that the Romans had actually crossed the river. This had the expected result of causing confusion amongst the British ranks (ταραττομένων σφῶν) as the dead horses became entangled with the now immovable chariots, and for this reason not even the charioteers escaped. One interesting point that arises out of this passage is that British fighting methods had evidently not progressed since the time of Julius Caesar. Chariots had not been used in Gaul for over one hundred years (they had been a new phenomenon even for Caesar[82]), but the Britons were still using them in 43 A.D.

As the next step, Plautius, ἐπιδιέπεμψε τόν τε Οὐεσπασιανὸν τὸν Φλάουιον τὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοκράτορα μετὰ ταῦτα ἀρχὴν λαβόντα, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Σαβῖνον ὑποστρατηγοῦντα οἱ. G. Vrind[83] has thoroughly discussed these lines which seem to imply that Vespasian was superior in rank to his older brother, Sabinus. Since the phrase ὑποστρατηγοῦντα οἱ in other cases would designate a commander subordinate to Plautius himself, Vrind, rather than understanding Vespasian in οἱ, suggests reading ὑποστρατηγοῦντας. This emendation is supported by Xiphilinus, where both brothers are

82 Caes *BGall*, 4.24.33.

83 G. Vrind, *De Cassii Dionis Vocabulis ...*, 90.

regarded as subordinate commanders to Plautius in charge of their own respective legions.[84] In support of this, too, is the fact that, despite his predilection for such details, Dio makes no mention of the brothers' age relationship. Vrind's reading, then, would make logical sense.

As he describes the progress of the brothers, καὶ οὕτω διελθόντες πη καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τὸν ποταμὸν συχνοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ προσδεχομένους ἀπέκτειναν, Dio's strained language seems to reflect the difficulty encountered in crossing the river, and ἐκεῖνοι must refer back to Vespasian and Sabinus since there is no other plural. The words μὴ προσδεχομένους ('taken by surprise'), in turn, seem to be an attempt by Dio to give undue credit to the speed of the Romans. Since he has already informed us that the river as traversed with some difficulty, the crossing itself must have taken some time (especially as there may have been up to 10,000 troops (or two legions) involved), and to some extent the Britons would have been prepared.[85] Although this attack was largely successful, according to Dio, it was evidently not a decisive strike, as the somewhat surprised comment οὐ μέντοι οἱ λοιποὶ ἔφυγον, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑστεραίας αὖθις συμβαλόντες ... reveals. Evidently the resistance put up by the Britons was far stronger than Dio has acknowledged up to this point, for on the following day when they engaged the enemy in battle, for a time, things hung in the balance (ἀγχώμαλα ἀγωνίσαντο).

Dio stresses that it was the courage shown by Hosidius Geta that tipped the balance: πρὶν δὴ Γναῖος Ὁσίδιος Γέτας κινδυνεύσας ἁλῶναι, ἔπειθ' οὕτως αὐτῶν ἐκράτησεν ὥστε καὶ τιμὰς ἐπινικίους, καίπερ οὐχ ὑπατευκὼς λαβεῖν. Γναῖος is Reimar's emendation for Γαῖος.[86] Groag, however, keeps Γαῖος,[87] claiming that Gnaeus and Gaius Hosidius Geta

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84 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 99, adopts this view, but it is refuted by P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 84, who maintains that Vespasian was superior to his brother. S. Frere (1987), 70, suggests that the crossing was under the overall command of Sabinus. A. Burn, *op. cit.*, *History* (June 1953), 112-113, ignores the problem but does state that probably only one legion was sent across — the Second, under Vespasian's command.

85 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 99, following R. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, 83, suggests that there was some sort of outflanking movement.

86 See U. Boissevain, vol. 2, 682, n. 9 (Dio, 60.20.4).

87 See 'Britannia', in *RE* 8.2490.

were two separate men, probably brothers. G. Townend concludes that it is very likely that the text is corrupt at this point and that Reimar was right to alter Gaius to Gnaeus, basing his conclusion on Dio's failure to mention any fraternal relationship.[88] This theory is further reinforced by Dio's reference to the award of *triumphalia ornamenta* to Hosidius 'although he had not been consul'.[89] At this time, normally only consuls received this highest of honours (triumphs being reserved for members of the imperial family). Moreover, Gnaeus Hosidius Geta had already served in Mauretania with some success,[90] and, as Townend notes, Claudius had gathered an 'unusual number of experienced officers'[91] for this expedition.

The British then retreated, as Dio relates, ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τῶν βρεττανῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Ταμέσαν ποταμόν, suggesting that the Britons had a contingency plan if they failed to stop the Romans at the first river. It also implies that the British plan of resistance was well considered, contrary to the implications in Dio's narrative. Intelligently, the Britons withdrew to the Thames[92] in the hope that the Romans could be defeated there. The exact point to which the Britons retired is not easily identifiable, because 'this passage requires a greater knowledge of the topography of the river and its estuary in the mid-first century than it is possible to reconstruct'.[93] Following a line of march from the south-east, Webster has suggested a crossing point at Higham on the south side to East Tilbury on the north,[94] while Frere has suggested somewhere near Westminster.[95] Hind also supports the theory for a site in the region of Southwark to Westminster.[96]

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88 G. Townend, 'Traces in Dio Cassius of Cluvius, Aufidius and Pliny', *Hermes* 89 (1961), 227-248.
89 Dio, 60.20.5.
90 Cf. *ibid.*, 9.1.
91 G. Townend, *op. cit.*, *Hermes* 89 (1961), 232.
92 For the name Thames, see U. Boissevain, s.v. 10.3.1: Ταμῆσα Ptol. 2.3.4 and 11; *Tamesa*, Tac *Ann*, 14.32; *Tamesis*, Caes *BGall*, 5.11..18 (or *Tamesin*) 6.9.6); *Tamesa*, *Geogr Rav*, 428.8.
93 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 101.
94 *Ibid.*
95 S. Frere (1987), 51.
96 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989), 17.

Although Dio does not state it explicitly, the Romans found themselves frustrated by the Britons: οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι επακολουθήσαντές σφισι ταύτῃ μὲν ἐσφάλησαν. They did not know the area and were unable to discover routes through the marshy ground. Perhaps too, a degree of recklessness is hinted at on the part of Plautius, since the area should have been thoroughly reconnoitred first.

Once again the Batavians (τῶν Κελτῶν)[97] were sent across καί τινων ἑτέρων διὰ γεφύρας ὀλίγον ἄνω διελθόντων. An outflanking movement is, thus, suggested by the narrative, and Webster has used this phrase to support his theory of a crossing point at Tilbury.[98] Hind, however, suggests that the rest of the Roman force crossed at *Pontes* (the present day Staines[99]). He claims that Plautius could have sent troops round when his intelligence reported a bridge 'some way (*sic*) up river'. The Greek, however, reads ὀλίγον ἄνω 'a little way' up river, but Staines is approximately fifteen miles away, which is almost a day's march in Roman terms.

The narrative at this point implies a single engagement as had occurred at the earlier river. It would be too much to expect the Romans to undertake such a lengthy march when they could cross the river in exactly the same way as they had done previously. It is also possible that there was no pre-existing bridge. διά merely means 'by way of', and it is, therefore, possible that the Romans themselves built a temporary bridge,[100] as they were equipped to do on campaign.[101] Dio records the Roman success concisely: πολλαχόθεν τε ἅμα αὐτοῖς προσέμιξαν καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν κατέκοψαν.[102]

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97 *Supra*, on Dio, 60.19.2.

98 *Supra*, n. 93.

99 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 20 (1989), 17-18.

100 See Caes *BGall*, 4.17.

101 Veg, 1.10; I. Richmond, 'Trajan's army on Trajan's column', *PBSR* 13 (1935), 7, 28-29. For a fuller discussion as to whether there was a pre-existing bridge, see G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 101-102.

102 Dio, 60.20.6.

This chapter has often been used to explain why the Britons were surprised by the legions at the first river crossing.[103] There is nothing in Dio's account to suggest any similarity, apart from the Celts swimming across a river *again*. If there had been a similar manoeuvre at the first river, then the Britons would not have been taken in again, especially as Caratacus was to prove himself a very shrewd general, and Dio would have described such a move at the first river rather than at the Thames.

The Roman pursuit, however, ran into problems: τούς τε λοιπούς ἀπερισκέπτως ἐπιδιώκοντες ἔς τε ἕλη δυσδιέξοδα ἐσέπεσον καὶ συχνοὺς ἀπέβαλον. Dio shows that the Romans were unable to have things all their own way. This may be Roman propaganda to provide a pretext for Plautius to call on the Emperor, since, up to this point, Dio has tried to show how careless the natives were. Plautius certainly displayed some rashness in following the enemy, apparently without reconnaissance. ἀπέβαλον is a strong word suggesting the men were 'thrown away', almost 'lost needlessly'. Although the British resistance had, by now, been broken by Plautius, the untimely loss of several of his men in pursuing the enemy would have provided a good excuse to halt and to await the arrival of Claudius.

Dio's account, continued in 60.21, again suggests the use of Roman propaganda, perhaps derived from official sources, giving Plautius a reason to send for Claudius: διά τε οὖν τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ Τογοδούμνου φθαρέντος οἱ βρεττανοὶ οὐχ ὅσον ἐνέδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν αὐτοῦ ἐπισυνέστησαν, φοβηθεὶς ὁ Πλαύτιος οὐκέτι περαιτέρω προεχώρησεν, ἀλλ' αὐτός τε τὰ παρόντα διὰ φυλακῆς εποιήσατο καὶ τὸν Κλαύδιον πετεπέμψατο. Since the Britons had been defeated twice in major battles, Plautius' next obvious move was to advance on, and capture Colchester, the centre of British resistance, as Webster suggests.[104] He had to wait, however, and obey the 'specific instructions' which Dio tells us he had received previously from the Emperor. Salway

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103 Cf. *ibid.*, 20.4.

104 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 103.

proposes[105] that it was not out of character for Plautius to appeal to the Emperor for help as he had already done so in the case of the 'mutiny' at Boulogne.[106] Dio's statement: καὶ παρασκευή γε ἐπὶ τῇ στρατείᾳ πολλὴ τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἐλεφάντων προσυνείλεκτο, implies that those provisions necessary for an expedition had *already* been prepared. This is more than a little coincidental; quite clearly Claudius intended to come to Britain himself, if at all possible. Furthermore, victory by another man could, given Claudius' precarious position, result in his sudden downfall. The Emperor had to be present to gain the acclaim for victory, however shallow it may have been.

Dio then relates Claudius' subsequent activities, an account that is supported by Suetonius.[107] Dio remarks that Claudius entrusted affairs at home to his consular colleague, Lucius Vitellius, whom he had kept in office for half a year. A. Barrett has argued that this statement must be erroneous,[108] since the suffect consuls for 43 were Lucius Pedanius Secundus and Sextus Palpellus Hister, who must have entered office before 7 March and probably before the end of February. Therefore Vitellius cannot have been consul for six months from the beginning of the year. Suetonius, too, states that all Claudius' consulships were *bimestris* except for the last in 51 which was *semestris*.[109] The confusion here may be due to the fact that consulships had generally been held for periods of six months, and that Suetonius also remarks of L. Vitellius: *curam quoque imperii sustinuit, absente eo [sc. Claudio] expeditione Britannica.*[110] This would mean that if Claudius were absent for a period of six months as the sources relate, then Vitellius was supposed to have held a six month consulship during that time. There is a further complication in that Claudius did not start his expedition until late in the year, therefore, Vitellius' control of Rome must have been in the second half of the year 43 through to 44 and his consulship would have been a separate office held at the beginning of 43. Another

105 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 85.
106 Cf. Dio, 60.19.
107 *Ibid.*, 21.2ff.; Suet *Cl*, 17.
108 A. Barrett, 'Chronological errors in Dio's account of the Claudian invasion', *Brit* 11 (1980), 31.
109 Suet *Cl*, 14.
110 Suet *Vit*, 2.4.

possibility concerns the verb ὑπατεύω which is derived from ὕπατος meaning 'supreme'. Taken literally the meaning of ὑπατεύειν is 'to be supreme', not necessarily 'to be consul', although the verb is generally linked with consular status. If there were suffect consuls while Claudius were absent from Rome, for Vitellius to hold authority 'on a par' (ἐξ ἴσου) with Claudius would have required him to have consular authority to equal at least that of the suffect consuls. Perhaps Dio has been confused by his source, accepting that another word meaning 'supreme' implied 'consul', and he is merely trying to convey that Vitellius was in control of affairs at Rome as a kind of *Praefectus Urbi* for the length of time that Claudius was absent.

Both Suetonius and Dio give brief accounts of Claudius' journey to Britain which may be usefully compared: καὶ καταπλεύσας ἐς τὰ Ὄστια ἐκεῖθεν ἐς Μασσαλίαν παρεκομίσθη, κἀντεῦθεν τὰ μὲν πεζῇ τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ποταμῶν πορευόμενος πρός τε τὸν ὠκεανὸν ἀφίκετο, καὶ περαιωθεὶς ἐς τὴν Βρεττανίαν συνέμιξε τοῖς στρατοπέδοις πρὸς τῷ Ταμέσᾳ ἀναμένουσιν αὐτόν. (Dio).[111]

Huc cum ab Ostia navigaret, vehementi circio bis paene demersus est, prope Liguriam iuxtaque Stoechadas insulas. quare a Massilia Gesoriacum usque pedestri itinere confecto inde transmisit. (Suetonius).[112]

Initially, their accounts are fairly similar. Claudius sailed from Ostia. Suetonius adds the detail that during his voyage to Marseilles, Claudius was almost sunk twice, and for this reason (*quare*) he travelled from *Massilia* to Boulogne by land. Uncharacteristically and probably using a different source to Suetonius, Dio omits this detail, but states that Claudius' journey from *Massilia* was partly by land and partly along rivers. There is no way of solving this discrepancy between the two accounts without further literary

111 Dio, 60.21.3.
112 Suet *Cl*, 17.

evidence. Claudius' apprehension about travelling by water after he had almost been sunk twice is understandable, but it is somewhat strange that Dio should explicitly state that he travelled διὰ τῶν ποταμῶν. Barrett sheds some light on this when he remarks: 'Dio's narrative implies that Claudius ... travelled if not in haste, at least without serious or lengthy interruption from Ostia'.[113] Claudius would not have wished to delay Plautius for too long, and, perhaps, to speed his journey, supplies were sent ahead by barge.[114]

On his arrival in Britain, Suetonius relates: *sine ullo proelio aut sanguine intra paucissimos dies parte insulae in deditionem recepta, sexto quam profectus erat mense Romam rediit, triumphavitque maximo apparatu.*[115] Dio remarks in a little more detail: καὶ παραλαβών σφας [sc. τὰ στρατοπεδα] ἐκεῖνόν τε επιδιέβη, καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτοῦ συνεστραμμένοις ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθὼν μάχῃ τε ἐνίκησε καὶ τὸ Καμουλόδουνον τὸ τοῦ Κυνοβελλίνου βασίλειον εἶλε. κἀκ τούτου συχνοὺς τοὺς μὲν ὁμολογίᾳ τοὺς δὲ καὶ βίᾳ προσαγαγόμενος αὐτοκράτωρ πολλάκις ἐπωνομάσθη παρὰ τὰ πάτρια ... καὶ τὰ ὅπλα αὐτῶν ἀφελόμενος ἐκείνους μὲν τῷ Πλαυτίῳ προσέταξεν, ἐντειλάμενός οἱ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ προσκαταστρέψασθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην ἠπείχθη, τὴν αγγελίαν τῆς νίκης διὰ τῶν γαμβρῶν, τοῦ τε Μάγνου και τοῦ Σιλανοῦ προπέμψας.[116] And later on he notes: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Γαΐου τε Κρίσπου τὸ δεύτερον καὶ Τίτου Στατιλίου υπατευόντων, ἦλθέ τε ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην ὁ Κλαύδιος ἓξ μῆνας ἀποδημήσας, ἀφ' ὧν ἑκκαίδεκα μόνας ἐν τῇ Βρεττανίᾳ ἡμέρας ἐποίησε, καὶ τὰ νικητήρια ἔπεμψε ...[117]

There is conflict between the two versions. Suetonius claims that there was no battle and no blood spilt. Dio, on the other hand, asserts that Claudius led his army across the Thames and defeated the barbarians, capturing Colchester, the capital of Cunobelinus. In addition, he states that Claudius won over tribes both by agreement (ὁμολογίᾳ) and by force (βίᾳ).

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113 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 32.

114 A. Barrett does not seem to recognise any discrepancy when Suetonius states that Claudius travelled from Marseilles to North Gaul by land.

115 Suet *Cl*, 17.

116 Dio, 60.21.4.

117 *Ibid.*, 23.1.

There may be some exaggeration in his account, for, as seen above, the main British resistance had been broken by Plautius,[118] but Claudius would undoubtedly have faced some sort of token resistance as he moved against Colchester. Resistance prearranged by Caratacus, perhaps, to give himself more time to make good his escape and to establish himself elsewhere, possibly at Minchinhampton,[119] in the Cotswolds.

Suetonius' phrase: *sine ullo proelio aut sanguine* sustains the viewpoint of the first sentence of the chapter: *Expeditionem unam omnino suscepit eamque modicam*. D. Dudley suggests that the phrase is a deliberate misinterpretation of the Arch of Claudius which records the words *sine ulla iactura* ('without any losses').[120] Dudley adds that the passage in Suetonius' *Life of Vespasian* where Vespasian's activities in the south-west are described, *partim Claudii ipsius ductu* weighs against Suetonius' own comment here.[121] So too does his description of the triumph of Claudius involving the capture and storming of a British town which,[122] if it were meant to be Colchester, would certainly reinforce Dio's account of British resistance after the crossing of the Thames.

Dio's account also stresses that Claudius was saluted *imperator* 'several times contrary to precedent'. It seems unlikely that Claudius would have allowed himself to be hailed in this way more than once,[123] as his opponents would be looking for means to weaken his position and such a breach of precedent would be highly unpopular. It is more plausible that this honour was accorded to one or more of Claudius' generals after victory in the field.[124] Technically, it would not have been Claudius who would have been hailed *imperator*, but, as commander-in-chief of the Roman army, this honour would be attributed to him because his generals were acting in his name. If this view is accepted, it indicated

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118 *Supra*, 36.

119 See *Bagendon*, 160f.

120 D. Dudley, *op. cit.*, *UBHJ* 7 (1951), 12. For the Arch of Claudius, see *CIL* 6. 920 (= *ILS* 216). This view is also cleared stated by M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 84.

121 Suet *Vesp*, 4.1.

122 Suet *Cl*, 21.6.

123 Note Dio, 60.21.5: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑνὶ οὐδενὶ πλέον ἢ ἅπαξ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολέμου τὴν ἐπίκλησιν ταύτην λαβεῖν.

124 E.g., Vespasian, who operated 'partly' under the command of Claudius, Suet *Vesp*, 4.1.

that, contrary to the account of Suetonius, there was extensive fighting in Britain. Dio states that Claudius only spent sixteen days in Britain.[125] Allowing for his travelling time to and from Colchester, a distance of at least four to five days march from his port of entry (probably Richborough), he would have had a maximum of only six days to enter Colchester, receive the supplication of the British kings,[126] and hand affairs over to Plautius, the first governor of Britain. Claudius himself would hardly have had time to lead a campaign against many tribes as implied by συχνοὺς τοὺς μὲν ὁμολογίᾳ τοὺς δὲ καὶ βίᾳ προσαγόμενος αὐτοκράτωρ πολλάκις ἐπωνομάσθη ... Dio then relates that after depriving the Britons of their weapons, Claudius ordered Plautius to subdue the remaining resistance (τὰ λοιπὰ) and he himself hastened (ἠπείχθη) back to Rome. The news of the victory was sent ahead by way of the Emperor's sons-in-law, Magnus and Silanus, to provide proof that Claudius had actually been present in Britain. The use of ἠπείχθη here does not seem unusual, until chapter 23 is taken into account, where Dio notes that Claudius returned to Rome after a total absence of six months. If he did not linger on his journey from Rome to Britain and back, then ἠπείχθη does present a problem. The figure of six months is also supported by Suetonius: *sexto quam profectus erat mense Romam rediit.*[127] Suetonius also notes that Claudius received the submission of Britain *intra paucissimos dies*[128] which strengthens Dio's version of sixteen days in Britain itself.

This chronological problem has caused some discussion,[129] since Dio tells us that Claudius returned during the consulship of C. Crispus and T. Statilius, that is in 44. Barrett assumes two possibilities. The first is that Claudius was delayed on his outward journey, a delay caused by the 'mutiny' of the troops and, possibly, the illness of Galba.[130] He also suggests that the difficulty encountered by Plautius in tracking down the Britons was an additional

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125 Dio, 60.23.1.

126 See *CIL* 6.920.

127 Suet *Cl*, 17.2.

128 *Ibid*.

129 In particular, see A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 32-33.

130 Suet *Gal*, 7: *ut cum subita ei valitudo nec adeo gravis incidisset dilatus sit expeditionis Britannicae dies.*

factor.[131] This ignores the fact that Claudius was, apparently, waiting at Rome for Plautius' message before setting out, hence it would not affect his total absence of six months. Plautius himself had been forced to set out late in the season because of the disturbance at his starting point[132] and, as noted above, this could have meant a departure as late as June or even July. In which case, as Barrett states, this might simply mean that Claudius was obliged to conduct his campaign in Britain in 43 in a shorter season than had been anticipated.[133] Since Vegetius informs us that the seas were closed from 10 November to 10 March and that the best sailing season was from 14 March to 22 September,[134] Claudius would have wished to leave Britain at the latest before the end of October and, if at all possible, before the September equinox. It could also be argued that Claudius set out from Rome too late to cross to Britain in 43 and had to winter in Gaul. As A. Barrett remarks, however, it would be difficult to see how 'Claudius might have been gainfully employed during the four months or so he would have had to while away in Gaul' and it is strange that no literary source saw fit to mention this fact.

Barrett's second possibility is that Dio's account of Claudius' return to Rome, rather than his departure for Britain, is at fault.[135] S. Frere suggests, contrary to most modern authorities, that Claudius travelled slowly through Gaul on his return journey.[136] There is flimsy support for this suggestion in the work of Pliny the Elder who records: *Claudius Caesar e Britannia triumphans praegrandi illa domo verius quam nave intravit Hadriam.*[137] This may indicate 'some sort of majestic expedition south then north along the Italian coast to Ostia'.[138] In addition, the possibility of a protracted return journey would correspond with Dio's annalistic method. This would, however, imply a somewhat roundabout route especially if Claudius had already taken time to visit the Gallic

131 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 32.
132 Dio, 60.19.3.
133 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 33.
134 Veg, 4.39.
135 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 33.
136 S. Frere (1987), 51.
137 Pliny *NH*, 3.119.
138 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 11 (1980), 33.

provinces. Perhaps after entering the sea from the River Po near Ravenna he cut across land to Rome, giving himself an opportunity to demonstrate his triumph to the Roman people.

Barrett notes, too, that 'in correspondence' S. Frere has stated ἠπείχθη refers not to Claudius' haste to return to Rome but his haste to leave Britain — a view reinforced by the μέν and δέ construction contrasting the action of Plautius, remaining in Britain, with that of Claudius' urgency to leave.[139] Barrett takes this further and considers that Dio may have misunderstood his, possibly, ambiguous source which stated that Claudius made all haste to leave Britain, and thought that this implied that the Emperor hurried to return to Rome.[140] This theory makes all the more sense if Claudius did not arrive in Britain until as late as September. Like Caesar, he would have hurried to depart before the September equinox in fear of the coming stormy season.[141] As already mentioned, Claudius had suffered on his journey from Ostia to Marseilles,[142] and so he would have been all the more eager to have a relatively gentle crossing of the English Channel. Two further points may be added. Firstly, sixteen days is scarcely a creditable length of time for Claudius to have claimed the conquest of Britain, so he must have had a good reason to leave Britain so soon. Secondly, if his journey from Rome had taken place in late July, or even August, he would have returned to Rome around January (if Dio's and Suetonius' figure of six months is correct). The tardiness of his return could then be explained by his desire to parade through the Gallic provinces. This area was special for him because he had been born there and would know that provincials saw far too little of their emperors. This would have been an ideal opportunity for Claudius to visit them and to establish his reputation.

While Claudius returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph on an enormous scale, the formation of Britain as a province was going ahead. In particular, the early years were ones of military advance in several directions. There is little literary evidence

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139 *Ibid.*
140 *Ibid.*
141 Cf. Caes *BGall*, 4.36.
142 Suet *Cl*, 17.

documenting this but one passage of Suetonius, concerning the activities of Vespasian in the south-west, stands out: *Claudio principe Narcissi gratia legatus legionis in Germaniam missus est; inde in Britanniam translatus, tricies cum hoste conflixit. duas validissimas gentes superque viginti oppida et insulam Vectem Britanniae proximam in dicionem redegit, partim Auli Plauti legati consularis partim Claudii ipsius ductu.*[143] As Legio II was later to establish its headquarters at Exeter,[144] it seems that this must have been the legion under Vespasian's command. The south-west was one of the three main lines of advance, with Legio IX pushing northward to an eventual base at Lincoln[145] and Legio XIV moving westwards to Wroxeter.[146] Legio XX remained at Colchester.[147] Vespasian's campaign, the only one to be documented, was, according to Suetonius, fairly extensive.

There has been some debate as to the identity of the two tribes mentioned by Suetonius. Almost without exception, historians identify one as the Durotriges of Dorset; the other, however, is more difficult. Various suggestions include the western portion of the Atrebates,[148] later formed into a *civitas* of the Belgae;[149] the Dumnonii;[150] and the southern Dobunni[151] (that section of the tribe that had not already surrendered to Plautius). As Webster has noted, the Dumnonii may have been a friendly tribe[152] but perhaps the determining factor is how far to the south-west they lay and whether Vespasian penetrated so far during his tenure. Of the options available the southern

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143 Suet *Vesp*, 4.1.

144 Ptol 11.3.13. Ἴσκα λεγίων δεύτερα Σεβάστη was once considered to be erroneous since the legion was situated at *Isca Dumnoniorum* instead of *Isca Silurium* where the legion is well-attested later. See P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 98n.; A. Rivet and C. Smith, 378, s.v. *Isca Dumnoniorum*; P. Bidwell, *The Legionary Bathhouse and Basilica and Forum at Exeter*, 3-19.

145 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 163.

146 *Ibid.*, 125.

147 *Ibid.*, 123, and see P. Crummy, 'Colchester: the Roman fortress and the development of the *Colonia*', *Brit* 8 (1977), 65-76.

148 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 98n.

149 M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 76.

150 S. Frere (1987), 58; P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 93; H. Scullard, *Roman Britain*, 40.

151 G. Webster, *Roman Invasion*, 107; K. Branigan, *Roman Invasion*, 30.

152 G. Webster, *ibid*.

Dobunni seems most likely, since it is probable that Caratacus had established a base in this area of the country after he was forced to flee from the Roman advance.[153]

There is more agreement on the hill-forts (*oppida*) involved since archaeology is able to assist. Not all the sites can be identified but the main ones are Maiden Castle,[154] Hod Hill[155] and Cadbury Castle.[156] Todd notes that there are further signs of conflict at Spettisbury Rings (Dorset) and of a hill-top garrison at Ham Hill.[157]

In the light of Vespasian's apparently impressive achievements, a reference to the Claudian invasion in the *Agricola* of Tacitus comes to mind: *divus Claudius auctor tanti operis ... et adsumpto in partem rerum Vespasiano, quod initium venturae mox fortunae fuit: ... monstratus fatis Vespasianus. consularium primus Aulus Plautius praepositus ....*[158] R. Ogilvie states that 'if this passage stood alone, we might suppose that Claudius commenced the first invasion in person with Vespasian as his chief of staff and that Plautius was sent out afterwards to govern the province.[159] Momigliano's appraisal is that Tacitus is perhaps the 'first victim of the gross exaggeration'[160] to be found primarily in Josephus: προσκτησάμενον δὲ τοῖς ὅπλοις Βρεττανίαν τέως λανθάνουσαν, ὅθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ Κλαυδίῳ παρέσχε χωρὶς ἱδρῶτος ἰδίου θρίαμβον καταγαγεῖν.[161] Momigliano also points to references in the works of Vespasian's professional flatterers, men such as Valerius Flaccus and Silius Italicus, who suggest that Vespasian operated in the very north of Britain.[162] But Suetonius is clear as to Vespasian's theatre of operations and Pliny relates, in a passage that refers to no later than 77, that the Romans had not

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153 See *Bagendon*, 160ff.

154 R. Wheeler, *Maiden Castle, Dorset. Research Report of the Society of Antiquaries*, 12.

155 I. Richmond, *Hod Hill* 2, 155.

156 L. Alcock, 'Excavations at South Cadbury Castle', *Antj* 51 (1971), 1-7; *"By South Cadbury is that Camelot ..."*, 105-106; J. Campbell, M. Baxter and L. Alcock, 'Radiocarbon dates for the Cadbury massacre', *Antiquity* 53 (1979), 31-38.

157 M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 76.

158 Tac *Agr*, 13.3.

159 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 187, following Furneaux-Anderson, 78.

160 A. Momigliano, *'Panegyricus Messallae* and *Panegyricus Vespasianae*. Two references to Britain', *JRS* 40 (1950), 39-42.

161 Jos *Bell Iud*, 3.1.2.

162 See Val Flacc *Argon*, 1.7b; Silius Italicus, *Punica*, 3.597f.

progressed beyond the vicinity of the Caledonian Forest.[163] Clearly the words of men such as Flaccus and Italicus should be largely ignored, although, having been written before Tacitus wrote his works, they may have had an adverse influence on his appraisal of the real situation.

One authority who should be taken into account when considering Vespasian's contribution to the conquest is Eutropius: *Britannia intulit bellum quam nullus Romanorum post C. Caesarem attigerat eaque devicta per Cn. Sentium et A. Plautium, inlustres ac nobiles viros, triumphum celebrem egit.*[164] C. Stevens has noted that late epitomators, such as Eutropius, 'rarely offer anything which is not in Suetonius',[165] but here there is clear evidence of an alternative source. Cn. Sentius appears nowhere else in connection with Britain but he must have played a fairly significant role for Eutropius to mention his name, perhaps as a legionary commander. Following the suggestion of E. Hübner that a force landed on the Sussex plain in 43, Stevens has argued that 'Sentius retook the West Sussex kingdom and prepared for Claudius the scheme of Cogidubnus' installation'.[166] If this view were accepted, it would have been Sentius who received the surrender of the Dobunni. However, this theory has to be rejected because the south-west was Vespasian's territory, and it would make no sense if the commanders were moved around to different locations after the capture of Colchester. It is possible, even probable, that Sentius was the fourth legionary legate, in addition to Vespasian (legate of Legio IX), Hosidius Geta and Sabinus, Plautius having relinquished his command of Legio IX to assume the reins of government. As an ex-consul,[167] Sentius had some standing and may well have led one of the other lines of advance in command of Legio IX or XIV.

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163 Pliny *NH*, 4.16 (102).2.

164 Eutropius, *Hist Brev Rom*, 7.13.2-3.

165 C. Stevens, 'Claudius and the Orcades', *CR* n.s. 1 (1950), 7ff.

166 Cf. C. Hawkes in *Bagendon*, 65.

167 See Tac *Ann*, 2.74.

Vespasian's importance may have been further exaggerated if D. Eichholz's view as to the length of his command is accepted.[168] He argues that Vespasian might not have returned with Claudius in 44 to receive his *triumphalia ornamenta*, since these were sometimes awarded before a term of office had ended.[169] For Vespasian to have returned with Claudius, he would have had to have achieved all the results narrated by Suetonius within the space of about three or four months (June to September). There was scarcely time for him to have done all these things in 43, especially as archaeology shows that the advance in other directions was far more gradual. Eichholz argues for a date as late as 47 for the end of his command, citing as evidence a passage from Dio's epitomator, Xiphilinus: ἐν δὲ τῇ Βρεττανίᾳ περιστοιχισθέντος τοῦ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ποτὲ καὶ κινδυνεύοντος φθαρῆναι, ὁ Τίτος ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ περὶ τῷ πατρὶ δείσας τήν τε περίσχεσιν αὐτῶν παραλόγῳ τόλμῃ διέρρηξε, κἀκ τούτου φεύγοντάς σφας ἐπιδιώξας ἔφθειρεν. ὁ δὲ Πλαύτιος ἀπὸ τοῦ Βρεττανικοῦ πολέμου, ὡς καὶ καλῶς αὐτὸν χειρίσας καὶ κατορθώσας, καὶ ἐπῃνέθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλαυδίου καὶ ἐθριάμβευσε.[170] These events are placed within the context of 47 and in Britain, as the last sentence reveals. Titus, however, was only eight years old at the time. Hence, Boissevain has argued that this incident must belong to the Jewish campaign when both father and son were fighting. In contrast, Eichholz feels that Dio narrated some of Vespasian's exploits before mentioning Plautius' departure from Britain. This would make sense in the light of what Suetonius relates. Moreover, Titus was military tribune in Britain in 57,[171] and this may have caused Xiphilinus (or Dio) some confusion.

Eichholz also quotes these lines of Dio in support of a later departure date: ταῦτα μὲν δὴ διὰ τὰ Βρεττανικὰ ἐπράχθη, καὶ ἵνα γε καὶ ἄλλοι ῥᾷον ἐς ὁμολογίαν ἴωσιν, ἐψηφίσθη τὰς συμβάσεις ἁπάσας, ὅσας ἂν ὁ Κλαύδιος ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀντιστράτηγοι αὐτοῦ πρός τινας

168 D. Eichholz, 'How long did Vespasian serve in Britain?', *Brit* 3 (1972), 149ff.

169 See *ibid.*, 152 for examples, including Ostorius Scapula (Tac *Ann*, 12.38); Corbulo (Tac *Ann*, 11.20); and the governors who fought against Tacfarinas (Tac *Ann*, 4.23).

170 Xiph 142.29-143 = Dio, 60.30.4.

171 Suet *Tit*, 4.1.

ποιήσωνται, κυρίας ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν τόν τε δῆμον εἶναι.[172] This chapter begins a new year, which Dio introduces traditionally by citing the names of the consuls. If he were keeping to an annalistic method, then everything after the beginning of the chapter belongs to 44. Therefore, if οἱ ἀντιστράτηγοι refer to Vespasian as well as Plautius, Hosidius Geta and, even Cn. Sentius, then Vespasian was still in Britain in 44. Eichholz concludes that the case for Vespasian remaining in Britain until as late as 47 is far stronger than for his departure to take part in Claudius' triumph.

Dio provides one more piece of information concerning Vespasian in Britain: ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὔνοια πολλὴ ἦν πρὸς αὐτόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Βρεττανίας δόξα ...).[173] This would seem, in part, to reinforce the claims made by his flatterers and by Tacitus. He cannot be credited with as much as they try to give him, but it is apparent that Vespasian still played a major role in the formation of Britain into a Roman province. It would have been fitting indeed if he had returned to receive his *triumphalia ornamenta*, the distinction of two priesthoods and, shortly afterwards, a consulship, at the same time as Aulus Plautius returned to celebrate his *ovatio*.

Claudius himself had returned in 44 to a triumph on a grand scale,[174] as Suetonius remarks: *triumphavitque maximo apparatu*.[175] He may even have held some preliminary celebrations.[176] The significance of his victory can be measured by the detailed descriptions given in Dio[177] and Suetonius[178] (which almost equal the length of the narrative concerning the actual invasion) of the honours awarded to those involved in the expedition. Almost all gained their *triumphalia ornamenta*.[179] Even one of Claudius' freedmen, Posides, was awarded the headless spear along with other soldiers.[180] Special

172 Dio, 60.23.6.
173 Xiph, 196.3-197 = Dio, 65.8.3.
174 Discussed fully by D. Dudley, *op. cit.*,*UBHJ* 7 (1951), 6-17.
175 Suet *Cl*, 17.3.
176 *Supra*,43.
177 Dio, 60.22-23.6.
178 Suet *Cl*, 17.3.
179 See Dio, 60.23.2.
180 Suet *Cl*, 28.

privileges were granted to Messalina and to Claudius himself (including the title Britannicus). Quite rightly, Tacitus could call the Emperor *auctor tanti operis*,[181] for Claudius had achieved a feat which the great Julius Caesar could not and which Augustus had not even attempted. The myths concerning Britain had been exploded. Claudius had not only conquered a foreign land but also the Ocean and his people's irrational fear of what lay beyond. For those reasons the public's admiration was captured. Claudius' position at the head of the Roman Empire had been secured.

181 Tac *Agr*, 13.3, *contra* Suet *Cl*, 17 where the expedition is described as *modica*.

Chapter 3: 47 – 58 A.D. The Formation of a Province

The main source for this period is Tacitus' *Annals* 12.31-40, which relates the governorships of Publius Ostorius Scapula and Aulus Didius Gallus. Subsequent events, concerning Veranius' governorship, are found in the *Agricola*[1] and in *Annals* 14.[2] Tacitus' narrative in *Annals* 12 commences: *at in Britannia P. Ostorium pro praetore turbidae res excepere, effusis in agrum sociorum hostibus eo violentius, quod novum ducem exercitu ignoto et coepta hieme iturum obviam non rebantur.*[3]

Although Ostorius receives more attention than most other governors of Britain, little is known about him, apart from details of his consulship.[4] It is likely that he had had some previous military experience since he is described elsewhere by Tacitus as *bello egregius.*[5] R. Syme[6] suggests that Ostorius may have accompanied Claudius to Britain in 43 and achieved some renown for which he was rewarded with the consulship (probably in 45). However, the phrase *exercitu ignoto* would seem to rule out this possibility. It would be a peculiar remark to make of a man who had only fairly recently been to Britain, presumably, as a *comes* of Claudius. Furthermore, the use of *ignotus* seems to indicate that Tacitus is deliberately drawing attention to Ostorius' lack of experience of Britain compared with that of his predecessor, Aulus Plautius. On his arrival Scapula encountered *turbidae res*, 'an unsettled state of affairs'. A. Barrett,[7] quoting examples from Tacitus,[8] demonstrates instances where *turbidus* is used of internal trouble, or even sedition. He challenges the popular thesis that there was an attack from outside the Roman province on

1 Tac *Agr*, 14.3.
2 Tac *Ann*, 29.
3 *Ibid.*, 12.31.1.
4 On the date of which see A. Birley, *Fasti*, 41.
5 Tac *Agr*, 14.1
6 R. Syme, 'Domitius Corbulo', *JRS* 60 (1970), 28.
7 A. Barrett, 'The military situation in Britain in A.D. 47', *AJPh* 100 (1979), 538-540.
8 *Ibid.*, 539; Tac *Hist*, 1.55; *Ann*, 3.27. Also *Ann*, 1.34, 43; 3.12; 6.11; *Hist*, 2.19, 23; 3.49; 4.39, 56.

one of Rome's client kings (for example, by the Silures, led by Caratacus, on the Dobunni).[9] But if this phrase refers directly to the events following, that is that the 'enemy' did invade 'the territory of allies', then this does not quite accord with Barrett's opinion that there were 'widespread *internal* disruptions'.[10] He also takes *effusis* combined with *eo violentius* to imply something much more than a 'mere border raid'.[11] This may be true but Tacitus was writing for effect. There may have been a series of fierce border raids and *effusis hostibus eo violentius* would graphically describe such incidents.

If the view that the Silures attacked the Dobunni is accepted, then the effect of the raiding should be considered. Clearly there were anti-Roman sentiments voiced in Britain[12] and these incursions could well have incited those with such sentiments to stir up trouble in the hope that the Romans could be driven from Britain. Indeed, Ostorius was not the last to face problems at the outset of his governorship, for both Aulus Didius Gallus[13] and Agricola[14] also faced similar trouble from different quarters. In Agricola's case he too had set out too late in the year (*quamquam transvecta aestas*)[15] and it would appear that it was the hallmark of a good general not to delay his campaigning, even if the season were unfavourable.

Tacitus' account continues: *ille gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni, citas cohortes rapit et caesis qui restiterant, disiectos consectatus.*[16] The language at this point is full of fast-moving and vivid imagery. The contrast of ideas *metum aut fiduciam* is followed by the alliterative *citas cohortes rapit et caesis qui restiterant*. As A. Birley notes, the speed of both the narrative and language used indicates that Ostorius was an

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9 So S. Frere (1987), 60; A. Rivet, 'The First Icenian Revolt', in *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, ed. by B. Hartley and J. Wacher, 203.

10 A. Barrett, *op. cit., AJPh* 100 (1979), 539.

11 *Ibid.*

12 For example amongst the Iceni and the Brigantes.

13 See Tac *Ann*,12.40.2 where the Brigantes cause trouble.

14 See Tac *Agr*, 18 where the Ordovices have cut down a unit operating in their territory.

15 Tac *Agr*, 18.2.

16 Tac *Ann*, 12.31.2.

experienced soldier. 'He knew (*gnarus*) that the first results engender fear or loyalty'.[17] Barrett claims that these swift attacks occurred within the province because there would have been difficulties in pursuing the Silures or any other Welsh tribe.[18] If there had been disturbances within the province then Tacitus would have been the first to mention it in his narrative. Indeed Ostorius' later advance into Wales was a logical step forwards if those disturbances had been caused by Welsh tribes.

The text of *Annals* 12 next contains one of the most debated sentences in the sources for Roman Britain: *ne rursus conglobarentur infensaque et infida pax non duci, non militi requiem permitteret, detrahere arma suspectis cunctaque castris [cis Tris]antonam et Sabrinam fluvios cohibere parat.*[19]

The text at this point is notoriously corrupt. The river *Antona* is otherwise unknown and this led Heraeus and Bradley to conjecture *[Tris]antona* (= Trent),[20] while Mannert offered *Avona*.[21] The former view has been almost universally accepted, because as G. Webster has shown, at this time, a *limes* had been formed along the Fosse Way stretching from the Severn to the Trent.[22] Apart from this problem, there are two other points of note in this passage.

The first has been covered by A. Rivet, who states that 'the bearing of arms was already illegal in the province proper and a general ban in the client kingdoms would be virtually impossible'.[23] Furthermore, since arms were taken away from those 'who were suspect', it is difficult to see how this could include the Iceni, who are specifically mentioned in this chapter. Therefore, Rivet suggests that some of the military units of the client kingdom

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17 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 43.

18 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 100 (1979), 539-540.

19 This is based on the reading of E. Koestermann, *Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen*, vol. 3, 159 which favours the inclusion of *castris*.

20 The river name is a common one in Britain, see A. Rivet and C. Smith, 476-477, s.v. *Trisantona* 1. As seen previously, in ch. 2, the name could refer to the River Tern, but the Trent is more significant and, therefore, more likely to be the river implied here.

21 See H. Furneaux, *The Annals of Tacitus*, vol. 2, 97, n. 10.

22 G. Webster, 'The military situation in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71', *Brit* 1 (1970), 174-191.

23 A. Rivet, *op. cit.*, in *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, ed. by B. Hartley and J. Wacher, 203.

were withdrawn and replaced by units of the regular army *in castris* but this seems unlikely. Firstly, if the client kingdoms had military units, which they surely did, then Rome would follow her normal policy of incorporating them into the regular army as auxiliary troops. It is unlikely that at this stage, the Iceni still had any need for armed units, as they were within the province and safe from external attack. Yet it is possible that they were allowed to carry arms and on hearing of murmurs of dissension, Ostorius acted sensibly, under the circumstances, in ordering a general ban on arms to prevent an outbreak of violent insurrection. In doing this, he underestimated the amount of ill-feeling the action would cause. It was perhaps this disturbance that led, in part, to the foundation of the colony at Colchester.[24]

The second point of note is whether *castris* should be retained in the text. This would make sense if the appraisal of Ostorius in the *Agricola* is considered: *consularium primus Aulus Plautius praepositus ac subinde Ostorius Scapula uterque bello egregius: redactaque paulatim in formam provinciae proxima pars Britanniae.*[25]

The normal manner of consolidating a province was to build forts, especially in districts that were most susceptible to attack, either from without or from within. Such consolidation would enable Scapula to drive forward into Wales without fear of attack or revolt in his rear.

Ostorius' apparently innocent action provoked a violent reaction: *quod primi Iceni abnuere valida gens nec proeliis contusi, quia societatem nostram volentes accesserant.*[26] Here there is confirmation of the Iceni's client kingdom status. They had not been 'broken' (*contusi*)[27] in battle but had entered the Roman alliance 'willingly'. As noted above, it seems likely that Ostorius had tried to disarm the Iceni in accordance with the *lex Iulia de vi* because he was

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24 Tac *Agr*, 14.1.

25 *Idem*.

26 Tac *Ann*, 12.31.3.

27 *contusi* appears only four times in Tacitus at *Hist*, 2.19.2 and 4.28.11 and *Ann*, 4.46.2 and here. On three of these occasions the epithet is applied to foreign tribes.

concerned to protect his rear in preparation for an advance into Wales. The Iceni saw this as a violation of their rights and objected strongly, as they were to do far more violently on a future occasion when they had been wronged.[28] A further reason to dispute Rivet's suggestion that some military units of the Iceni were disabled is the fact that Tacitus' language implies wider unrest. Shortly afterwards (c. 49) a colony was established at Colchester, in the territory of the Trinovantes, *subsidium adversus rebellis et imbuendis sociis ad officia legum.*[29]

It is possible that the Iceni were objecting not to disarmament but to the establishment of camps. It is difficult to support this view, for as Rivet states, there is no evidence for the existence of camps in Icenian territory at this time.[30] His conclusion is that, perhaps, we should substitute Dobunni for Iceni since they were a large tribal group worthy of the epithet *valida*. In addition, the disturbances at the outset of Ostorius' governorship appear to have taken place between the Silures and the Dobunni.[31] It is also difficult to explain *circumiectae nationes* as referring to the Iceni since three-quarters of their territory was surrounded by water. Lastly, there is the question of Tacitus' knowledge of the geography of Britain. He mentions few tribes by name in his works, and those he does could easily have been related to him by his father-in-law, Agricola.[32] Rivet quotes Tacitus' mistaken reference to the Brigantes (instead of the Iceni)[33] in the speech of Calgacus in the *Agricola*[34] as an example of his confusion over tribal names. This is not conclusive, however. Such an error would be understandable, since both tribes had had outstanding female rulers and both, moreover, according to Tacitus, had a history of anti-Roman behaviour.[35] It is more difficult to see how Tacitus could confuse the Dobunni (who do not

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28 On the occasion of the Boudican Revolt. See Tac *Ann*, 14.29-39; Dio, 62.1-12.

29 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.4.

30 A. Rivet, *op. cit.*, in *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, ed. by B. Hartley and J. Wacher, 204.

31 See *supra*, 51.

32 Cf. A. Burn, in *Tacitus*, ed. by T. Dorey, 40.

33 A. Rivet, *op. cit.*, in *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, ed. by B. Hartley and J. Wacher, 205.

34 Tac *Agr*, 31.4.

35 For the Brigantes, see Tac *Ann*, 12.32.2, 40: *Hist*, 3.45. For the Iceni, see Tac *Agr*, 15-16; *Ann*, 12.31.3; 14.29-39.

appear elsewhere in his works) with the Iceni, an infamous tribe. However, the Iceni were to revolt in 61. It would have satisfied Tacitus and his Roman audience if the tribe were to have a history of revolt. Therefore, he could have replaced the name of the relatively insignificant Dobunni with that of the Iceni, of whom Tacitus' educated audience would have heard.

Tacitus continues with a description of the succeeding engagement. The site and character of the terrain where the action took place is marked by heavy assonance and alliteration: *saeptum agresti aggere et aditu angusto.*[36] Features such as these which hinder a comfortable Roman advance (*ne pervius equiti foret*) often attract Tacitus' attention, as for example, when he describes the last stand of Caratacus.[37] In neither instance, however, does he choose to name the site, presumably because he either did not know or realised that the name would be of no account to the ordinary Roman.

This appears to have been the only battle in the so-called 'First Icenian Revolt' and, according to Tacitus, it was over fairly quickly. Within his narrative there are several points of interest.

In the first instance there is the statement: *sine robore legionum socialis copias ducebat.* Rivet suggests that this implies the use of native troops[38] and rejects Barrett's proposal that *sociales* could be used of the normal *auxilia.*[39] The basic meaning of *socialis* is 'allied', 'confederate'.[40] Tacitus employs the phrase *copiae sociales* just once elsewhere in the *Annals* at 6.44.15, where he is referring to the 'allied forces' of the tribe of the Abdagaeses in Mesopotamia. At *Annals* 4.73.10 he uses the phrase *turmae sociales*, with reference to a cavalry wing of the Canninefates which was being used to help the Romans subdue the Frisii on the Dutch coast. Therefore, from the literary evidence in Tacitus himself, it

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36 Tac *Ann*, 12.31.3.
37 Tac *Ann*, 12.33.3.
38 A. Rivet, *op. cit.*, in *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, ed. by B. Hartley and J. Wacher, 205.
39 A. Barrett, 'The career of Tiberius Claudius Cogidubnus', *Brit* 10 (1979), 231.
40 See *OLD*, 1777-1778, s.v. *socialis*.

would appear that where he has used *socialis* with reference to Roman operations he uses it of allied tribes from the region in which the Romans were operating. It is known that Rome did frequently draw auxiliaries from areas recently conquered and it would not be unreasonable to suggest that this was the case in Britain as well. As an interesting point of information, Tacitus also notes that the cavalry were put to infantry work because of the reasons given previously for the choice of site for battle: *ne pervius equiti foret.*

With these forces then, Ostorius attacked and his men 'smashed through' (*perfringunt*) the rampart. Tacitus' language is vivid and violent, with the historical present *perfringunt* picking up *perrumpere*, both words strengthened forms of the basic verb. The attack threw the enemy into confusion (*turbant*, another strong verb) as they were hindered by their own defences. This scene, although short, evokes a vivid picture of the action because of Tacitus' skilful use of language, combining chiasmus with dramatic present tense.

Despite his natural bias towards the Roman army, Tacitus does have some respect for the Britons, as revealed in the sentence: *atque illi conscientia rebellionis et obsaeptis effugiis multa et clara facinora fecere.* Here *conscientia rebellionis* may echo Sallust[41] and for Tacitus it is this unworthy motive that results in the Britons rising above their normal lowly position of 'savages' and achieving 'many distinguished feats'.

As a further point of interest Tacitus remarks: *qua pugna filius legati M. Ostorius servati civis decus meruit.* Marcus Ostorius also receives a mention at *Annals* 16.15 where Nero is said to have been frightened of Ostorius because of his huge physique, his expertise with weapons and his distinguished military record. It is not inconceivable that the whole of this battle has been recorded merely so that Tacitus can inform his listener of this detail, although it may be possible that this was the only battle concerning which he had information. This does not preclude the possibility that there was more than one encounter but Tacitus' narrative does not imply any further action. In fact this revolt seems to have been a relatively minor affair and, perhaps, Tacitus is guilt of over-exaggeration,

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41 Cf. Sall *Cat*, 5.7; also Tac *Agr*, 16.9 and *Hist*, 4.41, 56 and 72.

attaching more weight than necessary to the episode merely to record an interesting anecdote. This insurrection may have been nothing more serious than a small group of hardline anti-Romans (encouraged by Caratacus(?)) occupying a hill-fort and, during the course of the ensuing engagement, a distinguished Roman gaining his oakwreath.

The succeeding chapter begins on a positive note, marked out by strong alliteration of the letter c: *ceterum clade Icenorum compositi qui bellum intra et pacem dubitabant, et ductus in Decangos exercitus.*[42] As expected, the submission of such a powerful tribe as the Iceni (if they were truly involved) brought about the acquiescence of the other tribes concerned. Perhaps there is a reference to the *turbidae res* mentioned previously in this sentence, although, apparently, nothing occurred beyond some disgruntled murmurs on the part of the other tribes. The use of the opposites 'war' and 'peace' at this point emphasises the hesitant and wavering attitude of the Britons. It should be noted that *in Decangos* is an emendation for the manuscript's *inde cangos* to give us a tribe of known name, attested by inscriptions on lead pigs.[43] Perhaps a slightly better reading might be *inde in Dec(e)ang(l)os.*[44] This could easily have been misread as a double *inde* of which one was then omitted by a diligent scribe. This reading would give a better impression of the army's move from one place to another, whether it had been operating in Icenian or Dobunni territory.[45]

Tacitus briskly relates the ensuing action: *vastati agri, praedae passim actae, non ausis aciem hostibus, vel si ex occulto carpere agmen temptarent punito dolo.*[46] The phrase *vastati agri* is common in Tacitus. In *Histories* 1.67.12 he uses it of Caecina's devastation of Helvetian territory and at 4.50.23 of the devastation around Leptis. The phrase is frequently used of the devastation of foreign lands.[47] Once again, however, the Romans

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42 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.2.

43 See H. Furneaux, *Tacitus*, vol. 1, 99.

44 A. Rivet and C. Smith, 331, s.v. *Deceangli* (?), offer the emendation *Dec(e)ang(l)os.*

45 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 15.26.3 and below, Tac *Ann*, 12.33.1.

46 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.1.

47 Lewis and Short, 1960, s.v.*vasto* and *vastus; OLD*, 2014-2015, s.v. *vasto* and *vastus*.

found themselves up against an elusive enemy *non ausis aciem hostibus.*[48] On this occasion through the use of British auxiliary troops or because of greater familiarity with the tactics of the Britons, the Romans were able to cope with their guerrilla tactics: *vel si ex occulto carpere agmen temptarent punito dolo.*

Tacitus does not give us details of the campaign, sketching everything in the barest outline. However, he does record: *iamque ventum haud procul mari, quod Hiberniam insulam aspectat.* Caesar refers to Hibernia in his *de bello Gallico*[49] and Tacitus gives a brief account of the nature of the island and its inhabitants in the *Agricola.*[50] Both authors note that it is situated between Britain and Spain. Caesar thought it was only thirty miles distant (which Ireland is by the shortest route from Scotland), while Tacitus believed that it was easily accessible from the Gallic sea. It seems fair to suppose that from the references to Ireland here and the aim of the governors Veranius, Suetonius Paulinus and Agricola to conquer Anglesey, Tacitus felt that there was (or at any rate, should have been) a Roman policy directed at Ireland and the exploitation of the trade route from there to Spain.[51]

In fact, at this time, Ostorius was still some distance from the coast facing Ireland, for he had the whole of the territory of the Ordovices to pass through and this tribe was not completely subdued until 78.[52] He may not have been aiming at the conquest of Wales, but rather, at an outflanking movement of the Silures and the Ordovices to keep them out of the Roman province, hemming them in by a pattern of forts until the time was right to conquer and subdue them.

Ostorius' plans were interrupted: *cum ortae apud Brigantas discordiae retraxere ducem destinationis certum, ne nova moliretur nisi prioribus firmatis.*[53] This passage would

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48 Cf. Caes *BGall*, 5, 15ff. and Dio, 60.19.5.
49 Caes *BGall*, 5.13.2.
50 Tac *Agr*, 24.
51 See Tac *Ann*, 14.29.
52 See Tac *Agr*, 18.
53 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.1.

appear to confirm that Ostorius was poised to conquer Wales when the Brigantes reacted. Tacitus' words are almost scornful, as if he considered that Ostorius should have had the good sense to safeguard his rear more securely.

If Tacitus' version of events is accepted, no real action took place and the disturbance was only minor, for the Brigantes soon 'calmed down' (*resedere*).[54] There was no need to terrify the enemy into submission by the near-annihilation of the tribe, as was to happen with the Ordovices.[55] Those not involved were allowed to live (*data venia*)[56] and only the ringleaders were put to death. At this point the Brigantes are compared with the Silures who were unable to be changed, either by cruelty or by kindness. The metaphorical *resedere* poised between the sentences, combined with the balanced contrast of *non atrocitate non clementia,* is particularly effective.

The legionary fort referred to in the narrative of Tacitus was presumably designed for the Twentieth Legion[57] for, as Tacitus states: *id quo promptius veniret, colonia Camulodunum ... deducitur*. The Twentieth had originally been based at Colchester and it would make sense if this were the legion transferred westwards to a base at Gloucester or Clyro. The founding of a colony *in agros captivos* gives us a hint of events to occur in 61, but in Roman eyes, this move was justified, as Tacitus notes in official terminology: *subsidium adversus rebellis et imbuendis sociis ad officia legum.*

Annals 12.33 commences: *Itum inde in Siluras, super propriam ferociam Carataci viribus confisos quem multa ambigua, multa prospera extulerant ut ceteros Britannorum imperatores praemineret.* Clearly Ostorius' advance on the Deceangli had been an outflanking movement, isolating the Silures and Ordovices from English sources of support and now he was commencing his campaign against the Silures who 'were not changed either by severity

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54 This word is used in this sense only here in Tacitus. It thus has special emphasis.

55 Tac *Agr*, 18.

56 On the meaning of *venia*, see D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, 171.

57 G. Webster, 'Military situations in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71', *Brit* 1 (1970), 187; M. Jarrett, 'Early Roman campaigns in Wales', *ArchJ* 121 (1964), 26. Gloucester seems almost certain, although Clyro is suggested as a site for part of the legion.

nor by mercy', in keeping with the Roman ideal of *debellare superbos*.[58] Ostorius felt that now was the time to punish this tribe which had been egged on by Caratacus,[59] both from his Minchinhampton base[60] and, after he was driven from this stronghold, from Silurian territory itself.

Caratacus is marked out by Tacitus as an outstanding leader at this point. *praemineo* is used only four times in Tacitus.[61] But the phrase *multa ambigua* does cast a shadow over his achievements. Caratacus' cunning approach to tactics is stressed in the following sentence: *sed tum astu locorum fraude prior, vi militum inferior, transfert bellum in Ordovices*. Realising that the approach of the Romans was a threat to his survival, Caratacus had the foresight to move his base of operations northwards into Ordovician territory. For the third time Caratacus had moved, ensuring he kept one step ahead of the Romans.[62] Evidently, he had gained the respect of other British tribes and achieved remarkable diplomatic success.

Tacitus next embarks on a detailed description of the place chosen by Caratacus for his 'last stand', in a manner similar to that in which he described the resistance of the Iceni in *Annals* 12.31 and that of Calgacus in his *Agricola*:[63] *additisque qui pacem nostram metuebant, novissimum casum experitur, sumpto ad proelium loco ut aditus abscessus, cuncta nobis inportuna et suis in melius essent, hinc montibus arduis, et si qua clementer accedi poterant, in modum valli saxa praestruit: et praefluebat amnis vado incerto, catervaeque armatorum pro munimentis constiterant.*

The phrase *novissimum casum* point the way to the climax of the struggle between Caratacus and Rome. It was to be his 'very last' opportunity to try the fortunes of war. The

58 Verg *Aen*, 6.853.

59 See above, in ch. 2.

60 E. Clifford, *Bagendon*, 162-163.

61 Tac *Ann*, 12.12.1; 15.34.1; 3.56.5.

62 From Kent to the territory of the Dobunni, then to the Silures and here to the lands of Ordovices.

63 Tac *Agr*, 35.3.

place was well chosen. Its natural features were *nobis inportuna*[64] and helped the natives (*ut et suis in melius essent*). Caratacus was determined to frustrate the Romans as far as possible. He had made use not only of the natural features but, where these were lacking, stones had been laid down as an obstacle in the manner of a rampart'. *praestruit*, like *inportuna*, is an unusual word for Tacitus to use, occurring only here in his extant works. In addition to these formidable (as emphasised by Tacitus' choice of language) natural and man-made defences, Caratacus had made sure that his army was also separated from the Romans by a river. This would have slowed their approach and when they came to scale the rampart and to hand-to-hand fighting, the Romans would have been wet and cold. Certainly Caratacus was a shrewd tactician. The identification of the location of the battle has been difficult. G. Webster has suggested a site above Newtown,[65] J. St. Joseph a site further south near Caersws at Cefn Carnedd.[66] S. Frere[67] and P. Salway, too, support this view, although the latter also offers Dolforwyn as a possibility.[68]

In the normal manner used when recording an important military engagement, Tacitus continues his narrative in chapter 34 with the reported speeches of the opposing generals. The narrative at this point is full of rhetorical devices. For example, the chapter begins: *Ad hoc gentium ductores circumire, hortari, firmare animos*, an excellent example of historic infinitives in asyndeton combined with triple listing. The commonplace *firmare animos*[69] is followed by strong alliteration in *minuendo metu*, and the latter phrase is, in turn, balanced by *accendenda spe* with *aliisque belli incitamentis* tacked on as an extension of the 'hope' idea, for if they won they would have all the spoils of war.

Caratacus is introduced by the strong *enimero* and, poetically, he is described as 'flitting this way and that' (*huc illuc volitans*). *illuc ... illum ... illam* is a good example of word

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64 inportuna is a rare word in Tacitus, only occurring elsewhere at *Ann*, 12.12.16, so it has special emphasis.

65 G. Webster, 'The Roman military advance under Ostorius Scapula', *Archl* 115 (1958), 52.

66 J. St. Joseph, 'Aerial reconnaissance in Wales', *Antiquity* 35 (1961), 270-271.

67 S. Frere (1987), 64.

68 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 105.

69 Tac *Ann*, 1.62; 15.59.18; 16.35.8.

play introduced for emphasis and this is followed by the chiastic commonplace (especially in Roman history writing) concerning freedom and slavery: *illum diem, illam aciem testabatur aut reciperandae libertatis aut servitutis aeternae initium fore.*[70] Typically Tacitus employs *oratio obliqua* throughout for economy and speed. As customary, Caratacus 'invoked the names of his ancestors'. Boudica does likewise in Dio's account of the rebellion of 61.[71] Dio's account also refers to Caesar and it is likely that he has used this passage for some of his ideas. Tacitus also employs a motif he has used previously in the *Agricola* when he refers to *intemerata coniugum et liberorum corpora.* For Calgacus in *Agricola* 31 talks of children enslaved, and wives and sisters raped. The passage is recalled in Boudica's emotional oration later in the *Annals.*[72] The speech ends traditionally: *haec atque talia dicenti,* plus the reaction of the audience: 'the crowd roared its support'. The verb *adstrepere* occurs with *vulgus* four times in Tacitus,[73] and hence, appears to be a common formula. It provides a convenient way of finishing the speech, and the chapter is rounded off neatly with a rhetorical flourish, conveying the determination of natives: *gentili quisque religione obstringi non telis, non vulneribus cessuros.*

The following chapter[74] begins on a startling note: *Obstupefecit ea alacritas ducem Romanum.* The sentence opens with the emphatic verb, 'astounded', whose subject is postponed. Even then Ostorius is not named but grandly referred to as *ducem Romanum.* The next sentence is full of alliteration combined with asyndeton, homoeoptoton and a favourite Tacitean adjective in *atrox: simul obiectus amnis, additum vallum, inminentia iuga, nisi atrox et propugnatoribus frequens terrebat,* thus reinforcing our view of the scene already described in chapter 33 and outlining the difficulties facing the Roman troops.

In a patriotic vein, Tacitus stresses the Roman reaction with effective use of collective singular noun, alliteration and historic infinitive: *sed miles proelium poscere cuncta virtute*

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70 Cf. the speech of Calgacus, Tac *Agr,* 30-31 and, especially, the speech of Boudica in *Ann,* 14.35.
71 Cf. Dio, 62.3-6.
72 Tac *Ann,* 14.35.
73 See Tac *Hist,* 2.90; *Ann,* 1.18.11; 12.34.
74 Tac *Ann,* 12.35.1.

expugnabilia clamitare. Despite all the odds, the Roman soldiers demanded to fight. Tacitus is employing a commonplace in stating that the troops should display the dutiful behaviour expected of them, for he has already remarked that Caratacus was *vi militum inferior*[75] and that he had been forced to move into Ordovician territory for this very reason.

The chapter continues: *tum Ostorius, circumspectis quae inpenetrabilia quaeque pervia ducit infensos amnemque haud difficulter evadit*. Here the governor receives his first mention by name since the beginning of the British section and, thus Tacitus introduces a new player other than Caratacus. Ostorius displays certain hallmarks attributed to sound generals. He inspects all the possible approach routes to the Britons' fortifications and, only then, leads his angry men forward. Interestingly, the Roman troops are referred to only by the adjective *infensos*, but by this method, Tacitus adds colour to the scene, creating an image of an angry horde attacking a hostile rampart. The river was clearly not too much of an obstacle, despite its earlier description as *amnis vado incerto*, since the Romans crossed it 'without difficulty'. The attack was not without its problems, however. The Romans were assailed by a barrage of 'missiles' on reaching the rampart and, not surprisingly, initially, most of the casualties were on their side. 'Missiles' is a very general word and, undoubtedly, included spears, arrows and, probably, rocks, sticks, stones and anything else the Britons could lay their hands on.

A solution was soon found: *postquam facta testitudine rudes et informes saxorum conpages distractae parque comminus acies decedere barbari in iuga montium*. Resorting to their famous 'tortoise' formation, which would have been difficult to organise under the onslaught of missiles, the Romans were able to overcome the 'rough and ready' defence of the Britons. Once the two sides were on equal terms, it was a different story. The Britons, described as *barbari* in typical Greek or Roman fashion, 'withdrew to the mountain tops'. There is an element of exaggeration in this, as in the context, this must merely refer to the

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75 Tac *Ann*, 12.33.

nearest 'hill-tops', since the time span indicated is too short to allow the Britons to make a complete withdrawal to the mountains of Wales.

The ensuing skirmish is neatly portrayed, with active verb forms for the Romans and passive for the Britons: *sed eo quoque inrupere ferentarius gravisque miles, illi telis adsultantes, hi conferto gradu, turbatis contra Britannorum ordinibus, apud quos nulla loricarum galearumve tegmina.* The chiastic *apud quos nulla loricarum galearumve tegmina,* is tacked on as a point of information and Dio later uses this in Boudica's speech where she criticises the Romans for needing to wear armour.[76]

The account of the encounter is also well-balanced: *et si auxiliaribus resisterent, gladiis ac pilis legionariorum, si huc verterent, spathis et hastis auxiliarium sternebantur.* Skilfully, Tacitus avoids repetition of *auxiliaribus* and, to balance *gladiis ac pilis,* uses *spathis*[77] *et hastis,* although the two phrases do, in fact, mean the same. The balance of this section makes the whole event seem almost anti-climactic, as though it were a foregone conclusion. The last sentence contains a neat summing up of events. It begins with *clara ea victoria fuit,* the exact phrase used when Civilis gained a notable victory over the Roman forces,[78] and ends: *captaque uxor et filia Carataci fratresque in deditionem accepti.* This sentence tells us that Cunobelinus must have had more than four sons. For Togodumnus had already died and Verica had been driven out of his kingdom by Caratacus and Togodumnus.[79]

The statement *in deditionem accepti* is interesting. It is also found on the Arch of Claudius[80] and, as Dudley states, would appear to apply to those who, whether after defeat or negotiation, made a formal act of submission to Claudius.[81] This view is further borne out by a repetition of the wording in Tacitus.[82] The official surrender of Caratacus'

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76 Dio, 62.5.

77 A word that occurs only here in Tacitus.

78 Tac *Hist,* 4.17.

79 See Dio, 60.19.

80 *CIL* 6.920 (= *ILS* 216).

81 D. Dudley, 'The celebration of Claudius' British victories', *UBHJ* 7 (1951), 11.

82 Cf. Tac *Hist,* 1.68; 3.19; 4.46, 79; *Ann* 1.71; 2.25.26.

brothers and the capture of his wife and children may have been part of the Roman propaganda designed to force Caratacus to submit.

Chapter 36 relates the subsequent fortunes of Caratacus: *Ipse, ut ferme intuta sunt adversa, cum fidem Cartimanduae reginae Brigantum petivisset, vinctus ac victoribus traditus est, nono post anno quam bellum in Britannia coeptum.* *Ipse,* referring to Caratacus, is emphatically placed at the beginning of the sentence and chapter. The Briton's capture is also marked out by the hyperbaton *intuta sunt adversa.* Caratacus had been seeking Cartimandua's 'trust' (*fides*), but her *fides* no longer applied to the British resistance, since she had given her loyalty to Rome. The use of *fides* at this point is very emotive because this sense of loyalty was a very Roman quality here displayed by a Briton towards Rome.

The capture of Caratacus is also referred to in the *Histories: et auxerat [s.c. Cartimandua] potentiam postquam capto per dolum rege Carataco instruxisse triumphum Claudii Caesaris videbatur.*[83] I. Richmond has suggested that these two versions represent summaries from different points of view of a more detailed source. He believes that both versions are not mutually exclusive.[84] Thus, the two may be combined: Caratacus was captured by a trick, thrown into chains and handed over to the Romans. The story has some similarity to the capture of Jugurtha, who was deceived through his father-in-law, Bocchus, by Sulla.[85]

Why Caratacus turned to Cartimandua is not made clear. In chapter 32 Tacitus relates that Ostorius quelled a rebellion there, therefore, he must either have been asked to help or felt that he should because the Brigantes were a client kingdom. Tacitus also states that Ostorius only put to death the ringleaders. This would mean that there would still have been anti-Roman elements remaining in Brigantia and it may have been that Caratacus was hoping to link up with these, not Cartimandua, and was ambushed by some trick on her part when she discovered his intentions.

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83 Tac *Hist*, 3.45.

84 I. Richmond, 'Queen Cartimandua', *JRS* 44 (1954), 48-49.

85 Sall *Iug*, 113.6

Finally, in this British section only one firm date is given, which is marked out by hyperbaton: *nono post anno quam bellum in Britannia coeptum.* Since the Claudian invasion occurred in 43, we must assume that the year in question is 51, although 52 has also been suggested.

Tacitus' account then continues with an eulogy of Caratacus expressed in the warmest terms: *unde fama eius evecta insulas et proximas provincias pervagata per Italiam quoque celebrabatur, avebantque visere, quis ille tot per annos opes nostras sprevisset.* He emphasises the extent of Caratacus' fame through chiasmus and alliteration and the use of the unusual *pervagor*.[86] Tacitus also adds that 'the name of Caratacus was not without distinction even at Rome', where the use of *ne ... quidem ... ignobile* is an excellent example of the double negative (*litotes*) for emphasis. *ignobilis* is just the epithet that we would be expected to describe a 'barbarian' such as Caratacus, but his character was such that he had risen above such stereotyping. Tacitus has a special interest in freedom fighters and his praise for their heroic stand continually stresses the contrast with the servile attitude of Rome under the Caesars. Certainly, Tacitus' flattery of Caratacus is aimed at, and achieves the effect of enhancing the Roman achievement in Britain. It is not unlikely that Caratacus had gained glory because of his valiant resistance to Rome for over eight years and that his name had become a symbol of freedom for all those who felt oppressed and threatened by Roman rule. To spare the man was far better for propaganda purposes, since his execution could have provoked a widespread hostile reaction against Rome. As Martin has stated, 'the bold resistance of Caratacus clearly captured the Roman imagination',[87] and Tacitus' narrative continues describing the celebrations at Rome. Claudius could hardly celebrate a second triumph,[88] but he was able to hold a procession that was,

86 It is used elsewhere in Tacitus only at *Ann*, 15.38.9.

87 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 156.

88 D. Dudley, *op. cit.*, *UBHJ* 7 (1951), 15.

apparently, on as grand a scale as the triumph of 44,[89] so important was the capture of Caratacus.

The description of Caratacus is worth noting at this point. While the prayers of the rest were 'grovelling' (*degeneres ex metu), at non Caratacus aut vultu demisso aut verbis misericordiam requirens.* In addition, Tacitus, to characterise further the noble savage, gives him a speech. Dudley feels that the evidence suggests that Caratacus did speak[90] but obviously he would not have done so in these words since he would hardly have had such command over the Latin language (if he could even speak it!). This speech is the climax of the whole series of preceding events[91] and it has further significance because it is the only direct speech in *Annals* 12.[92] Contained within it are many home truths which would not have gone unnoticed by the educated Roman.

For example, the opening sentence, with the popular conditional to begin a speech, stresses the qualification for acceptance by Rome: *Si quanta nobilitas et fortuna mihi fuit, tanta rerum prosperarum moderatio fuisset, amicus potius in hanc urbem quam captus venissem, neque dedignatus esses claris maioribus ortum, plurimis gentibus imperitantem foedere in pacem accipere.*

Dudley feels that such an offer had been made to Caratacus,[93] but this need not be true, as he is here made to talk hypothetically (*Si ...*). It was an event that would not come to pass because Caratacus was not going to submit like a Cogidubnus nor a Prasutagus, nor a Cartimandua. Indeed, the Romans would have welcomed his alliance. It would have meant nine fewer years of an expensive war and furthermore, Caratacus could have aided the Romans in their diplomatic relations with other tribes.

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89 See Dio, 60.23.
90 D. Dudley, *op. cit., UBHJ* 7 (1951), 15-16.
91 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 156; D. Dudley, *op. cit., UBHJ* 7 (1951), 16f.
92 R. Martin, *ibid.*
93 D. Dudley, *op. cit., UBHJ* 7 (1951), 16.

Tacitus is close to the mark with statements such as: *praesens sors mea ut mihi informis, sic tibi magnifica est*, and: *nam si vos omnibus imperitare vultis, sequitur ut omnes servitutem accipiant*? The latter is particularly cutting. There had been numerous instances in Roman history where the Roman government, eager to implement an imperialistic policy, had ridden roughshod over the defeated enemy. There are many examples of whole tribes being scattered or exterminated, financial extortion by Romans in the provinces and numerous other abuses endured by the conquered.

The speech ends with a typical Tacitean moralising flourish: *si statim deditus traderer, neque mea fortuna neque tua gloria inclaruisset; et supplicium mei oblivio sequeretur: at si incolumem servaveris, aeternum exemplar clementiae ero.* This is true. Through his resistance, Caratacus had ensured his own fame throughout Britain and the rest of the provinces, while at the same time his capture by the Romans had given Claudius *gloria*. The appeal to the clemency of a general or emperor was a traditional one, and it was a quality that was of old linked with Julius Caesar or those to whom the Senate here refer:[94] Scipio Africanus who defeated Syphax of Numidia and Aemilius Paullus who conquered Perses of Macedonia. Neither king was executed immediately after capture. Obviously the Senate's words contain a great deal of flattery, but this should not be criticised too much, for the capture of Caratacus had been an event of great importance, as we can see from two unusual features of the celebration. The first was that the Praetorian Guard stood under arms, which they only did on special occasions, and secondly, Agrippina was sitting on a level with Claudius, as Tacitus notes: *novum sane et moribus veterum insolitum, feminam signis Romanis praesidere.* Such events would not be tolerated unless there was good reason.

Dio, or rather his epitomator, Zonaras, also testifies that Caratacus was taken to Rome.[95] Καράτακος δέ τις βαρβάρων ἀρχηγὸς ἄλλος καὶ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀχθείς, καὶ συγγνώμης παρὰ τοῦ Κλαυδίου τυχών, εἶτα περινοστήσας τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὴν ἄφεσιν, καὶ ἰδὼν

94 Tac *Ann*, 12.38.

95 Dio, 60.33.3 (= Zonaras, 11.10 p. 33, 19-250).

αὐτῆς τὴν λαμπρότητα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος "εἶτα" ἔφη, "ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι τῶν σκηνιδίων ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμεῖτε".[96]

There is no reason to suppose that Dio used the same source as Tacitus, for these details (apart from Caratacus' pardon and release) are missing in Tacitus. D. Braund feels that *venia* probably does not mean 'pardon', but only that Caratacus and his relations were not executed.[97] The story contained in Dio is most likely to be anecdotal, but certainly, from Tacitus, Dio and Petrus Patricius (see n. 96) there appears to be a tradition that Caratacus did speak at Rome.

Annals 12.38 then returns to events in Britain: *censentur Ostorio triumphi insignia, prosperis ad id rebus eius, mox ambiguis, sive amoto Carataco, quasi debellatum foret, minus intenta apud nos militia fuit, sive hostes miseratione tanti regis acrius ad ultionem exarsere.*

This is a clear example of a governor given his *triumphalia ornamenta* before the end of his governorship,[98] but matters in Britain were far from settled and Ostorius' glory was subsequently tarnished. Tacitus gives two reasons for Ostorius' downfall. The first was that the army relaxed because the threat of Caratacus had been removed, and the second, that the enemy wanted to avenge the loss of their hero all the more.

This must support Braund's understanding of *venia*. Caratacus cannot have been allowed to return to Britain, unless it was under strict guard. Even if he had returned he would have found himself in a difficult position since he would either have to remain passive and suffer the ridicule of his countrymen, or rejoin them in their struggle once more. The latter is unlikely. Caratacus disappears from the annals of history at this point. It was the view of

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96 Cf. Petrus Patricius, also summarising Dio, *Exc Vat*, 42, 208sq. Mai = 191, 12-19 Dind.: ὅτι τῶν Βρεττανῶν ὁ ἄρχων Καρτάκης κατασχεθεὶς εἰς Ῥώμην ἀνεπέμφθη· ὄντινα ἐπὶ βήματος ὁ Κλαύδιος χλαμύδα φορῶν εἰσήγαγεν· ὃς καὶ συγγνώμης ἔτυχε σὺν γαμετῇ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ διάψων· καί ποτι περινοστήσας τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἰδὼν τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν οἴκων "διὰ τί" ἔφη "τοσαῦτα καὶ τελικαῦτα κεκτημένοι τῶν σκηνῶν ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμεῖτε".

97 D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, 171.

98 See above; D. Eichholz, 'How long did Vespasian serve in Britain?', *Brit* 3 (1972), 152.

Patricius that he stayed in Rome with his wife and children but this is as unlikely as the preceding suggestion that he was allowed to return to rejoin the struggle in Britain. Perhaps a more likely suggestion is that Caratacus, now old and weary of the fight, was allowed to return to Colchester or to another stronghold in the south and remained there under close guard until his death.

Tacitus' view that the enemy wanted revenge all the more is probably just as valid as the army becoming complacent, because the centrepiece of British resistance for the last nine years had been removed. In this case, as we learn from Tacitus, the Silures were the enemy, who, no doubt, encouraged by the success that Caratacus had had with his guerilla tactics in the Welsh mountains, continued their resistance. The first incident to be picked out by Tacitus was an attack on a company building forts in Silurian territory: *praefectum castrorum et legionarias cohortes exstruendis apud Siluras praesidiis relictas circumfundunt. ac ni cito nuntiis ex castellis proximis subventum foret copiarum obsidio occidione obcubuissent: praefectus tamen et octo centuriones ac promptissimus quisque e manipulis cecidere.*[99]

This incident is probably picked out because of the large numbers of the men involved — at least 640 (eight centuries of eighty men) and possibly even more. Actual figures are not given so it is impossible to be precise. It is certain, however, that there were eight centuries present, since eight centurions were killed along with the 'most courageous' men from the units. *promptus* and its derivatives is commonly used to describe courageous men of action in Tacitus[100] and the superlative here gives emphasis to the heavy loss inflicted by the Britons.

Tacitus also records the loss of a foraging party: *nec multo post pabulantis nostros missasque ad subsidium turmas profligant.* The verb *pabulor* occurs only here in Tacitus. Its use recalls *de Bello Gallico* 5.17 where Caesar's foraging legions were also ambushed, although on

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99 Tac *Ann*, 12.38.3.

100 See Gerber and Greef, 1212, s.v. *promo* B a) *promptissimus*.

that occasion the Britons were put to flight. Livy, also, uses the word at 6.30.4 where the Manlii sent some troops out to forage. Again there was an ambush and help was sent.

The account continues in 39: *Tum Ostorius cohortis expeditas opposuit; nec ideo fugam sistebat, ni legiones proelium excepissent: earum robore aequata pugna, dein nobis pro meliore fuit.* Throughout his governorship Ostorius tried to conserve his prized legionary troops and to rely mainly on auxiliary forces.[101] The main reason for this was that the life of a Roman citizen was valued more highly than that of a non-Roman and losses of legionaries were, therefore, considered to be far more tragic and shameful than the loss of auxiliaries. In addition, the use of auxiliary troops was an intelligent one. For many of them came from the same sort of tribal background as the Britons they were fighting. Indeed, by now, some may even have been Britons.[102] Thus, they had experience of guerrilla-type warfare.

Curiously, Tacitus states at this point: *effugere hostes tenui damno quia inclinabat dies.* It must either be understood that the end of chapter 38 and the beginning of chapter 39 refer to engagements on one and the same day or that Tacitus is slightly confused. His narrative in 38 would seem to indicate that the loss of the building party and of the foraging group were isolated incidents. However, if *quia inclinabat dies* refers only to 39, who did Ostorius attack with his cohorts? Perhaps it must be assumed that it is against the group who attacked the foraging party and that 39 refers to battle on the same day or on a subsequent occasion. Certainly the text is not clear on this point and the following *crebra hinc proelia,* etc. must refer to the next few days, weeks or even months. Without doubt, however, the overall effect that Tacitus wishes to achieve is one of continuous guerrilla warfare as he says: *in modum latrocinii per saltus per paludes.* Here *latrocinium* is an unflattering word, implying the common bandit found on Rome's highways. Gone is the respect that Tacitus

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101 E.g., in the case of the 'First Icenian Revolt', Tac *Ann*, 12.31.

102 See above, and A. Rivet, 'The First Icenian Revolt', 203.

felt for Caratacus. Without him he regards the Britons as just a group of savage barbarians to be conquered.

In *per saltus per paludes* there is a variation on a theme which recurs in passages dealing with Roman Britain. Dio, too, talks of the Britons withdrawing to the swamps and forests,[103] and in Caesar, Cassivellaunus' kingdom was fenced in *silvis paludibusque*.[104] The language continues the antithesis of *per saltus per paludes*, but with skilful variety of construction: ... *sors aut virtute, temere proviso, ob iram ob praedam, iussu et aliquando ignaris ducibus*, in describing how the Romans were attacked by the Britons, but the main reason is isolated in its own sentence at the end: *ac praecipua Silurum pervicacia*. Clearly, the Silures are to be seen as the driving force behind these attacks. Tacitus feels that they should have been at peace now that their leader, Caratacus, was no longer present and he, sneeringly, puts their resistance down to 'stubbornness'.

Tacitus further elaborates on the reasons for their resistance: *Quos [Siluras] accendebat vulgata imperatoris Romani vox, ut quondam Sugambri excisi aut in Gallias traiecti forent, ita Silurum nomen penitus extinguendum*. The territory of the Sugambri had been devastated by Drusus in 12 B.C.[105] and the tribe was later forced by Tiberius to settle near the Rhine in 8 B.C.[106] That the Romans were capable of both cruelty and clemency towards conquered peoples is self-evident. If it were in the Roman interest to spare a man or tribe, they would undoubtedly do so. For example, already in this section Tacitus has related two cases of clemency, once towards the Brigantes[107] and once towards Caratacus.[108] On the contrary, later in the First Century, Agricola almost wiped out the whole of the Ordovices.[109] Elsewhere, when it was not in Rome's interest to be cruel, the situation was

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103 Dio, 60.19.5.
104 Caes *BGall*, 5.21.
105 See Livy *Ep*, 139; Dio, 54.32.1.
106 Vell, 2.97.4; Strabo, 7.1.3; Tac *Ann*, 2.26.3; Suet *Aug*, 21.2; Ps Victor, *Epit*, 17; Orosius, 6.21.24.
107 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.
108 *Ibid.*, 37.
109 See Tac *Agr*, 18.3: *caesaque prope universa gente.*

quickly put right by the replacement of the governor, as in the case of Suetonius Paulinus after his cruel suppression of the Boudican revolt.[110]

Here it is the fear of extinction, so Tacitus says, that prompted the Silures to cut off two auxiliary cohorts: *igitur duas axiliaris cohortis avaritia praefectorum incautius populantis intercepere.* The Silures do not do this through their own prowess alone but are successful as a result of the greed of the Roman commander, which is censured by the moralistic historian. *intercepere* appears to be a euphemism for 'wiped out' and the loss of some 160 men would be fairly significant, especially if the figures of Romans killed on other occasions are considered, for example, the 400 only killed in the final battle of the Boudican Revolt.[111]

Tacitus' account continues with the extension of the war by the Silures: *spoliaque et captivos largiendo ceteras quoque nationes ad defectionem trahebant.* It is impossible to know which tribes are meant. This could indicate tribes under Roman rule, since *defectio* implies 'revolt' or 'rebellion'. Among those that could be included are the Brigantes, for trouble broke out there at a later date.[112] Another possibility is the Dobunni; or, with more certainty, the Ordovices. The Deceangli might also have been one of these tribes. Apparently, however, there was limited success in this direction, for no tribe other than the Brigantes caused trouble in the near future. Furthermore, the premature death of Ostorius (*cum taedio curarum fessus Ostorius concessit vita, laetis hostibus, tamquam ducem haud spernendum etsi non proelium, at certe bellum absumpsisset.*) would have provided the ideal opportunity for a general insurrection, but this did not occur and only the Silures continued to fight on.

Tacitus sums up Ostorius with a characteristic epigram. He displays respect for the governor who had been a worthy adversary to the Silures. Although, in the end he could

110 See below, in ch. 4; Tac *Ann*, 14.38.
111 Tac *Ann*, 14.37.2.
112 See Tac *Ann*, 12.40.

not be killed in battle, it had been the tedious length of the war that had finally destroyed him.

Chapter 40 turns to the fortunes of Ostorius' successor: *At Caesar cognita morte legati, ne provincia sine rectore foret, A. Didium suffecit.* Aulus Didius Gallus[113] is mentioned three times in Tacitus as governor of Britain, once in the *Agricola*[114] and twice in the *Annals.*[115] In the *Agricola* his activities are described in these terms: *parta a prioribus continuit, paucis admodum castellis in ulteriora promotis, per quae fama aucti officii quaereretur.*[116] A similar mention is found in the *Annals: neque A. Didius legatus ... nisi parta retinuerat.*[117] He is portrayed as achieving little, merely holding his ground. But these references do not accord with his reputation. Didius was a 'trusted and senior man'[118] and he had gained success elsewhere in the empire, in both the civil and military spheres.[119] Furthermore, Tacitus opens his account with *is propere vectus.* This does not suggest an inactive governor; rather one who was keenly aware of the unstable state of affairs in Britain. Even in the interim period between governors, a matter of perhaps one and a half to two months, the Romans had suffered a setback, as a legion commanded by Manlius Valens had been defeated by the Silures.[120] This particular commander is mentioned for one reason only. In 96 he became consul at the age of ninety,[121] which is by far the oldest holder of this position known. Likewise, in 52, at the age of forty-five or forty-six, he is the oldest known legionary commander, although as A. Birley notes, seventeen years later he was still in command of another legion.[122] Clearly, for one reason or another, Valens' career had been retarded. Perhaps his eventual consulship in 96 was a reward for long (and not so distinguished!) service to the state. It would appear that Valens was in command of

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113 On Aulus Didius Gallus, see A. Birley, *Fasti*, 44-48.
114 Tac *Agr*, 14.2.
115 Tac *Ann*, 12.40; 14.29.
116 Tac *Agr*, 14.2
117 Tac *Ann*, 14.29.
118 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 44.
119 *Ibid.*, 47-48.
120 Tac *Ann*, 12.40.2: *Silures id quoque damnum intulerant.*
121 See Dio, 67.14.5
122 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 230.

the Twentieth Legion,[123] which was based in Gloucester about this period, if it were not already in the process of being moved to Usk.[124]

Tacitus is very unflattering to Didius. He records that the reports of Valens' defeat were exaggerated in two ways: by the enemy so that they could terrify the new governor and also by Didius himself for two reasons: either he hoped to gain greater praise if the situation were settled or to justify himself if it were not. In the event, the former was the case. Tacitus does not record whether Didius did gain greater praise. He simply dismisses the situation in one sentence: *Silures id quoque damnum intulerant lateque persultabant, donec adcursu Didii pellerentur.* This is emphatic, but the successful outcome passes almost without note in Tacitus because of his criticism of the governor. The words *lateque persultabant* are vivid, implying many varied raids, but Didius was able to drive back the Silures 'on his arrival', that is almost immediately and as if by his mere presence. There is no suggestion that there was a struggle to quell the Silures as was the case of Ostorius. Certainly now, if not before, the Twentieth Legion was moved forward as one unit to Usk.

The following lines concerning events in Brigantia, in conjunction with *Histories* 3.45, constitute probably one of the most hotly debated sections of Romano-British history. The problem is whether these two passages should be regarded as referring to the same incident, and if this is the case, whether the events should be assigned to the governorship of Didius (the date of the passage in the *Annals*) or to 69 (the date of *Histories* 3.45). However, the differences in the two versions make it uncertain whether Tacitus has erred and recounted the same story twice. Therefore, the incident contained in *Annals* 12.40 will be discussed here and that of *Histories* 3.45 in chapter 5. The problems surrounding the two passages are discussed in Appendix 2.

The passage in *Annals* 12.40 commences: *sed post captum Caratacum praecipuus scientia rei militaris Venutius, e Brigantum civitate, ut supra memoravi, fidusque diu et Romanis armis*

123 See S. Frere (1987), 64; P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 107.
124 S. Frere (1987), 66.

defensus, cum Cartimanduam reginam matrimonio teneret. This is the first extant reference to Venutius who, as Tacitus' words imply, had already been mentioned in the lost books of the *Annals*,[125] which cover the years 37-48, presumably under the governorship of Aulus Plautius. *fidusque diu* characterises the man, even though the Romans had only been in Britain since 43 and the year was now c. 54-55. Cartimandua is styled as the Queen of the Brigantes and Tacitus clearly regarded her as the real ruler in Brigantia. For he mentions that Venutius 'became hostile *even* towards ourselves' after his divorce (*mox orto discidio etiam adversus nos hostilia induerat*). Reading between the lines, this must have occurred because Cartimandua, as Queen of a large section of the Brigantes, if not the whole, had the backing of the Romans, especially after she had confirmed her allegiance to them by handing over Caratacus. It is, therefore, not implausible to suggest that the divorce came about because of this incident, since Caratacus, as has been seen, was a highly renowned chieftan and the Queen's act of treachery would have antagonised many a Briton.

I. Richmond discerns at least a 'dozen principal districts among the Brigantes ... sufficiently distant from one another to favour independence: all, at the same time, close enough to their neighbour as to invite confederacy as the sole guarantee of peace'.[126] This would favour the suggestion that Ventius was in fact a chieftain of another tribal area. This would explain the attack on Cartimandua and Tacitus' statement: *sed primo tantum inter ipsos certabatur.* Tacitus states that Cartimandua managed to ensnare the brother and relatives of Venutius *callidus ... artibus.* In the *Histories*, too, she is noted for her cunning, since she is said to have captured Caratacus *per dolum.* She was clearly a resourceful woman and Tacitus, who is always fascinated by the dominant woman in a man's world, brings this out skilfully in his narrative.

This behaviour spurred Ventius to attack Cartimandua. He launched his attack with a 'picked band of men', *ne feminae imperio subderentur.* This clearly implies that

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125 The last part of *Ann*, 6 to *Ann*, 10 are missing.

126 I. Richmond, *op. cit.*, *JRS* 44 (1954), 46.

Cartimandua did not enjoy total support in Brigantia, if, in fact, as noted previously, she ruled all of it. A possible scenario is that Cartimandua was in control of only a southern part of Brigantia, which would explain why no action was taken until Venutius invaded (from the north). This event had been foreseen (*quod nobis praevisum*) by the Romans and here there is more evidence of Didius' ability to take decisive action, contrary to Tacitus' poor opinion of him.

Thus, for the second time, the Romans clashed with the Brigantes:[127] *et missae auxilio cohortes acre proelium fecere, cuius initio ambiguo finis laetior fuit. neque dispari eventu pugnatum a legione, cui Caesius Nasica praeerat.* The battle was at first joined by auxiliaries, a common practice and one that the previous governor, Ostorius, had employed. Although they eventually did succeed, according to Tacitus' account, this was not the end of the matter. A legion, probably the Ninth (based at Lincoln?), under Caesius Nasica was soon ordered into action. Nasica is mentioned here probably because he was the brother of another legate of the Ninth and later governor of Britain, Quintus Petillius Cerialis.[128]

In his appraisal of Didius, Tacitus is unjustifiably scathing: *nam Didius senectute gravis et multa copia honorum per ministros agere et arcere hostem satis habebat.* The epithet *senectute gravis* is not strictly accurate. Didius was consul in 39, at the earliest age possible and, therefore, in 57 he can only have been about fifty-five years of age at the most. This was perhaps considered old for a violent province like Britain, but Didius was evidently a man of some military talent. If he did act through officers (*ministros* is a harsh word to use implying 'personal agents'), this was because he may have been too old to work in the field. His job was to make right decisions at the right time. As for *arcere hostem satis habebat*, this was true. Didius probably had strict orders not to advance but during his period of 'inactivity' he had managed to subdue the Silures, who had been a thorn in Rome's side for several years, and he had quelled a revolt amongst the Brigantes. In both areas there is

127 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 12.32.

128 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 66f. and 231.

evidence of fort building at around this time,[129] suggesting minor advances. In the main, these forts were established to secure the boundaries of the Roman province from hostile attack until the time was ripe for an advance. It was perhaps to Didius' governorship that Suetonius was referring when he remarked: *Augendi propagandique imperii neque voluntate ulla neque spe motus umquam, etiam ex Britannia deducere exercitum cogitavit, nec nisi verecundia, ne obtrectare parentis gloriae videretur, destitit.*[130]

B. Warmington feels that the 'most obvious hypothesis' is that this refers to a short-lived over-reaction after news reached Rome of Boudica's revolt.[131] This is possible, but if there were only a brief period of reaction it would not necessarily have been mentioned by Suetonius. C. Stevens felt that Nero had changed his mind after reading Veranius' will.[132] This argument also has its drawbacks, since Veranius was clearly following an expansionist policy and, as K. Bradley notes,[133] the motive (Nero's concern for Claudius' reputation) immediately invalidates the theory of a policy change dependent on fancy. It is preferable to follow the arguments presented by Bradley.[134] Following the suggestions of S. Frere[135] and E. Birley,[136] he argues that the appointment of Veranius 'certainly denoted that expansionism was to be pursued after all' and that it is likely that, while Suetonius does not deplore and even agrees with a non-expansionist policy — for he refers to Augustus in these terms: *tantumque afuit a cupiditate quoquo modo imperium vel bellicam gloriam augendi*[137] — it is the display of *verecundia* of which he approves.[138]

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129 See S. Frere (1987), 66f.; P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 107f; G. Webster, *op. cit., Brit* 1 (1970), 191-193; M. Jarrett, *op. cit., Archl* 121 (1964), 31-33 *inter al.*

130 Suet *Nero*, 18.

131 B. Warmington, *Suetonius: Nero*, 18.

132 C. Stevens, 'The will of Quintus Veranius', *CQ* n.s. 1 (1951), 4 ff.

133 K. Bradley, *Suetonius: Life of Nero*, 111, *contra* Stevens, *op. cit., CQ* n.s. 1 (1951), 6.

134 K. Bradley, *op. cit.*, 111-112.

135 S. Frere (1987), 68.

136 E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, 5.

137 Suet *Aug*, 21.

138 K. Bradley, *op. cit.*, 113.

Under Veranius, then, expansion was renewed with vigour, but his tenure of office receives scant mention in the *Annals:*[139] *... et successor Veranius modicis excursibus Siluras populatus quin ultra bellum proferret, morte prohibitus est, magna, dum vixit, severitatis fama, supremis testamenti verbis ambitionis manifestus: quippe multa in Neronem adulatione addidit subiecturum ei provinciam fuisse, si biennio [pro]vixisset.*[140] Likewise, in the *Agricola: Didium Veranius excepit isque intra annum exstinctus est.*[141] The career of Quintus Veranius, as E. Birley notes, is better documented than that of any pre-Hadrianic governor of Britain other than Agricola.[142] He was apparently supported by the Emperor, for his rise through the *cursus honorum* was rapid, especially so for a man of plebeian status. Since he had probably held the consulship in 49 at the age of thirty-seven, he was a fairly young man of forty-six when he died (*contra* Stevens).[143]

In narrating Veranius' activity in Britain, Tacitus tells us above that he 'devastated the Silures in some unremarkable forays'. Yet *populor* and *modicus* seems to be mutually exclusive. We must either understand one or the other. *modicis excursibus* is a curious statement if it is considered that this was a man who claimed he would have subjugated the province had he lived for another two years. He must, therefore, be credited with some aggressive activity, especially if sense is to be made of *Siluras populatus.*

Stevens calls Veranius a 'foolish old man'[144] but, as already noted, he was not old and he certainly would not have had the rapid promotion that he had had if he were 'foolish'. If Veranius were of sound mind, his suggestion that he could have subdued the whole province within another year or two is intriguing.

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139 Tac *Ann*, 12.29.

140 See R. Shaw-Smith, 'Three notes on Tacitus', *CQ* 29 (1979), 224-225. *proximo* is suspect. If he had lived two years longer these were bound to be the next two. Therefore this leads to the emendation *provivere* meaning 'to live longer' which is also used in this sense at Tac *Ann*, 6.25.

141 Tac *Agr*, 14.

142 E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, 2-3.

143 C. Stevens, *op. cit.*, *CQ* n.s. 1 (1951), 7.

144 *Idem*. Cf. E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, 6.

Since three years later the province erupted into violent rebellion, this was certainly a sign that Veranius would not have had total success, but that the seeds of discontent were already present. His instructions seem to have been to complete the conquest of Wales. The Silures were evidently placated before Suetonius Paulinus became governor, as he moved without hesitation into Ordovician territory. However, a problem lies in Tacitus' use of the word *provincia*. This would mean 'the province itself'; that is the area already governed by Rome. In which case Veranius might be seen to be continuing Didius' policy of containment of the natives by means of fort building and Romanization, keeping hostile tribes such as the Silures quiet, occasionally by threatening them but mainly by blocking their access routes to the province with forts. This might make sense of Tacitus' *modicis excursibus*. At any rate, Veranius managed once again to quell the Silures who had probably caused some trouble at the beginning of his governorship. Certainly on his death the situation was peaceful enough for Paulinus to attempt to complete the conquest of Wales.

Chapter Four: The Governorship of Suetonius Paulinus and the Revolt of Boudica[1]

This chapter covers events of the years 58 to 61, the years of the governorship of Suetonius Paulinus and also a period dominated by the larger-than-life figure of Boudica leading her British hordes against the Romans. Indeed, as far as the secondary source material for the revolt is concerned, far more has been written about it than any other single event in Romano-British history. This is largely due to the amount of space devoted to it by the authors Dio (twelve chapters)[2] and Tacitus (eleven chapters in the *Annals*[3] and two in the *Agricola*[4]). Only Tacitus, however, records the activities of Suetonius prior to the revolt.

Tacitus' account, which covers events from 57, still commences with a reference to the revolt: *Caesennio Paeto et Petronio Turpiliano consulibus gravis clades in Britannia accepta*.[5] The naming of the two consuls confirms the year as 61, but before embarking on a narrative of the events of this year, Tacitus goes back a few years in order to establish the background to the revolt. He briefly summarizes the achievements of Suetonius' predecessors in office, Aulus Didius Gallus and Quintus Veranius, before announcing: *sed tum Paulinus Suetonius obtinebat Britannos, scientia militiae et rumore populi, qui neminem sine aemulo sinit. Corbulonis concertator, receptaeque Armeniae decus aequare domitis perduellibus cupiens.* Attention is immediately drawn to the new governor through the hyperbaton of his name. Like Veranius, he was 'another specialist in mountain warfare'.[6] He had achieved notable success in Mauretania some years before and had returned to be

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1 For this as the correct spelling and on the pronunciation of her name, see K. Jackson, 'Queen Boudicca?' *Brit* 10 (1979), 255.

2 Dio, 62.1-12 = Xiphilinus, pp. 158, 24-165, 20R St.

3 Tac *Ann*, 14.29-39.

4 Tac *Agr*, 14.3-16, 2.

5 Tac *Ann*, 14.29.1.

6 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 54.

rewarded with the consulship sometime around 43.[7] From then until 58, however, there is no record of Suetonius holding another consular command. A. Birley proposes that it is not unreasonable to suggest that Suetonius governed one of the Germanies, Pannonia or Dalmatia in the late 40s or early 50s.[8]

The worth of Suetonius is further emphasised by the assonance of the letters m and n and the word play *sine ... sinit* in the phrase: *qui neminem sine aemulo sinit*. The alliterative *Corbulonis concertator*[9] (which B. Baldwin has suggested is 'comic by dint of its sound and weight'[10]) combined with the archaic *perduellibus* (a word which only occurs here in the works of Tacitus but is used in comedy[11] and is probably meant to be humorous here) adds to this 'eye-catching' picture.

In the *Agricola*, too, Suetonius is emphatically introduced through the division of his name by *hinc: Suetonius hinc Paulinus biennio prosperas res habuit, subactis nationibus firmatisque praesidiis,*[12] but the rest of the sentence contains common clichés: *prosperas res; subactis nationibus; firmatis ... praesidiis*. Despite recording his achievements in a succinct manner, Suetonius is not actually flattered in this passage.

Both accounts of Tacitus record the attack on Anglesey. The *Agricola* states: *quorum fiducia Monam insulam ut vires rebellibus ministrantem adgressus terga occasioni patefecit.*[13] This would seem to imply that Suetonius had initially been operating in Wales, continuing the work of his predecessor, Veranius, who appears to have finally quelled the Silures, as they are not mentioned in the ancient sources again.[14] Moreover, Suetonius was able to advance

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7 *Ibid.*, 55; cf. R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 387.

8 *Idem*, basing his theory on the work of Ritterling, Reidiger and Jagenteufel who demonstrate that there are gaps in our knowledge of the governors of these provinces at this time.

9 *concertator* is particularly striking since it only occurs here in extant Latin literature.

10 B. Baldwin, 'Tacitean humour', *Weiner Studien* n.s. 11 (1977), 138.

11 Cf. Plaut *Am*, 1.1.94; *Cist*, 1353; *Ps*, 218, 582, 589; *Mil Gl*, 222.

12 Tac *Agr*, 14.3.

13 *Ibid.*

14 G. Webster, 'Military situations in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71', *Brit* 1 (1970), 192.

into the territory of the Ordovices unhindered and felt secure enough after garrisoning north Wales to attack Anglesey because this island provided a safe haven for 'rebels'.

The *Annals* records events slightly differently: *igitur Monam insulam, incolis validam et receptaculum perfugarum, edgredi parat, navesque fabricatur plano alveo adversus breve et incertum.*[15] Here the main reason for the onslaught on Anglesey is Suetonius' desire for some glory to match that of his rival, Corbulo. Tacitus also describes the island as *incolis validam* (possibly reminiscent of the description of the Iceni as *valida gens* elsewhere[16]) and *receptaculum perfugarum*. This could conceivably refer to Roman deserters but more probably British fugitives fleeing from Rome. The latter meaning is more likely in view of the phrase *rebellibus ministrantem* used in the *Agricola*, for there as well Anglesey is seen as providing a refuge for those fleeing from the might of Rome. A parallel might also be drawn here with the use of *transfugas* in Suetonius, *Claudius* 17.[17]

In the *Annals* Tacitus next relates Suetonius' preparations for the assault. He constructed boats with flat hulls. This piece of information may be included to draw a parallel with another great general. In preparation for his British expedition of 54 B.C., Caesar had manufactured boats of a different design to the normal.[18] Presumably, Suetonius' boats resembled modern day landing craft. As Tacitus notes, the Menai Straits were neither deep nor far to cross and to stress this he uses language which has poetical associations:[19] *adversus breve*[20] *et incertum*. With typical *brevitas*, Tacitus next announces: *sic pedes*, antithetically juxtaposed to *equites*, who are depicted swimming beside their horses in the

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15 Tac *Ann*, 14.29.

16 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 14.31.

17 *Supra*, ch. 2.

18 Cf. Caes *BGall*, 5.1: *Earum [sc. navium] modum formamque demonstrat. ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque paulo facit humiliores quam quibus in nostro mari uti consuevimus, atque id eo magis quod propter crebros commutationes aestuum minus magnos ibi fluctus fieri cognoverat; ad onera, ad multitudinem iumentorum transportandam paulo latiores quam quibus in reliquis utimur maribus.*

19 See N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 107.

20 See *OLD*, 241, s.v. *brevis* 1c = 'shallow water', where the following are cited: Verg *Aen*, 5.22.1; Cels, 5.28.12; Mela, 1.102; Sen *Ag*, 572; Luc, 9. 317; Juv, 3.226 and Mela, 1.35. Tacitus may be the only prose author to use the word in this fashion.

deeper water. N. Miller has observed *adno* only occurs here in Tacitus[21] and, therefore, emphasises the unusual sight of soldiers and horses swimming across the Straits. The troops referred to at this point may indicate that Batavian cohorts were being employed since their special skill was the ability to swim.[22] The language throughout the whole of this section is poetic and exotic, and through this medium Tacitus is able to recreate history in an interesting and vivid manner.[23]

Annals 14.30 introduces a startling scene: *Stabat pro litore diversa acies, densa armis virisque, intercursantibus feminis, quae in modum Furiarum veste ferali, crinibus deiectis faces praeferebant: Druidaeque circum, preces diras sublatis ad caelum manibus fundentes, novitate adspectus perculere militem, ut quasi haerentibus membris immobile corpus vulneribus praeberent. Stabat* provides an emphatic opening word, 'There stood ...', and the scene is immediately set. *pro litore diversa acies* is a clever turn of phrase, for although *diversa*, in normal Tacitean usage, means 'the opposing army', here, as M. Roberts has stated, quoting *Annals* 13.57.2,[24] it implies that the enemy battle line was 'different' in appearance.[25] The description of the British forces begins naturally enough with the hendiadys *densa armis virisque* exaggerating the strength of the force opposing the Romans, but Tacitus next states *intercursantibus feminis*, where the curious sight of women appearing in a situation normally reserved for men is emphasised by the Tacitean solitary *intercurso*.[26] Moreover these women are portrayed by means of the simile, 'dressed in the manner of Furies, in black robes'. Again, *Furia* only occurs here in Tacitus and *feralis* is yet another word which has poetical associations,[27] as does the phrase *crinibus deiectis*.[28] The next phrase emphatically commences *Druidaeque circum*, directly linking the women

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21 See N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 107.

22 See M. Hassall, 'Batavians and the Roman conquest of Britain', *Brit* 1 (1970), 132.

23 N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 111.

24 M. Roberts, 'The revolt of Boudicca (Tacitus, *Annals* 14.29-39) and the assertion of *libertas* in Neronian Rome', *AJPh* 109 (1988), 120.

25 *Idem.*

26 Cf. Livy, 21.35.1 where the word is also used of barbarians. An echo may be intended here.

27 See *OLD*, 685, s.v. *feralis*; Lewis and Short, 235, s.v. *feralis*.

28 See N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 108.

with these mystical figures who appear to have been familiar to the Roman audience. Only Tacitus and the Elder Pliny[29] directly mention their role in Britain, but Caesar does give an account of their nature and importance in Gaul[30] and had regarded Britain as the source of their origin. The succeeding phrases *preces diras sublatis* and *caelum manibus fundentes* would appear to recall Horace and, especially, Vergil.[31] Certainly the tone is once again very poetic and the depiction of this strange sight is further heightened by the *sublatis ... manibus*, which in turn encompasses *ad caelum*. In consequence, the Roman troops were 'stunned' because of the novelty of the sight and were unable to move 'their frozen bodies open to attack'.[32] This picture of a Roman army rooted to the spot, unnerved by the enemy hordes confronting them is not an unusual one.[33] As in other instances, the troops overcame their fear in true Roman fashion and marched forward to victory: *dein cohortationibus ducis et se ipsi stimulantes, ne muliebre et fanaticum agmen pavescerent, inferunt signa sternuntque obvios et igni suo involvunt.*

Suetonius has in this way displayed the qualities of a good general,[34] encouraging his men forward 'so that they should not be terrified by a female and fanatical band'. Again there is a reference to the women mentioned above, only now the adjective *muliebre et fanaticum*[35] *agmen* is ambiguous, implying a hendiadys 'it was a fanatical, feminine battle line'. Perhaps Tacitus is drawing on his knowledge of mythology at this point, suggesting that the women have corrupted the men, just as Pentheus was once corrupted by the Bacchants,[36] causing them to be effeminate and 'inspired by the god'.[37] But a frenzied group such as this had no hope of withstanding the efficiency of the Roman fighting

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29 Pliny *NH*, 30.4.

30 Caes *BGall*, 6.13ff.

31 See N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 108.

32 *immobilis* is a rare word in Tacitus, only occurring elsewhere at *Hist*, 4.2.15, and *Ann*, 16.10.19. It therefore has special emphasis.

33 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 12.35; Caes *BGall*, 4.25.

34 Cf. Ostorius Scapula, Tac *Ann*, 12.35 and Agricola, Tac *Agr*, 18.4; 35.4.

35 Another rare word occurring again in Tacitus only at *Hist*, 2.61.

36 See Euripides, *Bacchae*, *passim*.

37 This is the original meaning of *fanaticum*, q.v. Lewis and Short, 725, s.v. *fanaticus-a-um*; *OLD*, 676, s.v. *fanaticus-a-um* 2.

machine once the troops had overcome their fear and, in another poetical phrase,[38] the Romans turned the torches against their bearers. M. Roberts points out that the tricolon structure of the verbs *inferunt, sternuntque, involvunt* (all dramatic presents and active verbs), expresses the ease with which the Romans win the day,[39] implying that the Britons' own fanatical style of warfare brought about their own destruction in the end. Indeed, up to this point Roberts sees a deliberate contrast between British reliance on emotion and religious frenzy, as exemplified by the women acting in the manner of Furies and the Druids invoking curses, and the cold, emotionless efficiency of the Roman forces. To reinforce this opinion, Roberts points to a cluster of words in Tacitus' narrative describing the Britons, commencing with the letter f: *feminis, Furiarum, ferali, faces, fundentes, fanaticum.*[40]

Tacitus summarises the aftermath: *praesidium posthac impositum victis excisique luci saevis superstitionibus sacri: nam cruore captivo adolere aras et hominum fibris consulere deos fas habebant.* Tacitus draws attention to this triumph through alliteration and assonance of the letter p: *praesidium posthac impositum.* Most importantly it is a victory for right over wrong, emphasised by the description of the barbaric nature of those who have been defeated. Their savagery is stressed by the chiasmus and alliteration of the phrase: *luci saevis superstitionibus sacri,* by further alliteration in *cruore captivo* and *adolere aras,* rounded off by the phrase *fas habebant* which implies a religious duty, when in fact to the Romans such practices were abhorrent. N. Miller has observed that again these phrases are poetic in nature with epic associations: the word *fibris* is also poetic,[41] and this style assists in creating a striking picture.

Within these lines a reason for the attack on Anglesey may be detected. The Druids had enormous influence in Britain and in Gaul;[42] their extinction could probably bring about the

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38 N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus,* 108. Cf. Verg *Georg,* 2.308: *involvunt flammis.*

39 M. Roberts, *op. cit., AJPh* 109 (1988), 120.

40 *Ibid.,* 120-121.

41 See N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus,* 108.

42 See Caes *BGall,* 6.13.

subjugation of Britain far more easily.[43] Indeed, C. du Toit, following the argument of D. Dudley and G. Webster, has suggested that Druidism was a prime reason for the onset of the Boudican revolt, begun in order to forestall the assault on Anglesey.[44] A rebellion at precisely this juncture is strikingly coincidental and Dio also suggests that Druidic influence was an important factor in fomenting it.[45] Yet there were other, deeper reasons, not the least of which was the, apparently, heaven-sent opportunity for rebellion while a large proportion of the occupying army was in Wales. As the *Agricola* states, *terga occasioni patefecit;* Suetonius had laid himself wide open to an attack from the rear and the Iceni were quick to seize the opportunity as the characteristically Tacitean final sentence of *Annal* 14.30 emphasises: *haec agenti Suetoni repentina defectio provinciae nuntiatur.*

The account of Dio virtually ignores the activities of Suetonius in Wales (there is a brief mention of Anglesey within his narrative[46]). He begins his account: ἐν ᾧ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐπαίζετο, πάθος ἐν τῇ βρεττανίᾳ δεινὸν συνηνέχθη· δύο τε γὰρ πόλεις ἐπορθήθησαν, και μυριάδες ὀκτὼ τῶν τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῶν ἐφθάρησαν, ἥ τε νῆσος ἠλλοτριώθη.[47] The suffering in Britain is deliberately set against Nero's frivolity at Rome (ἐπαίζετο, πάθος) in a similar manner to the way in which Tacitus contrasts events at Rome and Britain to influence his listeners' views.[48] The phrase πάθος ἐν τῇ βρεττανίᾳ δεινὸν συνηνέχθη contained in Dio is equivalent to Tacitus' *gravis clades in Britannia accepta.*[49] Dio's narrative, however, next summarises subsequent events; 'Two cities were destroyed and 80,000 Romans and their allies were killed, and the island belonged to another'. Tacitus records the actual destruction of Colchester, London

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43 C. Stevens, 'The will of Quintus Veranius', *CR* n.s. 1 (1951), 6.

44 C. du Toit, 'Tacitus and the rebellion of Boudicca;, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 52; D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Boudicca*, 53, *contra* S. Dyson, 'Native revolts in the Roman Empire', *Historia* 20 (1971), 260.

45 See Dio, 62ff, and below.

46 Dio, 62.8.1.

47 Dio, 62.1.

48 M. Roberts, *op. cit., AJPh* 109 (1988), 118-119.

49 Tac *Ann*, 14.32.

and Verulamium,[50] whilst Suetonius states: *clades Britannia qua duo praecipua oppida magna, civium sociorumque caede direpta sunt.*[51] J. Overbeck suggests that 'Suetonius' two important towns have become two, plain and simple, in Dio's account'.[52] At this point Dio is almost certainly employing the same source as Suetonius, except that he includes the added detail that 80,000 were killed. Of the three towns referred to by Tacitus, the two most likely to be meant in Suetonius and Dio are Colchester and London (despite Verulamium's standing as a *municipium*[53]), for later, in the speech of Suetonius Paulinus,[54] Dio remarks that one city was betrayed and the other abandoned. Both details are attested by Tacitus, the former with regard to Colchester[55] and the latter to London.[56] However, Overbeck argues that the second town must be Verulamium[57] since it had a charter although this ignores the fact that London was far larger and contained a far greater proportion of Roman citizens, including the imperial procurator, because of its importance as a centre of trade.

Dio next proceeds to relate the portents that occurred prior to the outbreak of rebellion: ὅς που καὶ τὸ θεῖον τὴν συμφορὰν αὐτοῖς προεσήμανεν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου θροῦς νυκτὸς βαρβαρικὸς μετὰ γέλωτος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου θόρυβος μετ' οἰμωγῆς ἐξηκούετο, μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων μήτε φθεγγομένου μήτε στένοντος, οἰκίαι τέ τινες ἐν τῷ Ταμέσᾳ ποταμῷ ὕφυδροι ἑωρῶντο, καὶ ὁ ὠκεανὸς ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς τε νήσου καὶ τῆς Γαλατίας αἱματώδης ποτὲ ἐν τῇ πλημμυρίδι ηὐξήθη.[58]

Tacitus, too, refers to these: *inter quae nulla palam causa delapsum Camuloduni simulacrum Victoriae ac retro conversum, quasi cederet hostibus. et feminae in furore<m> turbatae adesse exitium canebant, externosque fremitus in curia eorum auditos, consonuisse ululatibus*

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50 *Ibid.*, 33.
51 Suet *Nero*, 39.
52 J. Overbeck, 'Tacitus and Dio on Boudicca's rebellion', *AJPh* 90 (1969), 130.
53 See Tac *Ann*, 14.33.2.
54 Dio, 62.9.2.
55 Tac *Ann*, 14.32.2: *et impedientibus qui occulti rebellionis conscii consilia turbabant.*
56 See Tac *Ann*, 14.33.1: *unius oppidi damno servare universa statuit.*
57 See J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 131.
58 Dio, 62.1-2.

theatrum visamque speciem in aestuario Tamesae subversae coloniae. iam Oceanus cruento adspectu, et labente aestu humanorum corporum effigies relictae, ut Britanni<s> ad spem, ita veterani<s> ad metum trahebantur.[59] Tacitus' account occurs after his version of the reasons for the revolt, whereas Dio's occurs before these. Presented in this way Tacitus' description of the portents does much more to heighten narrative tension prior to the commencement of the rebellion itself.[60]

While the similarities in the accounts are clear, there are differences in the treatment of the subject. Tacitus relates that the statue of Victory at Colchester fell down, using assonance of the 'heavy' letters m and n to describe this ominous omen. Almost as an afterthought he adds *ac retro conversum, quasi cederet hostibus* as further evidence that the destruction of Colchester was predicted. Dio omits this detail but he does record the other omens that Tacitus now presents through the mouths of women, thereby creating extra pathos and distancing himself from any accusations of invention. The alliterative phrase *feminae in furorem*, recalling the Fury-like British women in chapter 30, is now applied to the Romans. This is followed by a poetical phrase strongly reminiscent of Vergil[61] and also of *Annals* 2.54.[62] The next phrase is exactly parallelled in Dio who too notes that 'foreign cries' (θροῦς ... βαρβαρικὸς = *externos fremitus*) came from the senate house but adds that these were intermingled with laughter. Both also record the sounds that came out of the theatre. Tacitus' version, however, is more concise and emphatic. He uses the strengthened verb *consonuisse*, which has poetical associations and is rare in Tacitus, only occurring here and at *Annals* 15.37.14. This verb is combined with *ululatibus*, also a largely poetical word and one only used of women.[63] Dio is less brief. He employs the contrasting θόρυβος μετ' οἰμωγῆς and μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων μήτε φθεγγομένου μήτε στένοντος to create the ghostly atmosphere of unnatural sounds. Dio's vocabulary is also poetic at this point and

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59 Tac *Ann*, 14.32.

60 See N. Miller in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 109.

61 Cf. Verg *Aen*, 8.656: *anser ... Gallos in limine adesse canebat.*

62 *et ferebatur Germanico per ambages, ut mos oraculis, maturum exitium cecinisse.*

63 See Gerber and Greef, 1697, s.v. *ululatus*, quoting *Germ*, 7.12: *Hist*, 4.18.17; *Ann*, 4.62.17.

reminiscent of tragedy. However, his actual narrative continues uninspiringly: οἰκίαι τέ τινες ἐν τῷ Ταμέσᾳ ποταμῷ ὕφυδροι ἑωρῶντο. Tacitus is more elaborate. He is not satisfied with the appearance of mere houses in ruins. For him the whole colony is destroyed (*subversae coloniae*) and this picks up the *Camuloduni* and *conversum* of the first sentence. As Dio's οἰκίαι are bland in comparison to Tacitus' *colonia* so is his ἐν τῷ Ταμέσᾳ ποταμῷ ὕφυδροι compared to *in aestuario Tamesae*. The slight word change creates an altogether more vivid scene, even if the location of Colchester at this point is not geographically accurate. Likewise, in his last sentence Dio records that the sea between Gaul and Britain once turned blood-red at flood tide. Tacitus omits the word 'once' and notes graphically that the Ocean appeared bloody, which is described with typical *brevitas* in only three words *Oceanus, cruento, adspectu*, whereas Dio takes two lines and adds that when the tide had receded likenesses of human corpses remained. Tacitus rounds off the section neatly with a pair of balanced phrases *ut Britannis ad spem, ita veteranis ad metum trahebantur*, contrasting Briton and Roman, hope and fear in a similar manner to his continuing antitheses of feminine/masculine, disorder/order, thus providing a launching pad for the action to follow.

Tacitus' description of the portents is far more dramatic than Dio's. This is aided by its presentation through the eyes of observers, perhaps with some variation from his original source which was clearly the same as Dio's and may have been the Elder Pliny[64] or the memoirs of Suetonius Paulinus[65] possibly derived via the work of Fabius Rusticus[66] or Cluvius Rufus.[67] The use of omens by historians dates back to Herodotus and there are plentiful examples of them marking an important event. For instance, Suetonius uses them to announce the death of Julius Caesar,[68] Tacitus to announce the death of Claudius,[69] and

64 G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich und die Fremden* ..., 130ff.
65 N. Reed, 'The sources of Tacitus and Dio for the Boudiccan revolt', *Latomus* 33 (1974), 927.
66 *Ibid.*, 932.
67 G. Townend, 'Some rhetorical battle pictures in Dio', *Hermes* 92 (1964), 474.
68 Suet, *DivJ*, 81.
69 Tac *Ann*, 1.18.

to herald the conspiracy of Piso against Nero.[70] In every case their purpose is to add interest and to create atmosphere either by marking an important event that has just happened or that is about to occur.

Both Dio and Tacitus also consider the underlying motives for the commencement of the revolt. Dio's version, introduced after his account of the portents, begins: πρόφασις δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ἐγένετο ἡ δήμευσις τῶν χρημάτων ἃ Κλαύδιος τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτῶν ἐδεδώκει· καὶ ἔδει καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ὡς γε Δεκιανὸς Κάτος ὁ τῆς νήσου ἐπιτροπεύων ἔλεγεν, ἀναπόμπιμα γενέσθαι.[71] The reason that Dio gives then is 'the confiscation of property which Claudius had given to the leading Britons'. C. Bulst suggests that this phrase rules out land grants or loans and must refer only to gifts.[72] The friction that the involvement of the procurator caused would seem to suggest that the latter is most likely. M. Gyles accepts this view and proposes that Catus Decianus had insisted that they were loans,[73] so causing this grave misunderstanding. Du Toit, however, argues that the gifts were recalled because the Britons were 'about to forfeit client kingdom status',[74] perhaps following the proposal of Bulst that the gifts were no longer needed because the loyalty of the Britons now seemed secure since they were on the point of becoming Roman subjects.[75] If this were the case then the Iceni were justifiably outraged. Such grants as gifts were not uncommon in order to woo a tribe over to the Roman side.[76] Gifts also had purpose in aiding the Romanisation of a newly conquered territory. For example, Colchester could not have been provided with constructions such as a senate house, theatre and a grand temple to the Emperor Claudius as early as 60 unless substantial financial had not been given to the Trinovantes. M. Gyles argues that the recall of these monies that had been invested in certain projects was

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70 *Ibid.*, 15.47.

71 Dio, 62.2.1.

72 C. Bulst, 'The revolt of Queen Boudicca in A.D. 60', *Historia* 10 (1961), 497.

73 M. Gyles, 'Effects of Roman capital investment in Britain under Nero', in M. Gyles and E. Davis (eds.), *Laudatores Temporis Acti*, 104.

74 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 150.

75 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 497.

76 Cf. Caes *BGall*, 1.43.3 and Dio, 63.6.3; cf. also M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 91.

preparatory to Nero's reform of the currency and that the real problem lay in Decianus's over-zealous reacquisition of this Roman wealth.[77]

Catus Decianus also appears in the pages of Tacitus.[78] Once when asked to assist the beleaguered Romans at Colchester (where his name is Catus Decianus as opposed to Dio's Δεκιανὸς Κάτος perhaps an inversion like Tacitus' Paulinus Suetonius in chapter 29) and the second time at the end of chapter 32: *qua clade et odiis provinciae, quam avaritia eius in bellum egerat, trepidus procurator Catus in Galliam transiit.* Here Tacitus regards the man as a major instigator of the revolt, although he is not mentioned in his summary of reasons in 31. On this point Tacitus and Dio would seem to agree. Yet in Tacitus his implied involvement (Catus is not named) occurs under rather different circumstances: *Rex Icenorum Prasutagus, longa opulentia clarus, Caesarem heredem duasque filias scripserat, tali obsequio ratus regnumque et domum suam procul iniuria fore. quod contra vertit, adeo ut regnum per centuriones, domus per servos velut capta vastarentur. iam primum uxor eius Boudicca verberibus adfecta et filiae stupro violatae sunt; praecipui quique Icenorum, quasi cunctam regionem muneri accepissent, avitis bonis exuuntur, et propinqui regis inter mancipia habebantur.* For Tacitus the trouble begins with the death of Prasutagus whom he describes as *longa opulentia clarus.* S. Dyson has pointed out that this phrase implies that the king had prospered under Roman rule,[79] perhaps having been installed following the Icenian revolt in 47[80] (if, in fact, this ever occurred). The veracity of the phrase has been doubted because of the lack of concrete evidence for such wealth. However, M. Mossop has convincingly argued that the five coins discovered at Joist Fen, Lakenheath, published by D. Allen[81] (and supported by a further four, with the inscription SUB RIC(ON) PRASTO on the obverse and ESICO FECIT on the reverse, could be interpreted as 'Under King Prasutagus, Esico made this', thus confirming Allen's 'remarkable legend.[82]

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77 M. Gyles, *op. cit.*, 104.
78 See Tac *Ann*, 14.32 and 33.
79 S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 258.
80 See D. Allen, 'The coins of the Iceni', *Brit* 1 (1970), 2.
81 *Idem.*
82 D. Allen, 'Did Adminius strike coins?', *Brit* 7 (1976), 276-278.

Tacitus next remarks that Prasutagus made Nero heir with his two daughters. the phrase *tali obsequio* is cynical, as though Tacitus finds it surprising that anyone could have been so naive as to suppose that such an action would protect his kingdom and household under a bad emperor. M. Griffin,[83] D. Allen[84] and C. Bulst[85] agree with the evidence of Tacitus that Nero was made a co-heir. D. Braund, however, argues that Prasutagus bequeathed his kingdom to Nero and made provision for his daughters to receive legacies, just as in the case of Nicomedes IV of Bithynia.[86] Curiously, Boudica appears to have been omitted from the will. Various reasons have been proposed for this. Perhaps, as Bulst suggests[87] (followed by du Toit[88]), it was because Prasutagus' daughters were potential wives of any client king appointed to succeed him. S. Dyson argues that after Cartimandua the Romans had had their fill of female rulers.[89] More plausible is the proposal that Boudica may have had obvious anti-Roman sentiments.[90] This would have influenced Prasutagus, who would not have wanted his now secure kingdom to be threatened by the actions of his headstrong widow. Perhaps the best reason is that Boudica was no longer a young woman. It would make better sense if the eldest daughter succeeded to the throne and established a marriage alliance with another strong and influential tribal leader. Another possibility is that Boudica was not of the royal blood line. Although described as *generis regii*[91] she may have come from another family. At all events, the Romans now decided to annex the kingdom. J. Bishop states that 'it was probably the intention of the Roman government to tolerate the native kingdoms for the lives of their present rulers and to integrate their territories with the Roman province as each throne was vacated through death'.[92]

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83 M. Griffin, *Nero*, 225.
84 D. Allen, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 1 (1970), 2.
85 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 498.
86 *Contra*, apparently, R. Collingwood, 'The conquest of Britain', *CAH* 10, 802.
87 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 498.
88 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 151.
89 S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 259; M. Griffin, *Nero*, 225.
90 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 498; C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 151.
91 Tac *Agr*, 16.1.
92 J. Bishop, *Nero*, 140.

Certainly, as Braund has shown,[93] nowhere does Tacitus attack the actual annexation of the kingdom, rather he criticises the way in which it was done and, perhaps, this is an indication that the annexation in itself was justified and that Prasutagus had left his kingdom to Nero.

Tacitus describes the takeover in balanced phrases: *regnum per centuriones, domus per servos,* coupled with the strong verb *vasto*. This sentence is comparable to a similar turn of phrase in the *Agricola* where the centurions are depicted as the instruments of the governor and the slaves the instruments of the procurator: *singulos sibi olim reges fuisse, nunc binos imponi. e quibus legatus in sanguinem, procurator in bona saeviret ... alterius manus centuriones, alterius servos vim et contumelias miscere.*[94] In both accounts Tacitus seems to apportion the blame equally between the governor and procurator, for the centurions were directly under the command of Suetonius Paulinus, whereas the slaves were the responsibility of the procurator. The former were present to oversee the takeover of the actual territory of the Iceni, the latter to make an inventory of the possessions and wealth contained therein.

Tacitus moves on to relate the brutal behaviour of these men. In particular, he concentrates on Boudica and her daughters, the female characters of this incident, in order to add pathos to the scenario. Boudica herself was flogged but her daughters were, even worse, violently raped. These abominable acts, which are aptly conveyed by the passive forms, may have been provoked by resistance to the Roman annexation,[95] although Dyson does point out that Roman officials were often badly controlled and displayed a lack of tact and diplomacy.[96] Perhaps, in this instance, they had been encouraged by the absence of the governor whom Bulst acquits of any blame because he was on his way to Anglesey.[97] Yet Suetonius must have been aware of the king's will and it is more probable, as du Toit

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93 D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, 144.
94 Tac *Agr*, 15.2.
95 See M. Griffin, *Nero*, 225; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 763f.
96 S. Dyson, *op. cit., Historia* 20 (1971), 268.
97 C. Bulst, *op. cit., Historia* 10 (1961), 497.

suggests,[98] that he left for Anglesey because no trouble was expected. If the officials were not provoked and did act in a heavy-handed manner, as the sources, suggest, then Suetonius as the emperor's agent and the man in ultimate command in Britain must bear a share of the blame for the breakdown in discipline and Decianus, too, clearly deserved his criticism.

Tacitus also records that the leading men of the Iceni were stripped of their ancestral possessions. The phrase used is similar to that used in the *Annals* 4.21 to describe the confiscation of the goods of Cassius Severus when he was exiled to Crete (*bonisque exutus*). It would appear to be an official phrase used to describe the confiscation of a state for good reason. Tacitus may be using this phrase in an ironic sense here because as the Romans had now taken over the kingdom they thought it was their right to strip the Iceni of their property. Bulst feels that the phrase *avitis bonis* is equivalent to the χρημάτα of Dio's account.[99] However, as observed above, the latter is probably referring to gifts in the form of loans and it is not possible to equate ancestral property with a loan given during the reign of Claudius since the earliest that these could have been given would have been seventeen years previously.

Of additional interest is Dio's reference to Seneca: διά τε οὖν τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι ὁ Σενέκας χιλίας σφίσι μυριάδας ἄκουσιν [or αἰτοῦσιν][100] ἐπι χρησταῖς ἐλπίσι τόκων δανείσας ἔπειτ' ἀθρόας τε ἅμα αὐτὰς καὶ βιαίως ἐσέπρασσεν <ἐπανέστησαν>.[101] The inclusion of Seneca's name has caused some debate. R. Syme refutes it as an invented story,[102] stating that Dio was 'animated by a double prejudice against Seneca' since he had used Fabius Rusticus as a source. This view has been supported by du Toit,[103] but Overbeck is more conservative, suggesting that 'it should at least be played down if not altogether rejected'.[104] However, it was not unusual for Roman capital to be placed at the disposal of

98 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 152.
99 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 497.
100 See U. Boissevain, vol. 3, 44, s.v. ch. 62.2, n. 21.
101 *Ibid.*
102 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 763.
103 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 150.
104 J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 140.

provincial landowners,[105] and men with loans could employ the imperial procurator to reacquire it.[106] Furthermore, there is the speech of Suillius Rufus, the famous opponent of Seneca, in the *Annals* in which he accuses Seneca: *Italiam et provincias inmenso faenore hauriri.*[107] This is presumably something of an exaggeration, but if Seneca had an estate worth 300 million sesterces, as Suillius asserts, an investment of 40 million in a relatively new province, rich in minerals, would have been an attractive investment. Therefore, as M. Griffin states,[108] this story is not unlikely, but to suggest that Seneca was the sole offender is probably an exaggeration. G. Townend[109] and N. Reed[110] prefer to concentrate on the sources used by each author to answer the problem. They regard Tacitus' source to be Fabius Rusticus who may have omitted Seneca altogether[111] or have attempted to answer the charges made against him at some length since he was pro-Seneca,[112] while Dio's source could well have been anti-Seneca. This view accords with Dio's inclusion of details such as the description of Boudica or the references to the Celtic deities, Andarte and Andraste, which do not occur in Tacitus and of which the former, at least, has been confirmed by archaeology. Hence, this statement concerning Seneca should not be rejected out of hand.

It is not clear whether the reason for Seneca's withdrawal of his loan was a cause of the rebellion or a result of it.[113] The former would appear to be the more likely because the use of violence mentioned by Dio accords with the provocative actions of the Romans that Tacitus records prior to the revolt. Perhaps, as C. Stevens suggests,[114] Seneca recalled his loan because Nero was thinking of abandoning Britain at this time. M. Gyles, on the contrary, argues that it is unlikely that Seneca suddenly developed a 'liquidity

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105 M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 91.
106 A. Burn, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 46.
107 Tac *Ann*, 13.42.
108 M. Griffin, *Nero*, 225.
109 G. Townend, 'Cluvius Rufus in the *Histories* of Tacitus', *AJPh* 85 (1964), 343, and *op. cit.*, *Hermes* 92 (1964), 468.
110 N. Reed, *op. cit.*, *Latomus* 33 (1974), 928-929.
111 *Idem.*
112 G. Townend, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 85 (1964), 343.
113 C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 500-501.
114 C. Stevens, 'The will of Quintus Veranius', *CR* n.s. 1 (1951), 5.

preference'[115] and suggests that he withdrew his loan preparatory to the currency reform (although it is difficult to see how this would have affected his own personal loan). Another possibility is that as the kingdom of the Iceni was to be incorporated into the Empire, there would have been less scope for financial gain for private investors. Whatever the cause, the recall of this money would have hit the Britons hard because they needed it to carry out projects such as the Temple of Claudius at Colchester. Even if it were not an immediate cause of the revolt a certain amount of resentment would have been engendered.

It seems that two significant events occurred at the same time. About 59, Prasutagus died leaving his kingdom to Rome and at the mercy of the Roman officials. At the same time private investors (not just Seneca) decided to recall their loans, fearing financial loss, with no regard for the hard-pressed provincials.[116] This was accompanied by over-zealousness on the part of the officials assigned to annex the kingdom which resulted in the sudden outbreak of hostility as Tacitus remarks: *qua contumelia et metu graviorum, quando in formam provinciae cesserant, rapiunt arma, commotis ad rebellationem Trinovantibus et qui alii nondum servitio fracti resumere libertatem occultis coniurationibus pepigerant, acerrimo in veteranos odio.* As N. Miller states,[117] at this point in the narrative the mood changes from the passive, while the Britons had been suffering, to the active as soon as they took up the fight creating a vivid picture. Significantly, Tacitus once again takes the opportunity to criticise the Roman administration implying that 'abuse and the fear of worse measures' went hand-in-hand with the establishment of a province. The interesting detail that the Trinovantes were incited to rebel is emphasised by the Tacitean solitary *rebellatio*.[118] Their involvement is often ignored or assumed, especially with regard to the initial destruction of Colchester. This was the Trinovantian capital and in tribal terms, not

115 M. Gyles, *op. cit.*, 104.
116 Cf. S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 268.
117 N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 108-109.
118 A rare word, q.v. *OLD*, 1578, s.v. *rebellatio*.

Icenian at all, hence the blame for its destruction is probably to be laid at their doorstep and not the Iceni.

Tacitus' account concentrates on Colchester: *quippe in coloniam Camulodunum recens deducti pellebant domibus, exturbabant agris, captivos, servos appellando, foventibus impotentiam veteranorum militibus similitudine vitae et spe eiusdem licentiae.* The phraseology is taut as Tacitus depicts the treatment suffered by the Britons at the hands of the boorish veterans. There are balancing phrases with active verbs, *pellebant domibus, exturbabant agris,* followed by asyndeton and the well-structured *foventibus ... militibus/similitudine vitae et spe eiusdem licentiae.* Since *impotentia* elsewhere in Tacitus is used, significantly, once of barbarians[119] and three times of women,[120] it has special force here. J. Drinkwater has proposed that this disgraceful behaviour was not enough to incite the Trinovantes to rebel;[121] the real reason depended on a special relationship established with Rome, dating back to Julius Caesar. After their absorption into the Catuvellauni, the Trinovantes had expected that their independence would be restored when Claudius invaded Britain. Since this had not occurred, they had been waiting until someone with the leadership qualities of Boudica came along to inspire them. C. de Filippis, however, argues[122] that J. Drinkwater's thesis underplays the violence of the colonists as well as other reasons, especially those concerning finances, and that there is no reason why Tacitus should maintain silence about such a special relationship with Rome. Tacitus, no doubt, mentions the Trinovantes because it was a large, well-known tribe and because the first object of attack was their capital. The colony had probably been built with forced labour[123] and, as Dyson has observed, settlers and traders were often the first objects of native attack because they were largely ignorant of native customs and thereby caused resentment.[124]

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119 Cf. Tac *Germ*, 35.8.

120 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 4.17; 12.57.10; 4.57.13.

121 J. Drinkwater, 'The Trinovantes: some observations on their participation in the events of A.D. 60', *RSA* 5 (1975), 53-57.

122 C. de Filippis, 'A proposito della partecipiazone dei Trinovanti alla rivolta de Boudicca', *RSA* 9 (1979), 125.

123 *Ibid.*, 128-129.

124 S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 269.

Tacitus hints at further financial motives for the rebellion when he comments: *ad hoc templum divo Claudio constitutum quasi arx aeternae dominationis adspicebatur, delectique sacerdotes specie religionis omnis fortunas effundebant.* D. Fishwick has demonstrated[125] that the temple was still unfinished at the time of the revolt. It was a vast construction erected at the expense of the native Britons, the Trinovantes, whose loans had probably been removed at this time. In addition, the temple was alien to their own religious practices and, therefore, as Tacitus emphasises, introducing the common emotive theme of freedom and slavery (already referred to in *alii nondum servitio fracti resumere libertatem*), it was 'a symbol of eternal despotism'.

This section can, perhaps, shed further light on the discrepancies between Tacitus and Dio, the former referring to Prasutagus and his will and the latter recalling gifts and loans. Tacitus refers to the Iceni but Dio could plausibly attest the Roman treatment of the Trinovantes. This would give adequate reasons for both wanting to rebel and, hence, their entry into 'a secret alliance to regain their freedom'. At this point the rebels attacked Colchester in what, initially, may have been a local revolt[126] but, most likely, also included the Iceni, considering the scale of the destruction and its similarity to the sacking of London and Verulamium. Certainly Dio, like Tacitus, envisages Boudica as the main protagonist: ἡ δὲ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἐρεθίσασα καὶ ἐναντία Ῥωμαίων πολεμεῖν ἀναπείσασα, τῆς τε προστατείας αὐτῶν ἀξιωθεῖσα καὶ τοῦ πολέμου παντὸς στρατηγήσασα, Βουδουΐκα ἦν, γυνὴ Βρεττανὶς γένους τοῦ βασιλείου, μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ γυναῖκα φρόνημα ἔχουσα.

Similarly, in the *Agricola* Tacitus states: *Boudicca generis regii femina duce (neque enim sexum in imperiis discernunt) sumpsere universi bellum.* Dio's γένους τοῦ βασιλείου is clearly parallel to the Latin *generis regii*, which may indicate a rhetorical commonplace, or that Tacitus and Dio used the same source at this juncture. Furthermore, both accounts

125 D. Fishwick, '*Templum divo Claudio constitutum*', *Brit* 3 (1972), esp. 165 and 179.
126 See J. Bishop, *Nero*, 142.

refer to Boudica's sex, but, whereas Dio credits her with greater intelligence than normal for a woman, Tacitus is less generous, simply commenting that the Britons make no distinction between male or female rulers. This, however, is not consistent with his own work.[127] Only one other female ruler is mentioned, Cartimandua of the Brigantes,[128] whose consort, Venutius, and his allies, made war against her *ne feminae imperio subderentur*.[129] This comment is also contrary to *Germania* 45.9 where Tacitus states that the Sitones differ because they are ruled by women.[130] Yet Tacitus does demonstrate some affection for his tragic female characters. He styles Boudica *femina dux* and at *Agricola* 31.4, where Calgacus is made to say *Brigantes femina duce*, clearly a reference to the revolt and to Boudica despite the mistake over the tribe's name. I. Richmond suggested that Brigantes was simply an error for Trinovantes,[131] but R. Syme argued that it was a wilful mistake by Tacitus to create 'a boastful Caledonian error'.[132] This could be a genuine mistake by Tacitus, for, as G. Clarke states, given the insufficient evidence in the *Agricola*, the possibility must remain that the mistake is Tacitus' own.[133] The phrase *femina dux* naturally invites comparison with another tragic queen, Dido, whom Vergil refers to in *Aeneid* as: *dux femina facti*.[134]

Dio adds further details concerning the appearance of Boudica which are unique to his account: ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεγίστη καὶ τὸ εἶδος βλοσυρωτάτη τό τε βλέμμα δριμυτάτη, καὶ τὸ φθέγμα τραχὺ εἶχε, τήν τε κόμην πλείστην τε καὶ ξανθοτάτην οὖσαν μέχρι τῶν γλουτῶν καθεῖτο, καὶ στρεπτὸν μέγαν χρυσοῦν ἐφόρει, χιτῶνά τε παμποίκιλον ἐνεκεκόλπωτο, καὶ χλαμύδα ἐπ' αὐτῷ παχεῖαν ἐνεπεπόρπητο. οὕτω μὲν ἀει ἐνεσκευάζετο· τότε δὲ καὶ λόγχην λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάντας ἐκπλήττειν. The description is dotted with superlatives: μεγίστη, βλοσυρωτάτη, δριμυτάτη, πλείστην,

127 See C. Bulst, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 10 (1961), 498-499.
128 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 12.36.1; *Hist*, 3.45.1.
129 Tac *Ann*, 12.40.3.
130 Cf. S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 262.
131 I. Richmond, 'Queen Cartimanuda', *JRS* 44 (1954), 50, n. 74.
132 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 763, n. 5.
133 G. Clarke, 'The Treveri and the tribute in Tacitus', *Historia* 14 (1965), 336.
134 Cf. Verg *Aen*, 1.364.

ξανθοτάτην; which create the portrait of a woman of great presence. D. Dudley and G. Webster stress that this portrayal is vivid and valuable and 'the most dramatic picture of a Celtic heroine in Classical literature'.[135] Its details, such as the golden torque (στρεπτὸν μέγαν χρυσοῦν) have been confirmed by archaeology.[136] Her robe, too, might be a tartan. S. Dyson also considers[137] that her grasping of a spear may have a parallel in a passage of Florus where he portrays Olyndicus shaking a silver spear as a sort of sacred talisman.[138] He suggests that perhaps 'the spear and other attributes of Boudicca *[sic]* are designed to produce a similar effect of supernatural power' as she proceeds to address her followers who numbered 120,000, according to Dio, although this is almost certainly a vast exaggeration.

In a clumsy manner, Dio proceeds to devote six chapters to Boudica's speech, quite unlike the account of Tacitus which follows up the reasons for the revolt with the catalogue of omens and a step by step account of the progress of the rebellion.

Tacitus first focuses on the plight of the inhabitants of Colchester: *sed quia procul Suetonius aberat, petivere a Cato Deciano procuratore auxilium. ille haud amplius quam ducentos sine iustis armis misit; et inerat modica militum manus. tutela templi freti, et impedientibus qui occulti rebellionis conscii consilia turbabant, neque fossam aut vallum praeduxerant, neque motis senibus et feminis iuventus sola restitit: quasi media pace incauti multitudine barbarorum circumveniuntur. et cetera quidem impetu direpta aut incensa sunt: templum, in quo se miles conglobaverat, biduo obsessum expugnatumque.* This is the first mention of Catus Decianus in Tacitus. As the procurator he undoubtedly had a number of men seconded to him to exact taxes from the people but they may not have necessarily been regular soldiers and in the *Agricola* Tacitus does refer to them as 'slaves'.[139] Tacitus

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135 D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Boudicca*, 54.

136 See R. Clarke, 'The early Iron Age Treasure from Snettisham, Norfolk', *Proceedings of the Prehistorical Society* 20 (1954), 41.

137 S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 262.

138 Cf. Florus, 1.33.14.

139 See Tac *Agr*, 15; *Ann*,14.31.

clearly does not like Catus and highlights his inefficiency by the negative phrase: *haud amplius ... misit*, as though it were his fault that he only had 200 lightly armed men to send. Tacitus does add that there were soldiers present but emphasises the paucity of their numbers in the alliterative phrase *modica militum manus*. He does, however, omit to mention the many veterans who would have still been able to fight.

The alliterative *templa tutela freti* introduces the graphic picture of the inhabitants futilely putting their trust in the temple. Tacitus has already referred to it as *arx aeternae dominationis*, and, appropriately, this was to be one of the first objects of the Britons' anger. Tacitus also notes the existence of a 'Fifth Column,[140] marked out by the assonance and alliteration of the letter c: *qui occulti rebellionis conscii consilia turbabant*, combined with the repetition of *occultus* used of the rebellion in chapter 31. In balanced phrases Tacitus implies the lack of time available to the Romans to build a ditch or a rampart, or to remove the old men and women in order to leave only a fighting force behind. These details are military in outlook and must lend support to the opinion that Tacitus was, directly or indirectly, using the memoirs of Suetonius Paulinus or even the official report of the rebellion. As N. Miller has observed,[141] the narrative is economical and the sentence structure kept deliberately short to create excitement. As the Britons were allotted passive verbs when they were suffering, so are the 'incautious' Romans who were surrounded by a host of barbarians after all else had been despoiled or burnt. *diripio* is a specific military technical term,[142] The military vocabulary being a feature of this passage, as the whole event is described as though a proper military engagement was taking place. Conveniently, the ordinary people disappear from Tacitus' narrative at this point as he states that it was the soldiers who had gathered in the temple. The inclusion of non-combatants would divert his listeners' attention away from the action. Again there is more technical

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140 N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 109.

141 *Idem*.

142 See Lewis and Short, 585, s.v. *diripio* 2; *OLD*, 548, s.v. *diripio*.

vocabulary[143] as Tacitus narrates how the temple withstood the siege for two days, an indication of the building's strength and the wisdom of assembling there.

The *Agricola* regards the event slightly differently: *ac sparsos per castella milites consectati, expugnatis praesidiis ipsam coloniam invasere ut sedem servitutis.* The differences between the two versions cannot be reconciled unless it is assumed that one or other of the accounts has confused events. The attacks on soldiers in the *Agricola* could possibly apply to the ambush of Petillius Cerialis related in the *Annals: et victor Britannus, Petilio Ceriali, legato legionis nonae, in subsidium adventati obvius, fudit legionem, et quod peditum interfecit: Cerialis cum equitibus evasit in castra et munimentis defensus est.* Since Petillius Cerialis was later to be governor of Britain,[144] he evidently came out of this affair without disgrace. Although this was partly due to other factors, in particular his marriage into the Flavian family, nevertheless he gained credit because he had at least attempted to aid the besieged veterans, unlike Poenius Postumus who failed to allow the Second Legion a chance for glory and was compelled to fall on his sword.[145] It is probably that Tacitus is guilty of some exaggeration in stating that all of Cerialis' infantry was killed since Nero only sent 2,000 legionaires as reinforcements after the revolt.[146] As only 400 were killed in the final battle with Boudica, the number of Cerialis' troops killed was probably less than 2,000. He may, therefore, have only had a part of his legion with him which may have been based at the fort of Longthorpe, for this fort displays signs of being reduced in size. The second smaller structure also lacks internal buildings which would appear to add weight to the view that the fort was hastily reduced in size in order to provide a more easily defensible area for a smaller number of troops.[147]

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143 *obsessum*, q.v. *OLD*, 1223, s.v. *obsideo* a) b) c); *expugnatum*, q.v. *OLD*, 653, s.v. *expugno*.

144 On Petillius Cerialis, see A. Birley, *Fasti*, 66f; 'Petillius Cerialis and the conquest of Brigantia', *Brit* 4 (1973), 179-190.

145 See Tac *Ann*, 14.37; and below.

146 *Ibid.*, 38.

147 S. Frere and J. St. Joseph, 'The Roman fortress at Longthorpe', *Brit* 5 (1974), 38ff.

This chapter ends with an announcement of Decianus' escape to Gaul because it was through his greed (*avaritia*) that the rebellion had begun. This damning statement is announced by *qua clade*, the same word used to describe the revolt at the beginning of the section on British affairs and a word which occurs again after the fall of Verulamium in chapter 33. As Roberts has pointed out,[148] each time the word is mentioned, it has reduced significance but creates a hint of circular composition within this British section. Its inclusion here adds special emphasis to the last sentence of the chapter.

Chapter 33 of *Annals* 14 announces the return of Suetonius Paulinus from Anglesey highlighted by the phrase *mira constantia* and the hyperbaton *medios inter hostis*. He was able to reach London, already an important town because of the number of merchants and traders operating from there. These facts are stressed by a cluster of words commencing with the letter c: *cognomento, coloniae, copia, commeatum, celebre.*[149] The town was an obvious target for the enemy because the traders, who frequently treated the provincials with contempt,[150] marked a soft target. Evidently, Suetonius' march was at some speed as he had managed to reach London before the rebels, whose own advance was probably slowed down by their desire for rape and pillage. K. Carroll has pointed out that the exact route taken by Suetonius cannot be determined,[151] but part of the journey would seem to have been made by sea, as Dio reports: ὁ δὲ Παυλῖνος ἔτυχε μὲν ἤδη τὴν Μῶνναν παραστησάμενος, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν Βρεττανικὴν συμφορὰν ἀπέπλευσεν εὐθὺς ἐς αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς Μώννης.[152] H. Benario suggests[153] that Suetonius sailed along the north coast of Wales to the River Dee and from there marched along Watling Street at a speed of some 30 to 35 miles a day.[154] It is possible, however, that Dio is referring to the short journey back across the Menai Straits, for it is not certain that Suetonius was supported by a

148 M. Roberts, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 109 (1988), 124.
149 N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 109.
150 Cf. S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 268-269.
151 K. Carroll, 'The date of Boudicca's revolt', *Brit* 18 (1987), 197-201.
152 Dio, 62.8.
153 H.W. Benario, 'Legionary speed of march before the battle with Boudicca', *Brit* 17 (1986), 359.
154 *Ibid.*, 361.

fleet at this time. Alternatively, if he did have naval assistance, then Suetonius could have sailed southwards round the Welsh coastline and up the Bristol Channel to embark on a much shorter land journey to London.

Once at London, Suetonius acted in an efficient military manner, deciding to sacrifice the town because he had too few men (*infrequentis militis*) to risk confronting the rebels, especially in view of the lesson already learnt from the rash example of Cerialis. Suetonius' emotionless, military manner, a predominantly Roman characteristic, is emphasised by the portrayal of his inflexibility despite the tears of the inhabitants whose emotion is stressed by the synonym *fletu et lacrimis*. This stern attitude is also borne out by the graphic phrase *quin daret profectionis signum* and by his conscious decision to leave certain groups of vulnerable people behind; women (*imbellis sexus*), the aged (*fessa aetas*) and those who did not want to depart because of their love of the place (*loci dulcedo attinuerat*). These people were subsequently 'crushed' by the enemy. *oppressi sunt* is a cold, unfeeling turn of phrase which sums up the necessary exigencies of the situation, and from which Suetonius is depicted as being totally detached, in true heroic military manner.

Tacitus next introduces the third disaster when he records the destruction of Verulamium, since the barbarians had not bothered to attack any garrisons (*contra Agricola* 16) but had made for the towns where there was the greatest opportunity for booty and which were most accessible. The Britons' reasons are emphasised by the superlative *uberrimum* and the chiasmus *uberrimum spoliant<i>/defendentibus intutum*. In typical manner, Tacitus sums events up in the final two sentences of the chapter: *ad septuaginta milia civium et sociorum iis, quae memoravi, locis cecidisse constitit. neque enim capere aut venundare aliudve quod belli commercium, sed caedes patibula, ignes cruces, tamquam reddituri supplicium, at praerepta interim ultione, festinabant.* The use of *constitit* suggests that these figures may be reliable, perhaps on official sources. Dio, however, records in a similar turn of phrase that 80,000 were killed: καὶ μυριάδες ὀκτὼ τῶν τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων

αὐτῶν ἐφθάρησαν.[155] Coincidentally, this figure is the same as the numbers killed at Arausio in 105 B.C.[156] and during the 'Asiatic Vespers' in 88 B.C.[157] It is possible that Dio has been influenced by these examples into making a mistake. Another possibility suggested by N. Reed is that textual corruption in Tacitus is to blame: *LXX* being a misreading of *LXXX*.[158] In either case numbers in ancient sources are notoriously unreliable.

The atrocities mentioned by Tacitus are narrated in still more gruesome detail by Dio: τοῖς τε ἁλισκομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τῶν δεινοτάτων ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐκ ἐγίνετο. καὶ ὅ δὴ δεινότατον καὶ θηριωδέστατον ἔπραξαν· τὰς γὰρ γυναῖκας τὰς εὐγενεστάτας καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτας γυμνὰς ἐκρέμασαν, καὶ νοῦς τε μαστοὺς αὐτῶν περιέτεμον καὶ τοῖς στόμασί σφων προσέρραπτον, ὅπως ὡς καὶ ἐσθίουσαι αὐτοὺς ὁρῷντο, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο πασσάλοις ὀξέσι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος κατὰ μῆκος ἀνέπειραν. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα, θύοντές τε ἅμα καὶ ἑστιώμενοι καὶ ὑβρίζοντες, ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις σφῶν ἱεροῖς καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀνδάτης μάλιστα ἄλσει ἐποιουν. οὕτω τε γὰρ τὴν Νίκην ὠνόμαζον, καὶ ἔσεβον αὐτὴν περιττότατα.

Tacitus spares his listener these brutal details recorded but still manages to create a picture of atrocity by the use of asyndeton and economy of words.[159] He employs historic infinitives *capere, venundare,* a cliché *belli commercium*[160] and then the emphatic asyndeton *caedes patibula ignes cruces.* These four emotive words evoke a powerful image as this type of treatment was only deserved by the basest criminal, yet here it is inflicted on respectable Roman citizens. Furthermore, all this was taking place as though the Britons were making a sacrifice to their gods conscious that this was a day of reckoning but in the meantime (*interim* is delayed for effect) they were taking revenge.[161] This whole picture is linked with the imperfect *festinabant,* stressed by its long vowels, to imply that

155 See Dio, 62.1.
156 Livy, *Ep,* 67.
157 App *Mith,* 22-23.
158 N. Reed, 'The sources of Tacitus and Dio for the Boudiccan revolt', *Latomus* 33 (1974), 932.
159 N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus,* 110.
160 Cf. Tac *Hist,* 3.81.2; Verg *Aen,* 10.532.
161 A similar phrase is used at Tac *Hist,* 1.35.1.

this indiscriminate carnage was taking place over a long period of time. It is almost impossible not to link such savagery with the description of the rituals of the Druids in chapter 30: *nam cruore captivo adolere aras et hominum fibris consulere deos fas habebant.* The atrocities are also briefly alluded to in the *Agricola*,[162] again with the omission of any specific details: *nec ullum in barbaris ingeniis saevitiae genus omisit ira et victoria.* Emphasis is gathered here by the combination *nec ullum ... genus* and by the postponement of *ira et victoria* to the end of the sentence.

Dio delivers up a gory scenario, almost certainly derived from the same source as Tacitus, perhaps Pliny.[163] Contrary to Tacitus, Dio states that captives were taken who were subjected to the most terrible atrocities. As he did in his description of Boudica, Dio rhetorically employs superlatives to convey emphasis. The adjective δεινός is unskilfully repeated in the following line where it is combined with θηριωδέστατον, a word linked with wild beasts and, hence, appropriate to the savage rites committed by the barbaric Britons. The Roman women are depicted as εὐγενεστάτας καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτας to create a greater sense of pathos at their misfortune. The verb κρέμαννυμι, meaning 'to hang up as an offering', is employed because of its religious associations.[164] This is made clearer as Dio's account progresses. περίτεμνω is a slightly unusual word in that it can mean 'to circumcise', although here it indicates 'to cut off'[165] and helps to convey the sexual overtones of this passage. These become even more explicit in the following words. Not only were the women's breasts stitched to their mouths as though they were eating them but also sharp stakes were run lengthwise through their bodies. The following sentence with its triple listing, θύοντές, ἑστιώμενοι, ὑβρίζοντες implies that just to commit the atrocities was not enough and Dio adds that these things especially occurred (again another superlative, μάλιστα) in the grove of Andate. She was their goddess of Victory and the Britons worshipped her before all others (περιττότατα, another superlative).

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162 See Tac *Agr*, 16.1.

163 N. Reed, *op. cit.*, *Latomus* 32 (1974), 932.

164 See Liddell and Scott, 993, s.v. κρέμαομαι.

165 *Ibid.*, 1390, s.v. περίτεμνω.

Boissevain refers[166] to Becker who suggests that Andate is equivalent to the Vocontian Andarta but the name is also strikingly similar to Andraste, the goddess to whom Boudica refers at Dio, 62.6.2. A mistake has possibly been made in transcribing one of the names and both may be the same goddess for Boudica does pray in this way to Andraste: προσεύχομαί τέ σοι καὶ αἰτῶ νίκην και σωτηρίαν καὶ ἐλευθερίαν.[167] Another possibility is that Andraste is a similar type of goddess but not the same. One manuscript (V) supplies the reading ἀδράστη which is strikingly similar to the name Ἀδράστεια, a title of the goddess Nemesis[168] who in most instances was a goddess of Retribution.[169] A prayer to her would be in keeping with the aim of the revolt — revenge for injustices suffered at the hands of the Romans.

The narrative of Dio, with its religious references in chapters 6 and 7, would seem to support the view that the Druids were influential, if not in causing the rebellion, then at least in encouraging it. Bulst has argued that the Druids were probable of 'some influence'[170] amongst the Iceni and that Boudica's position carried more importance than that of a mere queen. Before calling on the help of the gods, she publicly produced an omen in the manner of a priestess. Such a religious position might account for the *dea Tutela Boudiga*[171] found in the third century. Dyson, too, suggests that Boudica had some elements of a prophetic figure[172] and he draws a comparison with Veleda, a German prophetess who played a major part in the Batavian rebellion.[173] However, he argues that 'the role of the Druids in political, religious opposition to the Romans has been somewhat exaggerated',[174] although elsewhere he does concede that 'if we discount the Druids, no religious movements

166 U. Boissevain, vol. 3, 48.

167 Dio, 62.6.4. Cf. D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Boudicca*, 95, who assume they are the same goddess.

168 Cf. Liddell and Scott, 24, s.v. Ἀδράστεια; cf. Aeschylus, *Prom*, 936; Plato, *Rep*, 451a, etc.

169 *OCD*, 726, s.v. Nemesis.

170 C. Bulst, *op. cit., Historia* 10 (1961), 499.

171 *Idem*, quoting P. Corteault, 'An inscription recently found at Bordeaux', *JRS* 11 (1921), 101ff.

172 S. Dyson, *op. cit., Historia* 20 (1971), 271.

173 *Ibid.*, 262; cf. Tac *Hist*, 4.61, 65.

174 *Ibid.*, 260.

match the force of political movements'.[175] Certainly, the Druids had enormous power as the accounts of Caesar,[176] Dio,[177] and Tacitus[178] suggest but nearly all references are to Gaul. Little is said in connection with Britain, although Caesar does remark that the root of Druidism was Britain and that those who wanted to study the subject more deeply came to Britain.[179] This would account for Roman attempts to subjugate Anglesey, although P. Salway doubts this, arguing against Druidic political influence in Britain[180] since they do not appear elsewhere except in relation to the revolt of Boudica and Suetonius' attack on Anglesey. He does concede, however,[181] that the assertion by Pliny[182] of a British addiction to magic and ritual was probably inspired by the Druidic tradition, but, given the fact that the rebellion occurred when their stronghold was under threat, it would come as no surprise, as previously observed and, as Dudley and Webster propose,[183] that the Druids were anxious to foment rebellion in order to divert Roman attention away from Anglesey. Indeed, in view of the rites depicted by Dio and Tacitus, it would be unwise to assume that the Druids had no part to play in the rebellion and it is probable that, as in the case of the rebellions of Vercingetorix and of Florus and Sacrovir, they were a major influence.

Both Dio and Tacitus record the situation immediately prior to the final battle, although neither identifies the site. It has been generally assumed, however, that this action took place somewhere in the Midlands and G. Webster has argued that Mancetter provides a suitable location.[184] Dio summarises Suetonius' strategy: καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι μὲν αὐτίκα πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους οὐκ ἤθελε, τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν φοβούμενος ἀλλ' ἐς ἐπιτηδειότερον καιρὸν τὴν μάχην ὑπερετίθετο.[185] Tacitus, on the

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175 *Ibid.*, 273.

176 Caes *BGall*, 6.13f.; cf. the rebellion of Vercingetorix, *BGall*, 7, *passim*.

177 Dio, 62.6 and 7.

178 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 3.40f., the rebellion of Florus and Sacrovir.

179 See Caes *BGall*, 6.13ff.

180 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 678-679.

181 *Ibid.*, 680.

182 Pliny *NH*, 30.13.

183 D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Boudicca*, 53; cf. G. Webster, *Boudica*, 89; C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 152; C. de Filippis, *op. cit.*, *RSA* 9 (1979), 129.

184 G. Webster, *Boudica*, 111-112.

185 Dio, 62.8.1.

other hand, gives details of the numbers and of the detachments involved: *iam Suetonio quarta decuma legio cum vexillariis vicesimanis et <e> proximis auxiliares, decem ferme milia armatorum, erant, cum omittere cunctationem et congredi acie parat.* The involvement of the Fourteenth Legion in this campaign is also recorded elsewhere.[186] The absence of the Ninth is attested by Tacitus himself when he relates the rout of Petillius Cerialis. It is probable that Suetonius had hoped to link up with the Second Legion,[187] but this plan was foiled when Poenius Postumus failed to move the legion.[188] At this point Tacitus' version of events differs from that of Dio. He describes how Suetonius immediately decided to attack and emphasises the fact through alliteration: *cunctationem, congredi acie.* Dio, however, states that the Roman general did not want to attack immediately because he was afraid of the numbers of desperation of the Britons and, therefore, wanted to wait for a more convenient time. Eventually he was forced to fight through lack of food: ἐπεὶ δὲ σίτου τε ἐσπάνιζε καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐγκείμενοι οὐκ ἀνίεσαν, ἠναγκάσθη καὶ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτοῖς συμβαλεῖν.[189]

The delay related by Dio may be a reference to the sacrifice of London mentioned by Tacitus when Suetonius had too few men. Yet, in Tacitus Suetonius does plan to fight, while in Dio he is compelled to through lack of food. An answer to this may be found in *Annals* 14.38: *sed nihil aeque quam fames adfligebat serendis frugibus incuriosos, et omni aetate ad bellum versa, dum nostros commeatus sibi destinant.* If the Britons had failed to plant any crops and had attacked Roman garrisons in order to obtain supplies, as seems to be suggested here along with *Agricola* 16: *ac sparsos per castella milites consectati, expugnatis praesidiis,* then it is possible that Suetonius was running short of provisions, especially if the rebels had cut off any supply lines he might have had. Suetonius' official report is less likely to have mentioned that he was forced to fight than that the Britons were starving. Especially since, once the fight was over, they would have had no access to food and

186 Cf. Tac *Hist*, 2.11.
187 K. Carroll, 'The date of Boudicca's revolt', *Brit* 18 (1987), 200.
188 See Tac *Ann*, 14.37, and below.
189 Dio, 62.8.1.

having failed to plant any crops this would have exacerbated their plight. Dio's account is far more likely to include details adverse to Suetonius because he is observing the whole affair from a largely British point of view.

Dio continues, portraying Boudica riding in a chariot at the head of a horde of 230,000 men. Tacitus also depicts Boudica in this style, but accompanied by her daughters: *Boudicca curru filias prae se vehens.*[190] Dio's figure of 230,000 is once more an extraordinary exaggeration and almost double the figures (120,000) that he recorded at the start of the rebellion. Such numbers, however, are in keeping with his accounts of troop movements elsewhere; for example, the numbers gathered for Gaius' abortive British expedition.[191] Dio adds the unnecessary detail that Suetonius had so few men that he would have been unable to extend his line as far as that of Boudica, even if it were only one man deep. He, therefore, divided his army into three: τριχῇ τε ἔνειμε τὸν στρατὸν ὅπως πολλαχόθεν ἅμα μάχοιντο.[192] The division of an army into three sections is not uncommon in literature, as previously observed, and probably represents a rhetorical commonplace.[193] Tacitus' narrative, on the other hand, is far more informative and concise, even if some of the elements are stereotyped.

His description of the site of the battle seems to come from first-hand knowledge, perhaps Suetonius, or more likely, Tacitus' father-in-law, Agricola. Suetonius chose a strategic position. His rear was protected by woods and his front could only be approached through a narrow defile. Once more, as in the case of the assault on Anglesey, a comparison is drawn between the opposing forces. The Romans are organised: legionaries in the centre, lightly armed auxiliaries on the flanks and cavalry on the wings. The Britons are disorganised: *at Britannorum copiae passim per catervas et turmas exsultabant.* The verb *exsulto*, if this is

190 Tac *Ann*, 14.35.

191 G. Townend, *op. cit.*, *Hermes* 92 (1964), 479-480; Dio, 59.22.1, records that 200,000 or 250,000 men were assembled.

192 Dio, 62.8.3.

193 *Supra*, ch. 2.

the correct reading, only occurs here in the *Annals*,[194] so has emphasis. The phraseology, too, is meant to parallel the good order of the Roman forces: *frequens ordinibus adstitit*.[195] Tacitus also attests the massive numbers involved (*quanta non alias multitudo*) but prudently does not give a figure. He states that the Britons were so confident that they had even brought their wives along to witness their victory and had situated them in wagons around the battle field. Dio omits this detail but this may be the result of his epitomator at this point. At the end of the battle he remarks that many Britons were killed next to the wagons: καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς ἁμάξαις τῇ τε ὕλῃ κατεφόνευσαν.[196] The article ταῖς seems to propose that Dio's listener already had knowledge of the wagons, and it is probable that they were mentioned earlier; the same is true of τῇ ὕλῃ.

In customary fashion both authors put speeches into the mouths of the main protagonists before battle is joined. The speeches presented by Tacitus are well-balanced, although both are, in fact, in *oratio obliqua* and not direct speech. He gives one chapter to Boudica and then follows it with one chapter for Suetonius.

Boudica's speech, in the emotional style of a barbarian, concentrates on an impassioned appeal full of anger and pity. She claims that she is fighting not as a queen but as an ordinary woman, as one deprived of her freedom, scourged and seeking to avenge her raped daughters. She employs emotive phrases: *libertatem omissam*, freedom or the loss of it is generally a common theme in history; *confectum verberibus corpus; contrectatam ... pudicitiam; impollutam*, all of which are emphasised by hard consonants.[197] There is stylistic use of chiasmus and anaphora and another feature is the alliteration and assonance of the letter c throughout: *confectum, corpus, contrectatam, ulcisci, cupidines, corpora; cecidisse, ceteros, castris occultari; circumspicere, clamorem, copias, causas, secum,*

194 See M. Roberts, *op. cit*, *AJPh* 109 (1988), 122.
195 *Ibid.*, 123.
196 Dio, 62.12.5.
197 See N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 111.

vincendum, acie, cadendum. The concise, emphatic speech builds up to an alliterative climax *viverent viri et servirent*. As N. Miller states,[198] this emotional theme is in keeping with the nature of the Britons as portrayed by Tacitus. They are barbaric, female-dominated and emotional. Furthermore, the speech displays a contrast between freedom (*libertas*) and slavery (*servitudo*), a feature of the entire British section and of the encompassing Roman sections, as M. Roberts has demonstrated.[199]

The speech of Suetonius is dispassionate by comparison. He urges his men to ignore the noise and empty threats of the barbarians, a phrase later recalled by Dio: οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι κραυγῇ τε πολλῇ καὶ ᾠδαῖς ἀπειλητικαῖς χρώμενοι.[200] Suetonius then refers to the effeminacy of the Britons: *plus illic feminarum quam iuventutis adspici imbelles inermes cessuros statim*. Then in contrast, he appeals to the valour (a male, heroic quality) of his men: *etiam in multis legionibus paucos, qui proelia profligarent: gloriaeque eorum accessurum, quod modica manus universi exercitu famam adspicerentur* with *manus* juxtaposed to *universi* for emphasis. Throughout these lines the emphasis continues by means of alliterative pairs: *spernerent sonores; imbelles inermes; virtutem vicentium; paucos ... proelia profligarent; modica manus*. The speech, which is very much to the point, is effectively a battle plan. This is characteristic of the Roman general. There is no emotion; the odds are fixed in Suetonius' favour;[201] his soldiers are ready to fight; and ready to hurl their javelins, as stressed by the Tacitean solitary *intorquenda*.

Dio's treatment of the speeches is quite different. Boudica is made to address her followers before the very beginning of the rebellion and the attack on Colchester. She dwells on the contrasting themes of freedom and slavery: πέπεισθε μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ὅσον ἐλευθέρια τῆς δουλείας διαφέρει. But for the most part, Dio adduces clichés, some of which are clearly drawn from the *Agricola*. For example, in chapter 15, using reported

198 *Idem*.
199 M. Roberts, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 109 (1988), 126.
200 Dio, 62.12.1.
201 N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 111.

speech, Tacitus makes the Britons complain of the treatment suffered at the hands of Romans, as he does before the outset of the revolt: *nihil iam cupiditati, nihil libidini exceptum. in proelio fortiorem esse qui spoliet: nunc ab ignavis plerumque et imbellibus eripi domos, abstrahi liberos, iniungi dilectus, tamquam mori tantum pro patria nescientibus.*[202] Dio refers to these injustices by way of a series of rhetorical questions: τί μὲν γὰρ οὐ τῶν αἰσχίστων, τί δ' οὐ τῶν ἀλγίστων, ἐξ οὗπερ ἐς τὴν Βρεττανίαν οὗτοι παρέκυψαν, πεπόνθαμεν; οὐ τῶν μὲν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων κτημάτων ὅλων ἐστερήμεθα, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τέλη καταβάλλομεν; οὐ πρὸς τῷ τἆλλα πάντα καὶ νέμειν καὶ γεωργεῖν ἐκείνοις, καὶ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτῶν δασμὸν ἐτήσιον φέρομεν; This is a theme that also occurs in the speech of Calgacus.[203] Dio goes on to relate that even when dead there is no escape from Roman rapacity, for they even place a tax on dying. This may be an allusion to Cicero, *Verrine* 5, where the Sicilian executioner also places a price on everything.[204]

There is another echo of *Agricola* 15 in chapter 4: ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ πάντων τῶν κακῶν τούτων αἴτιοι, ὥς γε τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, γεγόναμεν, οἵτινες αὐτοῖς ἐπιβῆναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς νήσου ἐπετρέψαμεν, καὶ οὐ παραχρῆμα αὐτούς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα τὸν Ἰούλιον ἐκεῖνον, ἐξηλάσαμεν. Tacitus also refers to Julius Caesar but Dio goes on to mention Augustus and Gaius proceeding from a reference to the latter's abortive invasion to a reiteration of the myths surrounding the island of Britain that Tacitus refers to in *Annals* 2.24.[205]

In chapter 5, Dio ironically attacks the Britons for their effeminacy, whereas in Tacitus Suetonius calls them *imbelles*, here, according to Boudica, they show no fear of the Romans: φοβεῖσθε δὲ μηδαμῶς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους· οὔτε γὰρ πλείους ἡμῶν εἰσιν οὔτ' ἀνδρειότεροι. This is followed by two sets of rhetorical triple listing: τεκμήριον δὲ ὅτι καὶ κράνεσι καὶ θώραξι καὶ κνημῖσιν ἐσκέπασθε and σταυρώμασι καὶ τείχεσι καὶ τάφροις ἐσκεύασθε.

202 Perhaps an echo of Horace, *Odes*, 3.2.13.
203 Cf. Tac *Agr*, 30.4-31.1.
204 Cic *Verr*, 5.108-110.
205 *Supra*, ch. 1.

Then in balanced phrases Dio remarks that the Britons regard their tents as safer than walls and their shields as providing more protection than the whole armour of a Roman soldier. Boudica is also made to refer to the use of the swamps and mountains (ἕλη καὶ ὄρη) by the Britons, which echoes Caesar,[206] Tacitus[207] and his own work.[208] Other criticisms are made of the Roman tendency towards creature comforts: bread, wine, oil, shade and covering. In chapter 6 these are extended to include warm water, artificial dainties, myrrh, soft couches and young boys. Not surprisingly the Britons are portrayed as totally the opposite. They are real men in comparison with the women-like Romans led by an effeminate leader, a Mistress Domitia Nero. The final section of Boudica's speech is in the form of a prayer which allows Dio the opportunity to introduce some evidence of his wide learning: Andraste,[209] Nitocris,[210] Semiramis,[211] details concerning Nero and more about the Britons, such as the fact gleaned from Caesar[212] that they share wives and children. The finale is a return to an imprecation that the Britons should prevail over the effeminate Roman forces and a final impassioned appeal to Andraste.

Dio's version of Suetonius' oration occurs in the place expected, before the final battle. It is divided into three parts; one part addressed to each section of his forces. His appeal is more emotional than the version in Tacitus. He commences with an appeal to his soldiers to rise up and to demonstrate their superiority: ἄγετε ἄνδρες συστρατιῶται, ἄγετε ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι. The use of συστρατιῶται parallels the speeches of other Roman generals where they also address their *commilitiones*, as for example, Tacitus, *Agricola* 33 and *Histories* 1.37.

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206 Caes *BGall*, 5.21.

207 Tac *Agr*, 26.2.

208 Dio, 60.19.5.

209 See, *supra*.

210 See Herodotus, 2.100. This is the Egyptian Nitocris (as opposed to a successor of Semiramis, Herodotus 1.185), who was queen of the 26th dynasty attested in archaeological evidence as Neitakri.

211 See *OCD*, 972, s.v. Semiramis. In legend she is the daughter of the Syrian goddess Derceto. After the death of her second husband, Ninus, King of Assyria, she ruled for many years. She was renowned in war and as the builder of Babylon. On her death she was changed into a dove which was accordingly held as sacred (Diod Sic, 2.4-20). The historical figure is Sammuramat, wife of the Assyrian king, Shamshi-Adad V, who was regent, 810-805 B.C., for her son, Adad-Nirari III.

212 See Caes *BGall*, 5.14.

He appeals to Roman pride: αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ἃ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ὑπ' ἀρετῆς ἐκτήσασθε, νῦν ἀκλεῶς ἀπολέσαι. Here, too, as in Tacitus, Suetonius stresses the rash, unwarlike nature of the Britons where (ἐκ γὰρ ἀόπλου καὶ ἀμελετήτου προπετείας θρασύνονται) is equivalent to Tacitus' phrase *imbelles et inermes*. Dio makes the governor recall the destruction of the cities, left unspecified but easily identifiable; Colchester betrayed by a 'Fifth Column',[213] and London, which Tacitus records was abandoned to save the whole province,[214] the details omitted by Dio's epitomator perhaps. Finally, Dio makes Suetonius encourage his men to exact the proper penalty which is presented in official terminology παρ' αὐτῶν δίκην λάβετε because it is the Romans who have been wronged.

In his speech to the second section Suetonius again begins with a similar appeal to ὦ συστρατιῶται and stresses the need for brave soldiers. Their victory will set an example for the rest of the Roman army. It is up to them to win and to keep safe everything they have gained as well as all their fathers' possessions. The theme of freedom recurs here in the alliterative phrase ἔλεσθε ἐλεύθεροι εἶναι linked with power, wealth and prosperity ἄρχειν πλουτεῖν εὐδαιμονεῖν. The final words of the section μᾶλλον ἢ τἀναντία αὐτῶν ῥαθυμήσαντες παθεῖν provide the link to the next section where Suetonius considers the outrages already suffered.

Suetonius reminds the third group of the choice they have to make, either to suffer and be expelled from Britain or to conquer and avenge all wrongs. He continues, paraphrasing the famous line of Vergil, *Aeneid* 6,[215] that the Romans in conquest should provide an example of clemency to the obedient and severity to the rebellious. Suetonius then cites reasons why the Romans should win. The gods are on the side of right (in chapter 6 Boudica argues that they are on her side), and the Romans have courage, experience and prestige, for they are going to fight men who are their slaves: οὐ γὰρ ἀντιπάλοις τισὶν ἀλλὰ δούλοις ἡμετέροις συμβαλοῦμεν, οὓς καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους ὄντας εἰάσαμεν. Again

213 See, *supra*.
214 Tac *Ann*, 14.33.
215 Verg *Aen*, 6.853.

the theme of freedom and servitude is stressed. The general further appeals to his men that they should fall fighting if things go contrary to expectation. This gives him an opportunity to refer back to the atrocities mentioned in chapter 7: ἄμεινον ἐστι μαχομένους ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείως πεσεῖν ἢ ἁλόντας ἀνασκολοπισθῆναι, τὰ σπλάγχνα τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐκτμηθέντα ἰδεῖν, πασσάλοις διαπύροις ἀναπαρῆναι καὶ ὕδατι ζέοντι τηκομένους ἀπολέσθαι, καθάπερ ἐς θηρία τινὰ ἄγρια ἄνομα ἀνόσια ἐμπεπτωκότας. The unusual πάσσαλος is again used to emphasise this cruel and obscene ritual. The last line with its triple listing ἄγρια ἄνομα ἀνόσια echoes the conclusion of Boudica's speech where she describes the Romans as ὑβριστῶν ἀδίκων ἀπλήστων ἀνοσίων. These alliterative groupings seem to be part of a tradition going back to tragedy and may even be a conscious recall of Euripides, *Bacchae* 995, where the chorus attacks Pentheus as ἀθέον ἄνομον ἄδικον. Finally, Suetonius calls on his men to conquer or die in Britain, for their deaths would form a noble monument since their bodies would forever possess the land: τοῖς γὰρ σώμασι τοῖς ἡμετέροις πάντως αὐτὴν ἀεὶ καθέξομεν. This phrase is also unoriginal for the reference is evidently drawn from Vergil.[216]

Both authors proceed from the set speeches to launch into an account of 'Boudica's Last Stand' as they also do in the cases of other British leaders: Caratacus in the *Annals*[217] and Calgacus in the *Agricola*.[218] But, as J. Overbeck states, the treatments of the battle scene are quite different.[219]

Dio's narrative opens: κἀκ τούτου συνῆλθον, οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι κραυγῇ τε πολλῇ καὶ ᾠδαῖς ἀπειλητικαῖς χρώμενοι, οἱ δὲ Ρωμαῖοι σιγῇ καὶ κόσμῳ, μέχρις οὗ ἐς ἀκοντίου βολὴν ἀφίκοντο. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἤδη βάδην τῶν πολεμίων προσιόντων σφίσιν ἐξάξαντες ἅμα ἀπὸ συνθήματος ἐπέδραμον αὐτοῖς ἀνὰ κράτος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ προσμίξει ῥᾳδίως τὴν αντίταξίν σφων διέρρηξαν, περισχεθέντες δὲ τῷ πλήθει πανταχόθεν ἅμα

216 Cf. Verg *Aen*, 6.381.
217 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 12.34-35.
218 Cf. Tac *Agr*, 35-37.
219 J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 135.

ἐμάχοντο. The forces are contrasted in a manner similar to their previous portrayal by Tacitus.[220] The Britons, on the one hand, advanced with a great deal of shouting and with threatening songs which seem to recall Tacitus' synonym *strepitum ac clamorem*. The vocabulary at this point is classical ᾠδη and ἀπειλήτικος being words found in tragedy.[221] The Romans, on the other hand, in typical fashion advanced in silence and in good order, emotionless and efficient. According to Dio, this was the case until the two armies came to within a javelin's throw of one another, at which moment the Romans charge. Tacitus, however, remarks: *ac primum legio gradu immota et angustias loci pro munimento retinens, postquam <in> propius suggressos hostis certo iactu tela exhauserat, velut cuneo erupit*. The singular *legio* is probably not a rhetorical singular, but refers to the one legion that is known for certain to have been present, the Fourteenth. The phrase *angustias loci* clearly refers back to chapter 34 where the site is described as *locum artis faucibus*. Here the Romans do not move but first cast their javelins with certain aim (*certo iactu*). Perhaps Dio recalls this in the clause μέχρις οὗ ἐς ἀκοντίου βολὴν ἀφίκοντο but evidently the tradition for the battle differs, if Dio's account is not purely rhetorical. Tacitus' source as this point is obviously a good one for while both authors refer to a Roman charge, Tacitus describes it *velut cuneo erupit* and *idem auxiliarium impetus; et eques protentis hostis perfringit quod obvium et validum erat*. In contrast, Dio is not particularly interested in the military detail. For Tacitus the battle is soon over. He records *ceteri terga praebuere*[222] as though this action had cost the Romans little effort. Dio's version is quite different. In balancing phrases he describes how lightly armed troops fought lightly armed, heavily armed were opposed to heavily armed, cavalry to cavalry and the chariots to archers. The latter detail is interesting for, as J. Davies has observed,[223] only one *cohors sagittaria*, the *cohors*

220 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 14.36.

221 Cf. Liddell and Scott, 844, s.v. ωδη and 183, s.v. απειλη – ητικος.

222 Cf. G. Fletcher, 'Tacitea', *CQ* 37 (1943), 91, who argues that this is not unusual and that the use of *praebuere terga* is found in Curtius, 4.14.4.

223 J. Davies, 'Roman arrowheads from Dinorben and the *sagittarii* of the Roman army', *Brit* 8 (1977), 265.

I Hamiorum, is attested in Britain before 122 but it would be impossible to equate the unit mentioned here with them.

Dio characterises the fighting still further: τούς τε γὰρ Ῥωμαίους οἱ βάρβαροι ῥύμῃ τοῖς ἅρμασι προσπίπτοντες ἀνέτρεπον, καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων, ἅτε καὶ δίχα θωράκων μαχόμενοι, ἀνεστέλλοντο· ἱππεύς τε μεζὸν ἀνέτρεπε, και πεζὸς ἱππέα κατέβαλλε· πρός τε τὰ ἅρματα συμφραξάμενοί τινες ἐχώρουν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐσκεδάννυντο· τούς τε τοξότας οἱ μὲν ὁμόσε σφίσιν ἰόντες ἔτρεπον, οἱ δὲ πόρρωθεν ἐφυλάσσοντο καὶ ταῦτα οὐ καθ' ἓν ἀλλὰ τριχῇ πάνθ' ὁμοίως ἐγίνετο. ἠγωνίσαντο δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀμφότεροι προθυμίας καὶ τόλμης. The language continues in the same vein as before, in pairs of unimaginative statements. Certainly, at this point, Syme can criticise Dio for being 'verbose and miserable'[224] but at least he cannot be criticised for excessive brevity. Tacitus' account of the battle seems to be over all too soon, despite the protestations of Overbeck.[225] That the battle was so brief is not feasible if, as both accounts suggest, the Britons heavily outnumbered the Romans. Moreover, Dio's account indicates that resistance continued even after the death of Boudica,[226] and clearly states that the battle was not won until late in the day: τέλος δὲ ὀψέ ποτε οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἐνίκησαν, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς ἁμάξαις τῇ τε ὕλῃ κατεφόνευσαν, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ζῶντας εἷλον. As previously pointed out, this is the first mention that Dio makes of the wagons, which are recorded by Tacitus, and their previous omission was probably the fault of Dio's epitimator.[227] Boissevain considers that chapter 7 has been truncated,[228] and there could be other omissions since the amount of space given over to the speeches seems rather disproportionate to the amount of actual narrative.

Tacitus, for his part, expands on the actual defeat of the Britons, adding more colour and detail: *ceteri terga praebuere, difficili effugio, quia circumiecta vehicula saepserant*

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224 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 763.
225 J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 136.
226 See below.
227 See, *supra*.
228 U. Boissevain, vol. 3, 48,

abitus.[229] *et miles ne mulierum quidem neci temperabat, confixaque telis etiam iumenta corporum cumulum auxerant. clara et antiquis victoriis par ea die laus parta: quippe sunt qui paulo minus quam octoginta milia Britannorum cecidisse tradant, militum quadringentis ferme interfectis nec multo amplius vulneratis.* Thus the wagons so optimistically placed around the battle field contribute heavily to the massacre of the Britons. Contrary to Dio, Tacitus does not record that any captives were taken. In his account women and even the baggage animals were killed. Tacitus may be obliquely criticising the Romans at this point since they appear to be just as capable of indiscriminate brutality as the hordes of Boudica. Yet such a reaction is understandable in the light of the atrocities committed by the Britons which would have been seen at first hand by some of these soldiers. Tacitus is full of praise for a great victory against the odds, *clara et antiquis victoriis par* (marking a diversion away from his official source to a more sensational style of reporting. As customary he prefers to be conservative with regard to casualties stating *cecidisse tradant.* The figures are not his and Tacitus may not have believed them himself, yet they must be included for effect. The figure of 80,000 British dead looks suspiciously like a figure designed to equal the number of Roman dead, which Tacitus more confidently (*constitit*) stated as 70,000, as though retribution had been seen to be done. The figure should be halved at the very least. The figure of 400 Roman dead is probably more accurate but may be an underestimate, since Tacitus can give exact figures when it suits his purpose.[230] The main aim of the quoting of such numbers is to underline the extent of the Roman victory.[231]

Dio's account of the revolt ends with the death of Boudica: συχνοὶ δ'οὖν καὶ διέφυγον, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο μὲν ὡς καὶ αὖθις μαχούμενοι, ἀποθανούσης δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῆς Βουδουίκης νόσῳ ἐκείνην μὲν δεινῶς ἐπένθησαν καὶ πολυτελῶς ἔθαψαν, αὐτοὶ δ'ὡς καὶ τότε ὄντως ἡττηθέντες διεσκεδάσθησαν.[232] Tacitus also records her death in a

229 A Vergilian word, cf. N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 111.
230 E.g., after the battle of Mons Graupius, Tac *Agr*, 37.
231 Cf. N. Miller, in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 111.
232 Dio, 62.12.6.

succinct phrase emphasised by alliteration: *Boudicca vitam veneno finivit.*[233] As N. Reed as argued,[234] Dio's version provides an unsatisfactory end to the story, for a death by illness is anti-climactic. Tacitus' version of death by her own hand is far more fitting, following the tradition of other tragic heroines such as Dido[235] or Cleopatra.[236] N. Reed suggests that Tacitus' alternative version of events had been 'invented to provide a more appropriate ending', most probably not by Tacitus but by his source, Fabius Rusticus.[237]

Tacitus also records the suicide of Poenius Postumus, camp prefect of the Second Legion.[238] Aware that through his insubordinate action he had 'cheated' (*fraudaverat* is a strong word in this context) his legion of the glory which had been won by the Fourteenth, especially, and the Twentieth, legions, he fell on his sword in traditional Roman fashion. Tacitus conveys this in the poetic phrase *se ipse gladio transegit.* However, the historian does not relate why Poenius as the *praefectus castrorum* was in charge of the legion, nor why he should have chosen to disobey Suetonius, although a possible line of reasoning might be that the more senior officers were with Suetonius in Anglesey and that Poenius was scared to take on the responsibility of leading the legion through disaffected territory. For Tacitus this man's death is the antithesis to that of Boudica, an ignoble Roman dying nobly.

There is another discrepancy between the accounts. Dio narrates that after the death of Boudica the Britons scattered, feeling utterly defeated. Tacitus, however, relates: *contractus deinde omnis exercitus sub pellibus habitus est ad reliqua belli perpetranda.* Immediately after the battle Dio does record that some Britons who had escaped were planning to fight again, at least up until Boudica's death. This may actually represent not so much a discrepancy as confusion between the different accounts. Tacitus also refers to the

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233 Tac *Ann*, 14.37.
234 N. Reed, *op. cit.*, *Latomus* 33 (1974), 931.
235 See Verg *Aen*, 4.630ff.
236 See *OCD*, 251-252, s.v. Cleopatra VII.
237 N. Reed, *op. cit.*, *Latomus* 33 (1974), 931.
238 See, *supra.*

continuation of resistance in the *Agricola: tenentibus arma plerisque, quos conscientia defectionis et proprius ex legato timor agitabat.*[239] The point at issue would seem to be whether Boudica died immediately following the battle and, if not, was she responsible for the continuing resistance or did it survive her death. Dyson concurs with Tacitus,[240] stating that the revolt survived Boudica's 'relatively early demise' and that this suggests that there was a strong subsidiary leadership system. It need not be assumed that Boudica died immediately after the battle. Dio certainly does not imply this and Tacitus' version need not mean it. If Boudica's death were fairly soon after the battle, Dio's comment that the Britons were scattered in their defeat cannot be accepted in the light of Tacitus' narrative regarding the removal of Suetonius from his command. For his dismissal prevented the prolongation of the war. Perhaps Dio is referring to the Iceni since resistance continued among 'scattered groups'.[241] Indeed, A. Fox and W. Ravenhill have suggested that a westward campaign may have been undertaken by Suetonius, after the revolt, against wavering or hostile tribes.[242] Despite Tacitus' clear reference to 61 as the date of the revolt, the events contained within his narrative cannot be assigned to just one year, as this does not allow enough time for Suetonius to return from Anglesey, defeat the rebels, continue the campaign and return to Rome all in 61. It must be concluded that 60 was actually the first year of the rebellion and that it was finally put down some time in 61. This would allow Suetonius some time to carry out his reprisals before his eventual recall.

Tacitus' narrative alone summarises the aftermath. He briefly mentions that Nero increased Suetonius' forces with 2,000 legionaries, eight auxiliary cohorts and 1,000 cavalry from Germany, although the verb *auxit* is misleading since these troops were despatched to make up for numbers lost. Their arrival allowed the Ninth Legion to be brought up to strength. The number of legionaries sent, as previously seen, would seem to suggest that Cerialis had lost a maximum of 1,600 men since around 400 were killed in the

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239 Tac *Agr*, 16.2.

240 S. Dyson, *op. cit.*, *Historia* 20 (1971), 263, 268.

241 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 155.

242 A. Fox and W. Ravenhill, 'The Roman fort at Nanstallon, Cornwall', *Brit* 3 (1972), 90.

final battle. If the number of auxiliary reinforcements is indicative, Tacitus has omitted to mention their losses and, hence, played down the actual numbers killed in the final battle. The eight auxiliary cohorts mentioned here have often been assumed to be Batavians, since in 67 an identical number of Batavian cohorts were withdrawn from Britain.[243] This, however, cannot be proven and must remain a striking coincidence.[244]

Tacitus continues with the Roman strategy: *cohortes alaeque novis hibernaculis locatae, quodque nationum ambiguum aut adversum fuerat, igni atque ferro vastatum.* As noted above, these tribes may have included more than just the Iceni and the Trinovantes. Their attitude is emphasised by the alliterative *ambiguum aut adversum*. The Roman response is typical. Their territory was destroyed by fire and sword. The verb *vasto* at this point is often used of the devastation of foreign lands,[245] and the phrase *igni atque ferro* is a variation on the more common *ferro flammisque.*[246] These commonplaces do not convey the full savagery of Suetonius' reprisals. In the *Agricola* he is depicted in a less favourable light: *et proprius ex legato timor agitabat, ne quamquam egregius cetera adroganter in deditos et ut suae cuiusque iniuriae ultor durius consuleret.* Here Tacitus admits the general's excellence, but it is coloured by a reference to his anticipated ruthlessness. This passage may also suggest that a general amnesty had been offered to all those who would lay down their weapons but such was the fear of Suetonius that the offer was not accepted. Overbeck suggests[247] that the Britons probably had good reason to fear Suetonius if his actions, as described in *Annals* 14.38, are typical.

The *Annals* reveals yet another reason for the refusal to surrender: *sed nihil aeque quam fames adfligebat serendis frugibus incuriosos, et omni aetate ad bellum versa, dum nostros commeatus sibi destinant.* The Britons had nothing to return to. They not only had to produce crops for themselves but also for the Romans. They would now have to start again

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243 Tac *Hist*, 4.19.

244 See M. Hassall, 'Batavians and the Roman Conquest of Britain', *Brit* 1 (1970), 132.

245 Cf. Gerber and Greef, 1739, s.v. *vasto* 2.

246 *Ibid.*, 459, s.v. *ferrum* b β); cf. also *OLD*, 691, s.v. *ferrum* 5c, *ferrum et ignis (flamma).*

247 See J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 141.

under a heavier financial burden and they could not be certain that there would be further loans from the Roman government. No doubt many still hoped to throw off the Roman yoke.

Tacitus now diverts his attention away from the ruthless activities of Suetonius to introduce the new procurator, Julius Classicianus, whom he sees as a scapegoat for the hostilities: *gentesque praeferoces tardius ad pacem inclin<ab>ant, quia Iulius Classicanus, successor Cato missus et Suetonio discors, bonum publicum privatis simultatibus impediebat disperseratque novum legatum opperiendum esse, sine hostili ira et superbia victoris clementer deditis consulturum.* A. Burn has shown that friction between governor and procurator was common;[248] indeed at *Agricola* 9.4, Agricola, as governor of Aquitania, is praised for avoiding such confrontation. Their disagreement here is skilfully emphasised by the juxtaposition of *publicum* and *privatis* within the chiasmus *bonum publicum/ privatis simultatibus*, although it is Classicianus who is regarded as being obstructive (*impediebat*). Since Classicianus (whose impressive tombstone was being discovered in London[249]) was replacing Catus, apparently the main protagonist of the rebellion, he was likely to have been selected only after careful consideration. The situation required a man of tact and diplomacy to defuse the hostile atmosphere. He would have been at odds with Suetonius because the governor, having seen at first hand the horrific massacres at Colchester, London and Verulamium, would have been determined on revenge. Tacitus only regards the affair from the governor's point of view. He records that Classicianus spread a report that the Britons should wait for a new legate who would not display the anger of an enemy or the arrogance of a conqueror. The chiastic arrangement here emphasises the unsuitability of Suetonius but the criticism is seen to be not that of Tacitus but of Classicianus, even if the historian agreed with it. Classicianus' actions were not designed to prolong the war. He wanted the Britons to lay down their weapons but was aware that this was unlikely through their fear of Suetonius. Accordingly, he sent a report to Rome which he may have been requested to do by Nero in order that an assessment of the

248 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 46f.

249 *RIB* 12. See Appendix 5, fig. 1.

situation could be made. In this report Tacitus intriguingly states that Classicianus attributed the failures of Suetonius to his perversity and his successes to luck: *cuius adversa pravitati ipsius, prospera ad fortunam referebat.* This would seem to indicate, although the phrase is rhetorical, that there was more resistance than previously suspected, for the suggestion is that affairs did not always go in Suetonius' favour.

Annals 14.39 brings a response from Nero: *Igitur ad spectandum Britanniae statum missus est e libertis Polyclitus, magna Neronis spe posse auctoritate eius non modo inter legatum procuratoremque concordiam gigni, sed et rebelles barbarorum animos pace componi.* This passage affords Tacitus the perfect opportunity for one of his favourite complaints, the use of freedmen on imperial business. B. Baldwin sees humour in this passage,[250] beginning with the phrase *magna Neronis spe posse auctoritate.* The use of *magna* is ironic, but the hope entertained by Nero that Polyclitus would be able to reconcile legate and procurator (juxtaposed for effect) is reasonable. *sed et* is also ironic, for if reconciling the two officials were not enough, this ex-slave was hoping to pacify the rebellious spirits of the Britons. The following sentence continues the satire: *nec defuit Polyclitus, quo minus ingenti agmine Italiae Galliaeque gravis, postquam Oceanum transmiserat, militibus quoque nostris terribilis incederet.* Tacitus ridicules Polyclitus' mighty entourage, a burden on Italy and Gaul, and his advance after crossing the Ocean was even terrifying for the Roman soldiers. Tacitus relishes the fact that he was mocked by the enemy whose passion for freedom still burned. Again the theme of *libertas* occurs. B. Walker views the whole incident as a contrast between freedom and slavery,[251] and Roberts adds that Suetonius' 'ultimate indignity' was 'to take orders from an imperial freedman'.[252] The use of imperial freedmen by this time was common, but Tacitus cannot cease to marvel at the fact. Already in 43 Aulus Plautius had sent for help from Claudius, who in turn had sent his freedman, Narcissus, whom the soldiers had obeyed.[253] It is not necessary to accept the view of M.

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250 B. Baldwin, 'Tacitean humour', *Wiener Studien*, n.s. 11 (1977), 138.
251 B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus*, 30.
252 M. Roberts, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 109 (1988), 128.
253 Dio, 60.19.3.

Griffin that Polyclitus subjected a successful Roman general to public ridicule.[254] Nero had to investigate the concerns expressed by Classicianus. To do this he had sent his trusted freedman, Polyclitus. However, Tacitus relates: *cuncta tamen ad imperatorem in mollius relata*. This may suggest that the initial report of Classicianus had been over-harsh, so Suetonius was retained in office.

Tacitus then narrates the recall of Suetonius: *detentusque rebus gerundis Suetonius, quod postea paucas naves in litore remigiumque in iis amiserat, tamquam durante bello tradere exercitum Petronio Turpiliano ... iubetur*. Tacitus presents this as though the loss of some ships were a pretext to remove Suetonius from office,[255] which may have been the case, but the real reason lies in the phrase *tamquam durante bello*. It is possible that Classicianus and the governor had managed (or had been ordered by Polyclitus) to reconcile their differences. This view is rejected by du Toit,[256] who states that there was no reconciliation and that *in mollius* glosses over Polyclitus' report which advocated that a more humane governor should be sent to Britain. The government, not wishing to demean the success of Suetonius too much, then recalled him on the basis of a flimsy excuse at the first opportunity, in order that a more diplomatic governor could be sent. Indeed Tacitus himself states that Petronius was *exorabilior* and, hence, more lenient in dealing with the Britons.[257] Quite clearly, Suetonius had to be removed but Tacitus' account is influenced by his use of Suetonius' memoirs or an account given to him by Agricola. Overbeck suggests[258] that Agricola saw Suetonius' recall as instigated by an ungrateful government and that the new policy was a reproach to the great general. M. Griffin, discussing the differences between the accounts in the *Annals* and the *Agricola*, argues against any difference in the source material and, rather, suggests that Tacitus had his own reasons for omitting to give a

254 M. Griffin, *Nero*, 230.
255 Cf. A. Birley, *Fasti*, 56.
256 C. du Toit, *op. cit.*, *Acta Classica* 20 (1977), 156.
257 Tac *Agr*, 16.3.
258 J. Overbeck, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 90 (1969), 142.

full *apologia* in the *Agricola*,[259] for instance, in order to make Agricola stand out in comparison.

Whatever the circumstances surrounding the recall of Suetonius, which probably occurred in 61,[260] he may have been dismissed but he was not disgraced,[261] for he reappears in 69 as one of Otho's generals,[262] and, moreover, it seems likely, as A. Birley suggests,[263] that he was rewarded with the consulship and the *triumphalia ornamenta* for his services in Britain.

259 M. Griffin, 'Nero's recall of Suetonius Paullinus', *SCI* 3 (1976-77), 151-152.

260 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 56; K. Carroll, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 18 (1987), 201; M. Griffin, *op. cit.*, *SCI* 3 (1976-77), 138ff.

261 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 56.

262 Tac *Hist*, 2.37.1; 60.

263 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 55.

Chapter 5: Post–Boudica Britain 61-78 A.D.

The Boudican Revolt had captured the imagination of Roman historians but the following years were to be less eventful and, consequently, are poorly recorded by the ancient literary sources. Tacitus is the only author who even barely covers the whole period from 61-78 A.D.

The main source for this era is the *Agricola* 16.3-17 but other references are found elsewhere in the *Agricola*,[1] in the *Histories*[2] and the *Annals*.[3] Other evidence can also be gleaned from Dio,[4] Josephus[5] and Statius[6]

The brief summary of events in the *Agricola* commences: *missus igitur Petronius Turpilianus tamquam exorabilior et delictis hostium novus eoque paenitentiae mitior, compositis prioribus nihil ultra ausus ...*[7] Petronius is also mentioned as governor of Britain by Tacitus in *Annals* 14, in connection with his predecessor Suetonius Paulinus: *quod postea paucas naves in litore remigiumque in iis amiserat tamquam durante bello tradere exercitum Petronio Turpiliano qui iam consulatu abierat iubetur. is non inritato hoste neque lacessitus honestum pacis nomen segni otio imposuit.*[8]

In the *Annals* Tacitus immediately questions Petronius' character: *tamquam* is a key word, as is *eoque*, for they subtly help to create the impression of Petronius as an inactive, indolent governor (*pacis nomen segni otio imposuit*). *exorabilis*, a word only used here in Tacitus, would normally indicated an honourable quality perhaps equivalent to *clementia*,

1 Tac *Agr*, 7-8.
2 Tac *Hist*, 1.60; 2.65, 66, 97; 3.44, 45; 4.12.
3 Tac *Ann*, 14.39.
4 Dio, 63.22.1a.
5 Jos *Bell Iud*, 7.82.
6 Statius, *Silv*, 5.2.53-56, 143-144.
7 Tac *Agr*, 16.3.
8 Tac *Ann*, 14.39.4-5.

a propaganda word linked with great men, especially Julius Caesar and, later, Augustus. In displaying this quality Petronius is also criticised for his lack of action and for failing to appreciate the enormity of the crimes of the enemy (*delictis hostium novus*). Perhaps Tacitus has in mind those atrocities committed by the Boudican rebels which are referred to by Dio.[9] In Tacitus' view it is this naive failure to realise that the Britons deserved to be punished that made the new governor adopt a gentler attitude in his acceptance of British repentance. However, this interpretation should not be accepted too readily, since Tacitus admits that Petronius 'neither provoked the enemy nor was he attacked by them' and that he would not attempt any further action until the present situation had been settled. This would suggest that Petronius was acting in a diplomatic fashion after Suetonius Paulinus' violent resolution to the Boudican revolt and that he was under strict orders not to attack the enemy but to consolidate his position.

That Petronius' conciliatory policy was a success is revealed in the phrase *neque lacessitus*. Apparently, the Britons had accepted the new governor and were willing to acquiesce after the departure of Suetonius. M. Todd, therefore, seems wrong to suggest that the award of *triumphalia ornamenta* to Petronius, in 65, indicates that he had been involved in some action in Britain.[10] This is an attractive idea, but as A. Birley indicates,[11] these were awarded to Petronius for his part in suppressing the Pisonion conspiracy.[12] However, some fort building and strengthening of garrisons may have been necessary to ensure peace in certain areas.

Petronius' achievements lay in the administrative sphere and here he was able to achieve a degree of peaceful co-existence with the Britons. Tacitus, however, does not want to flatter this man for his own personal reasons. In the *Agricola* Tacitus is keen to attribute all the credit for the sound provincial administration and Romanization of Britain to his

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9 Dio, 62.7.2f.

10 M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 93.

11 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 58.

12 See Tac *Ann*, 15.72.1: *tum quasi gesta bello expositurus vocat senatum et triumphale decus Petronio Turpiliano consulari ... tribuit.*

father-in-law. Likewise, in the *Annals* Tacitus does not wish to belittle Suetonius Paulinus too much because it was under this man that Agricola gained his first military experience in Britain. Undoubtedly the picture that Agricola would have painted of Suetonius would have been flattering since his career had been advanced by this man,[13] and this bias is probably reflected in Tacitus' account.

Suetonius, as noted above, had been replaced on the grounds that he had lost a few ships and their crews but in reality it was because he was prolonging the war by his excessive retribution, although Tacitus presents the former reason as the one that he himself believes.[14] Hence Suetonius comes out of this episode rather well. As. A. Birley notes, he was dismissed but not disgraced.[15] At the same time, it was probably partly the problems caused by Suetonius that influenced the Emperor to adopt a policy of consolidation and conciliation under Petronius and his immediate successors.

Trebellius Maximus succeeded Petronius as governor in 63 when his predecessor received an appointment at home. Tacitus characterises his rule in this way: *Trebellius segnior et nullis castrorum experimentis, comitate quadam curandi provinciam tenuit, didicere iam barbari quoque ignoscere vitiis blandientibus.*[16] Like Petronius, Trebellius receives unfavourable treatment at the hands of Tacitus. He is described as *segnior*, which recalls Petronius' characterisation as *segnis* in the *Annals.*[17] In what way this was so, Tacitus does not make clear, since his predecessor 'had neither attacked nor been attacked'.[18] Trebellius is also referred to as a man *nullis castrorum experimentis*. This phrase has normally been taken to mean that he was 'without military experience' but A. Birley,[19] following Church and Brodribb,[20] offers the translation 'he neglected to make trial of the army'. This

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13 Tac *Agr*, 15.1.
14 Tac *Ann*, 14.38 and 39.
15 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 56f.
16 Tac *Agr*, 16.3.
17 Tac *Ann*, 14.29: *honestum pacis nomen segni otio imposuit.*
18 *Ibid.*, 39.5
19 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 60.
20 A. Church and W. Brodribb, *Tacitus: Agricola*, 16.

interpretation could be favoured on the grounds that in *Annals* 6[21] Tacitus refers to a Marcus Trebellius who was a legionary legate in 36. If this were the same man, then in 63 he would have probably been in his late 50s, about the right age for a provincial governor, as seen above in the case of Q. Veranius.[22] This is good reason to suggest that the two men were the same. If they were, then it should be borne in mind that the *Annals* were written after the *Agricola* and that Tacitus may not have had the relevant information concerning Maximus' early career when he wrote the *Agricola*. Furthermore, in *Annals* 14.46 Tacitus records that in 61 Trebellius was one of three men conducting a census in Gaul. It is possible that if he did know this when he was writing the *Agricola*, especially as the census was conducted just before Trebellius became governor, Tacitus may have assumed that Trebellius was a non-military man. Even so, 'without military experience' seems to be the more natural reading than that adopted by Church and Brodribb.

The choice of Trebellius Maximus was, no doubt, deliberate. He was an elder statesman, a man presumably of restraint and as such, unlikely to make rash advances in Britain at a time when diplomacy was the order of the day. Moreover, he had a proven record in provincial administration in Gaul, a country that bore many similarities to Britain. It may be the case that Trebellius was selected for the governorship of Britain because of his successful handling of the census in Gaul in 61. Indeed, Tacitus errs on the side of praise when he says that Trebellius 'governed the province with a certain affability'.[23] This is an indication that Trebellius was a popular governor and that his diplomatic approach had endeared him to the tribes of Britain. It is not too fanciful to suggest that help was given during these years by the Romans to the Britons to rebuild, to replace the crops which had been burnt during the Boudican revolt and to educate the tribes in the manners and customs of Roman civilisation as Agricola was later to do. Tacitus implies as much in the sentence: *didicere iam barbari quoque ignoscere vitiis blandientibus*. He sneers at the

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21 Tac *Ann*, 6.41.

22 On Veranius, see Tac *Agr*, 14.2; *Ann*, 14.29.1 and *supra*.

23 Tac *Agr*, 16.3.

corrupt morals of the day as typified by Nero but in the *Agricola* the education of natives is regarded as one of the functions of a good governor.[24]

Although Trebellius clearly displayed good qualities of leadership, he has gained infamy from Tacitus' criticism of him as governor of Britain: *et interventus civilium armorum praebuit iustam segnitiae excusationem, sed discordia laboratum cum adsuetus expeditionibus miles otio lasciveret.*[25] The reference is clearly to the outbreak of civil war in 69. That it offered 'a good excuse for inaction' is probably not so far from the truth, for the army and, especially, the governor of Britain would have been keeping track of events on the Continent in order that they might support the winning side. They would not wish to be decimated as was to happen to the legion of marines when Galba entered Rome in triumph.[26]

More importantly, this 'inaction' refers to attacks on the enemy and Trebellius was having enough difficulty in keeping his own troops in line.[27] It is probable that, at this time, there were murmurs among the native tribes, always quick to seize an opportunity for revenge. But it is a fact that for eight years now the soldiers had been at peace. Their main activities during these years would have been fort and road building and policing the Britons. This would have been trying for an army which, as Tacitus states, had been 'accustomed to campaigning'. The phraseology here is reminiscent of that used in the *Annals*[28] when describing the revolt of the Pannonian legions in 14 A.D., where Tacitus also employs the words *lascivire, discordare* and *otium*. Even so, *discordia* was bound to be present in an army where the troops were often housed legionaries and auxiliaries together, and where the legions wanted to ally themselves to different commanders, for example, the Second to Vespasian[29] (he had been its legionary legate in 43) and the other legions to

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24 See *ibid.*, 21.

25 *Ibid.*, 16.2.

26 Tac *Hist*, 1.6; Suet *Gal*, 12.

27 See below, and Tac *Hist*, 1.60.

28 Cf. *Ann*, 1.16.2: *eo principio lascivire miles discordare pessimi cuiusque sermonibus praebere auris, denique luxum et otium cupere disciplinam et laborem aspernari.*

29 See Tac *Hist*, 3.44.

Vitellus.[30] The account of this internal strife in the *Agricola*[31] goes on to record that Trebellius Maximus had to flee but afterwards returned to enjoy a 'precarious' authority by allowing the soldiers their licence (*licentia*) in return for which they spared his life so that their sedition did not involve bloodshed (*seditio sine sanguine stetit*).

A different and fuller version of events is presented in the *Histories*.[32] The account there commences: *Praeerat Trebellius Maximus, per avaritiam ac sordis contemptus exercitui invisusque. accendebat odium eius Roscius Coelius legatus vicensimae legionis, olim discors, sed occasione civilium armorum atrocius proruperant. Trebellius seditionem et confusum ordinem disciplinae Coelio, spoliatas et inopes legiones Coelius Trebellio obiectabat.* Tacitus refers here to a situation that was probably no fault of Trebellius'. In 69 there were only three legions in Britain, the 2nd Augusta, the 9th Hispana and 20th Valeria Victrix. The 14th had previously been removed from Britain by Nero,[33] thereby considerably weakening the garrison of Britain. At that time the province was presumably fairly stable and the effects of such a move would not be immediately evident. It would have necessitated a thinning out of garrisons, leaving them undermanned and at considerable risk if another revolt should occur, which must have seemed possible in view of the disturbances in the Roman world at the time. This, too, would have put a limit to military operations,[34] given above as a reason for the *discordia* within the army. Furthermore, there would have been other outbreaks of disaffection during this period. There is no way of telling what effect the Civil War was having on the supply route to Britain but the resources available to the governor would have been severely restricted at a time when the whole Empire was in disorder. It is possible to imagine the arguments being presented by the legions and Coelius by comparison with those of Percennius[35] or the German legions in 14.[36]

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30 See *ibid.*, 1.61; 3.44.
31 Tac *Agr*, 16.4.
32 Tac *Hist*, 1.60.
33 See Tac *Ann*, 2.66; A. Birley, *Fasti*, 61, quoting S. Frere (1987), 75.
34 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 61.
35 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 1.17.
36 Cf. *ibid.*, 1.31.

Tacitus implicitly states that the *discordia* was largely personal, consisting of a long-standing feud between the governor and the legate of the 20th legion, Roscius Coelius.[37] It is interesting, however, that both men were apparently supporters of Vitellius, for the account in the *Histories* notes that Trebellius fled to Vitellius so that *adiuncto Britannico exercitu ingens viribus opibusque Vitellius*.[38] Tacitus elsewhere states that the 20th was slow in transferring its allegiance from Vitellius to Vespasian, which suggests that it was a Vitellian legion originally.[39]

In balanced phrases, Tacitus contrasts the arguments of the two men: *Trebellius seditionem et confusum ordinem disciplinae Coelio, spoliatas et inopes legiones Coelius Trebellio obiectabat*.[40] Trebellius was in the right because he was in ultimate command in Britain and in the *Agricola* Tacitus suggests that Coelius had been mutinous: *ubi decessor seditiose agere narrabatur*.[41] Coelius probably had some genuine cause for complaint, for the reasons we have noted above, although the relative poverty of the Roman army in Britain at this time was almost certainly not due to Trebellius. Yet it provided Coelius with an excuse to malign his personal enemy. In the *Histories*[42] Tacitus describes their disagreement as a 'shameful quarrel' (*foedis ... certaminibus*). This is not without some truth, for the outbreak of their open hostility resulted in the breakdown of the legion's good behaviour (*modestia*). This seems to contrast with the *Agricola* where Tacitus puts the disturbances within the army down to the lack of action.[43] Both views are probably a part of the whole scenario. The army was certainly unsettled and the Civil War and the quarrel between Coelius and Trebellius gave the men an excuse to relieve some of their frustration by airing their grievances.

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37 See Tac *Hist*, 1.60.
38 *Ibid*.
39 Hinted at in *ibid*., 3.44.
40 *Ibid*., 1.60.
41 Tac *Agr*, 7.3.
42 Tac *Hist*, 1.60.
43 Tac *Agr*, 16.3.

As the troops of the 20th legion remained loyal to their commander following the custom (for Coelius had probably been legate for some time as implied by *olim discors* in the *Histories*), Trebellius was forced to flee. The *Agricola* states: *Trebellius fuga ac latebris vitata exercitus ira indecorus atque humilis precario mox praefuit.*[44] More explicitly the *Histories*, as has been seen, reports that Trebellius fled to Vitellius: *eoque discordiae ventum ut auxiliarium quoque militum conviciis proturbatus et adgregantibus se Coelio cohortibus alisque desertus Trebellius ad Vitellium perfugerit.*[45] At this point the auxiliaries are introduced to emphasise Trebellius' lack of authority to an even greater degree. They were not Roman citizens, and the governor could not even hold their respect now, let alone that of his legionaries.

The story then differs considerably in the two versions. The *Agricola* narrates that Trebellius returned to his post but now with 'precarious authority'. The *Histories* on the other hand, states: *quies provinciae quamquam remoto consulari mansit: rexere legati legionum, pares iure, Coelius audendo potentior.* There is no reconciliation between the two versions, unless it is assumed that the *Agricola* refers to an earlier episode in the mutiny. This is unlikely. Trebellius' flight is mentioned at *Histories* 2.65: *profugerat [sc. Trebellius Maximus] Britannia ob iracundiam militum; missus est in locum eius Vettius Bolanus e praesentibus*, and on this evidence, it seems reasonable to suppose that the *Histories*, as the later work which refers to Coelius by name, does contain the correct version of events. Therefore, either Tacitus' source for the *Agricola* was incorrect, or Tacitus himself has made an error. The former is more likely on the grounds that Tacitus' research for the *Histories* was probably more thorough than it had been for the *Agricola*. On the other hand, as already noted,[46] Tacitus may well have been in error when he states that Trebellius had 'no military experience'.

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44 *Ibid.*, 16.4.
45 Tac *Hist*, 1.60.
46 See, *supra*.

The next governor, Vettius Bolanus, receives as little credit as his two predecessors in the *Agricola: nec Vettius Bolanus manentibus adhuc civilibus bellis agitavit Britanniam disciplina; eadem inertia erga hostis similis petulantia castrorum.*[47] This is his second mention, for at *Agricola* 8, Tacitus states: *Praeerat tunc Britanniae Vettius Bolanus placidius quam feroci provincia diignum est. temperavit Agricola vim suam ardoremque compescuit ne increscerat, peritus obsequi eruditusque utilia honestis miscere.* Thus Tacitus is concerned to play down Bolanus' achievements because, under his governorship, Agricola received no opportunity for military glory. Agricola was sent to Britain to quell the men of the Twentieth Legion after their mutinous behaviour under Roscius Coelius and to bring them over to Vespasian. Agricola would have had sufficient problems without being engaged on campaigns as well.

Elsewhere in the *Histories*, Tacitus states that Vettius Bolanus *numquam satis quieta Britannia.*[48] This may refer to internal strife but in the preceding line Tacitus has stated that Hordeonius Flaccus was concerned that he might have a war of his own against the Batavi in Germany. It would seem reasonable to suppose that with Bolanus, too, Tacitus is referring to native unrest. That Bolanus did not spend his governorship inactively is reinforced by two other passages. The first occurs at *Histories* 3.44-45, where, under the events of 69, Tacitus mentions that there was support in Britain for Vespasian because he had been made commander of the Second Legion by Claudius and had distinguished himself in war there. However, the allegiance of Britain only came about after some resistance on the part of the other legions, many of whose officers and centurions owed their promotion to Vitellius. This reference to Britain causes Tacitus to embark on a brief digression concerning British affairs at that time, events which must have occurred during Bolanus' governorship, since the historian has already related the flight of Trebellius at *Histories* 1.60.

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47 Tac *Agr*, 16.5.
48 Tac *Hist*, 2.97.7.

Histories 3.45 begins: *Ea discordia et crebris belli civilis rumoribus Britanni sustulere animos auctore Venutio, qui super insitam ferociam et Romani nominis odium propriis in Cartimanduam reginam stimulis accendebatur. ea discordia* must refer to the previous chapter where Tacitus relates the Second Legion's loyalty to Vespasian while the other legions were wavering in their allegiance to Vitellius. The Civil War had been continuing for a whole year now, but Tacitus uses *crebris rumoribus* to emphasise the remoteness of Britain and the fact that Vespasian was now the fourth man to have been declared emperor. In these circumstances rumours concerning war and peace would have been continual.

The change of governor also provided the Britons with an opportunity to cause trouble, as on previous occasions.[49] On this occasion, they were led by the Brigantian Venutius, a man whom, as seen previously in chapter 3, Tacitus describes: *sed post captum Caratacum praecipuus scientia rei militaris Venutius.*[50] In *Histories* 3.45 he goes on to note that Venutius was a man with an 'inbred fighting spirit and a hatred of the Roman name as well as being inflamed by the goads of Cartimandua', although in the *Annals* he was described as: *fidusque diu et Romanis armis defensus cum Cartimanduam reginam matrimonio teneret.*[51]

As will be seen the account in *Histories* 3.45, while it has similarities to *Annals* 12.40, also has more differences, in particular the date is clearly meant to be around 69/70, as compared to the 50s. Therefore it seems reasonable to discuss the passage in full in its proper chronological position. However, a full discussion of the problems of *Annals* 12.40 and *Histories* 3.45, as noted previously, is to be found in Appendix 2.

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49 Cf. the experiences of Ostorius Scapula, Tac *Ann*, 12.31 and of Aulus Didius Gallus, Tac *Ann*, 12.40.

50 Tac *Ann*, 12.40.

51 *Idem*.

Why Venutius came to hate Cartimandua (and hence Rome) is related in *Histories* 3.45. It is stressed that Cartimandua was Queen of the Brigantes by the verb *imperitabat* and by the phrase *Cartimandua regina* which appears in both *Annals* 12.40 and *Histories* 3.45.[52] She derived importance from her high birth,[53] a fact that would not have gone unnoticed by Tacitus' audience, for *nobilitas* was a prerequisite for a successful career in Roman life. Cartimandua had increased her power through her capture of Caratacus by guile. In recognition of this she had received: *opes et rerum secundarum luxus*. This gives Tacitus the opportunity to adopt a moralising, judgemental tone to criticise Cartimandua in the following lines: *spreto Venutio (is fuit maritus) armigerum eius Vellocatum in matrimonium regnumque accepit*. Such behaviour was typical of the rich, corrupt aristocracy at Rome which Tacitus deplores and here paints a picture of a proud, corrupt queen.[54] The story contains elements of the tragic love tale and Tacitus' poetic language is fitted to the occasion: *concussa statim flagitio domus*. The chiastic, emotive phrase is short and effective. It commences with the strong, emphatic *concussa* which agrees with *domus*. This word normally suggests a peaceful haven but it is one that is now 'shaken' by the queen's 'crime'. This is followed by a balanced phrase: *pro marito studia civitatis pro adultero libido reginae et saevitia*. Interestingly, Tacitus notes that the people sided with Venutius while Vellocatus only had the 'lust and savagery of the queen' as his support. This would seem to refute W. Hanson and D. Campbell who state that 'Venutius was *merely* the consort of the real ruler, that is, Cartimandua',[55] for if such were the case, he would not have been able to command such widespread support. The picture of Cartimandua is not a flattering one, as Tacitus adds the vice of cruelty to her immoral character.

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52 Nowhere is Venutius styled *rex*. Cartimandua is clearly regarded to be the dominant force in Brigantia.

53 Tac *Hist*, 3.45: *pollens nobilitate*.

54 So cf. C. de Filippis, '*Libida reginae et saevitia:* osservazione sulla figura di Cartimandua in Tacito', *RSA* 8 (1978), 52: 'non e difficile cogliere in questa affermazione un guidizio moralistico di condanna'.

55 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, 'The Brigantes: from clientage to conquest', *Brit* 17 (1986), 77.

Tacitus' account continues: *igitur Venutius accitis auxiliis simul ipsorum Brigantum defectione in extremum discrimen Cartimanduam adduxit.*[56] If it is assumed that Venutius were the ruler of another tribal group in Brigantia, then he could quite easily have found support among the disaffected within the queen's capital and have summoned aid from his own tribe. There is no need to accept that he called on tribes north of Brigantia to help, although this is an attractive idea if the Romans had had contact with northern tribes before the time of Agricola.[57] In this passage Tacitus also refers to a revolt amongst the Brigantes at this time. This may apply either to Cartimandua's own supporters and their division over whether to support their queen or Venutius (who was evidently popular) or to the different tribal groups led by Venutius and Cartimandua. The former seems more likely. This combination of events brought Cartimandua into the gravest danger.

The narrative concludes: *tum petita a Romanis praesidia. et cohortes alaeque nostrae variis proeliis exemere tamen periculo reginam; regnum Venutio, bellum nobis relictum.*[58] As Brigantia was a Roman client kingdom, Cartimandua was able to call on the resources of Rome. In addition, Rome was probably not unwilling to provide troops, for the Brigantes were her northernmost protection and also a very large tribal area. If she lost Brigantia, the province would be susceptible to attack and conquest would have to be renewed. Thus the Romans provided *cohortes alaeque.* This phrase is normally taken to mean just auxiliary troops of foot and horse but as the housing of legionaries and auxiliaries together in the same forts (the so-called vexillation forts) was a fairly common practice at this time, *cohortes* could just as easily apply to legionary cohorts in the normal use of the word. Tacitus may not have distinguished them for the sake of brevity. The phrase *variis proeliis,* however, presents a slight difficulty in that it may be translated 'in doubtful battles' or 'in different battles'. The latter would be more likely, since the statement 'the

56 Tac *Hist,* 3.45.

57 See Tac *Agr,* 22. Agricola only met new tribes in his third year of campaigning.

58 Tac *Hist,* 3.45

war was left to the Romans' implies ongoing opposition rather than some doubtful encounters during the course of which Cartimandua was saved.

Venutius clearly had a great deal of support, for he was able to hold out against the Romans for some time although they were severely hampered by the limits placed upon them by the Civil War. It was left to the next governor, Petillius Cerialis, to 'strike terror into the Brigantes'.[59]

Support for the campaign fought under the auspices of Vettius Bolanus is to be found in Statius'[60] praises of Crispinus, the son of Bolanus. He refers to Vettius Bolanus entering Thule, rhetorically the furthermost land to the North;[61] that he conquered Caledonia; established watchtowers and fortresses; and took a breastplate from a British king. There is substantial poetic exaggeration in Statius' account. It is plausible, however, that these names are employed to indicate that Bolanus had operated in the northernmost territory known to Rome[62] (at this time Brigantia), and that this involved fighting in order to rescue Cartimandua and fort building to consolidate the Roman position.

As Tacitus states in the *Histories*,[63] 'the war was left to us' and it was the job of Bolanus' successor to continue the struggle. The account is continued in the *Agricola: Sed ubi cum cetero orbe Vespasianus et Britanniam reciperavit magni duces egregii exercitus, minuta hostium spes. et terrorem statim intulit Petilius Cerialis, Brigantum civitatem, quae numerosissima provinciae totius perhibetur adgressus. multa proelia et aliquando non incruenta; magnamque Brigantum partem aut victoria amplexus est aut bello.*[64]

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59 Tac *Agr*, 17.2

60 Statius *Silv*, 5.2.53-56 and 142-149.

61 See A. Rivet and C. Smith, 473, s.v. *Thule, Thyle.*

62 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 64; W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit., Brit* 17 (1986), 83-84. Elsewhere G. Webster, 'The military situation in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71', *Brit* 1 (1970), 196, accepts this view.

63 Tac *Hist*, 3.45: *bellum nobis relictum.*

64 Tac *Agr*, 17.

Josephus, a contemporary author, notes of Petillius Cerialis' appointment: ἐκ δαιμονίου προνοίας Οὐεσπασιανὸς πέμπει γράμματα Πετιλίῳ Κερεαλίῳ τῷ πρότερον ἡγεμόνι Γερμανίας γενομένῳ, τὴν ὕπατον διδοὺς τιμὴν καὶ κελεύων ἄρξοντα Βρεττανίας ἀπέναι.[65] This is unrecorded by any other source and supplements Tacitus' account. Tacitus also refers to Cerialis as governor of Britain at *Agricola* 8: *brevi deinde Britannia consularem Petilium Cerialem accepit. habuerunt virtutes spatium exemplorum, sed primo Cerialis labores modo et discrimina, mox et gloriam communicabat: saepe parti exercitus in experimentum, aliquando maioribus copiis ex eventu praefecit. nec Agricola umquam in suam famam gestis exsultavit: ad auctorem ac ducem ut minister fortunam referebat. ita virtute in obsequendo, verecundia in praedicando extra invidiam nec extra gloriam erat.*

A. Birley[66] has discussed Petillius Cerialis at some length. His full name was Quintus Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus.[67] It is likely that he was the son, or adopted son, of a Petillius Rufus who is mentioned in Tacitus, *Annals* 4.[68] Most probably adopted, his original name being Caesius Cerialis, and on adoption changing his name to Q. Petillius Cerialis Caesius Rufus. As previously noted, Cerialis was the commander of the Ninth Legion during the Boudican Revolt.[69] The previous legate of this legion had been a Caesius Nasica[70] and it is likely that Petillius Cerialis was his younger brother, since there was a 'common practice of allowing brothers to serve together, or in succession in the same post'.[71] The débâcle that was Cerialis' claim to fame at this time did not, however, retard his political career as such mistakes did in the career of others (for example, Manlius Valens).[72] This was almost certainly because of Cerialis' marriage into the new emperor's

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65 Jos *Bell Iud*, 7.82.
66 A. Birley, 'Petillius Cerialis and the conquest of Brigantia', *Brit* 4 (1973), 179-190.
67 See *CIL* 16.20.
68 Tac *Ann*, 4.68.
69 *Ibid*, 14.32.
70 See Tac *Ann*, 12.40.
71 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 66; *op. cit.*, *Brit* 4 (1973), 180.
72 See Tac *Ann*, 12.40; *supra*, ch. 3.

circle. He was, apparently, Vespasian's son-in-law.[73] The loyalty of Cerialis, therefore, was unquestioned.[74] It must have been partly for this reason that Vespasian entrusted him first with a command in Lower Germany to quell a rebellion there and then with the governorship of Britain,[75] an unsettled province.[76] It was not just his unswerving loyalty which would have been a determining factor in his selection as governor of Britain. For Cerialis had already served in Britain, albeit ingloriously.[77] He had invaluable knowledge of the province and, furthermore, the legion he had then commanded, the Ninth, may well have been one that had allied itself with Vitellius during 69, since only the Second is reported initially to have supported Vespasian. Tacitus refers to the others in these terms: *non sine motu adiunxit ceterarum in quibus plerique centuriones ac milites a Vitellio provecti expertum iam principem anxii mutabant.*[78] Cerialis' appointment would make good tactical sense, for a legion would be far readier to support a governor that it was acquainted with than a newcomer from among Vespasian's entourage.

The account in *Agricola* 17 of Cerialis' activities is not unflattering, neither is it overtly kind to the governor. It commences on an emphatic note, heightened by the alliteration: *terrorem statim intulit.* Cerialis achieved this against the 'most numerous' (the superlative is emphatic) tribe in Britain, the Brigantes. The account goes on to mention that he engaged in many battles some of which were 'not unbloody'. The litotes here draws attention to the fact that Cerialis was not totally successful. Likewise, A. Birley[79] quotes *aut victoria ... aut bello* to imply less than total success. This need not necessarily be true. A different reading of this phrase would indicate that by his victories in war Cerialis was able to frighten other sections of the tribe into submission. What does imply less than total success, however, is that Cerialis only conquered a 'large section of the Brigantes'. Hence,

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73 A. Birley, *Brit* 4 (1973), 182; G. Townend, 'Some Flavian connections', *JRS* 51 (1961), 58f. basing his argument on Tac *Hist*, 3.59 and Dio, 65.18.1.

74 G. Townend, *op. cit.*, *JRS* 51 (1961), 59.

75 See Jos *Bell Iud*, 7.82.

76 See Tac *Hist*, 3.44.

77 During the Boudican revolt see Tac *Ann*, 14.32 and 33.

78 Tac *Hist*, 3.44.

79 A. Birley, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 4 (1973), 182.

there were still areas left undefeated and perhaps this is to what Tacitus refers when he states of Cerialis' successor: *sustinuitque molem Iulius Frontinus.*[80]

A. Birley cites examples throughout Tacitus where the historian is less than favourable to Cerialis and he sees traces of this bias in *Agricola* 8, where Agricola at first only got to share *labores ... et discrimina*, and, afterwards, when he did gain success, he owed it all to the governor, thereby managing to escape *invidia* (presumably that of the governor). Certainly Cerialis gains a reputation for recklessness within the pages of Tacitus. Birley[81] notes that *incautus* is used by Livy of Q. Petillius (consul 176 B.C.), and this failing of his ancestor is echoed in Tacitus' descriptions of Cerialis.[82] Tacitus also puts his successes down to *fortuna* (luck), for example, at *Histories* 4.77.2. Quoting other examples where the adjective *foedus* and noun *flagitium* occur, Birley comes to the conclusion that 'Tacitus did not like this man: in fact he loathed him'.[83] Yet, as seen above, Cerialis does not receive such a harsh review in the *Agricola*. A possible reason for this lies in the fact that it was under this man's governorship that Agricola gained his first, real military successes and obviously, Tacitus would not wish to demean Cerialis too much for fear of adversely affecting his audience's reaction to Agricola's successes.

B. Hartley[84] argues that Cerialis was 'an obvious choice for the task of governor', perhaps following D. Dudley and G. Webster[85] who conclude that Cerialis was 'an ideal choice as the first Flavian governor of Britain'. From Tacitus' evidence alone this would not be true as Birley has shown but, as seen above,[86] there were sound diplomatic reasons for appointing Cerialis. He had knowledge of the province, had been a commander of one of its

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80 Tac *Agr*, 17.2.

81 A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 180.

82 See Tac *Hist*, 3.79 (*incautum*); 4.76.3 (*temeritatis*); 4.77.2 (*temeritate*); 4.78.2 (*incuria*); 5.20.1 (*neque satis cautum*).

83 A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 186.

84 B. Hartley, 'Some problems of the Roman military occupation of the North of England', *Northern History* 1 (1966), 9.

85 D. Dudley and G. Webster, *Boudicca*, 97.

86 *Supra*, 142.

legions and, given the circumstances of the time, most importantly, he was fully trusted by Vespasian to do his job and not to provoke further insurrection.

Archaeological evidence for Cerialis' governorship may also be taken into consideration. R. Wheeler suggested that Cerialis ended Brigantian resistance by defeating Venutius at Stanwick.[87] Hanson and Campbell[88] have shown in a recent article that Wheeler's original interpretation may be incorrect since the absence of any evidence of battle remains makes the probability of a major Roman assault unlikely. Indeed, this suggestion of one large scale battle seems inconsistent with the Tacitean narrative, which states that Cerialis engaged in *multa proelia* and there is no mention of Venutius' 'last stand' as there was in the case of Caratacus.[89] As Hanson and Campbell have also stated,[90] quoting archaeological examples, 'we should perhaps envisage the more drawn out process of pursuing an enemy who stopped to fight on ground of his own choosing. The line of march followed by Cerialis' army ought to be marked by a series of temporary camps of legionary size'. This campaign was almost undoubtedly conducted with the Ninth Legion which was moved from Lincoln to York (whose foundation was probably due to Cerialis[91]). This would seem logical if the arguments presented above for the appointment of Cerialis to the governorship of Britain are taken into account. He may have wished to give the Ninth some military glory, in order to strengthen their allegiance to himself and, of course, to the new régime.

Before continuing his campaign in Brigantia, Cerialis apparently consolidated his flank[92] by building forts in the territory of the Parisi after their conquest. Hanson and Campbell[93] suggest that the Twentieth Legion under Agricola assisted the Ninth. This seems likely

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87 R. Wheeler, *The Stanwick Fortifications*, 23ff.; A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 188-189; B. Hartley, *op. cit., Northern History* 1 (1966), 11.

88 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit., Brit* 17 (1986), 86.

89 See Tac *Ann*, 12.34-35.

90 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit., Brit* 17 (1986), 86.

91 See A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 188; B. Hartley, *op. cit., Northern History* 1 (1966), 10.

92 B. Hartley, *op. cit., Northern History* 1 (1966), 11; S. Frere (1987), 84.

93 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit., Brit* 17 (1986), 84.

from the narrative of Tacitus[94] but the presence of this legion at Wroxeter may imply that Agricola had a part to play in Wales, for the following governor Frontius was to attack the Silures. This suggests that during the period of Cerialis' governorship, while he was engaged in the north, the tribe had begun to cause trouble once more.

As governor of Britain, Cerialis evidently enjoyed some success, since Tacitus makes no mention of any disasters. Furthermore, on his return to Rome, he was awarded the honour of a second consulship, only four years after his first in 74.[95] He may also have earned this distinction in 83,[96] and A. Birley[97] suggests that this may account for Tacitus' hatred of the man. He would have been a key adviser in Domitian's German campaign which resulted in the removal of troops from Britain, thus restricting Agricola's success. In addition, Hanson and Campbell[98] quote from Pliny the Elder:[99] *XXX prope iam annis notitiam eius [sc. Britanniae] Romanis armis non ultra vicinitatem silvae Calidoniae,* and possibly follow E. Birley[100] (who takes this as evidence that Bolanus was certainly in reach of the Forth/Clyde isthmus) in suggesting that Cerialis or Frontius had reached this area of the country in contrast to the impression we obtain from the Agricola. Since the *Natural History* was dedicated to Titus in 77, Agricola cannot be accredited as the first Roman to penetrate the North of England, if the Caledonian Forest had been reached prior to the commencement of his governorship.

Cerialis' successor in office was Sextus Iulius Frontinus,[101] a man renowned as a writer and military tactician, the author of the *Strategemata* and a treatise on aqueducts. He is referred to as governor of Britain only in the *Agricola: et Cerialis quidem alterius successoris curam famamque obruisset: sustinuitque molem Iulius Frontinus vir magnus*

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94 See Tac *Agr*, 8.

95 See A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 186, quoting *CIL* 16.20 for his second consulship in 74, and A. Degrassi, *I Fasti Consulari* (1952), 25.

96 A. Birley, *op. cit., Brit* 4 (1973), 186.

97 *Ibid.*, 187.

98 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit., Brit* 17 (1986), 87.

99 Pliny *NH*, 4.102.

100 E. Birley, 'Agricola and his predecessors', in *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, 13-14.

101 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 69ff.

quantum licebat validamque et pugnacem Silurum gentem armis subegit super virtutem hostium locorum quoque difficultates eluctatus.[102] As suggested previously, *sustinuitque molem* may be taken to mean that Frontinus continued the struggle in Brigantia[103] and he may have been responsible for some construction work at Carlisle. This being the case, Venutius may not have been subdued until after Cerialis' governorship. As was noted above, the Silures, taking advantage of the occupation of Roman forces in the North, may have once more begun to cause trouble. The Silures are described as *validamque et pugnacem gentem*, a view which is reinforced by *Annals* 12.33, 38-39[104] and 40.[105] The enemy also receives praise for they had 'courage' (*virtus*), but Frontinus[106] was able to overcome both their valour and the difficulty of the terrain (also noted earlier in *Annals* 12[107] when Caratacus is leading his resistance from Silurian territory). This returns to Tacitus' view that 'Cerialis would have surpassed the vigilance and reputation of any other successor', had his successor not been so able. Despite the remarks of Tacitus elsewhere concerning Cerialis, it is not necessary to conclude that he is being sarcastic. Rather it may indicate Tacitus' enormous respect for Frontinus (he is described as *vir magnus*),[108] but Tacitus could not emphasise his achievements too much for fear of belittling Agricola's success. Frontinus' objective may have been the subjugation of Wales and it was only through his consolidation in South Wales (the *Legio II Augusta* may have been moved forward to Caerleon[109])and perhaps some campaigning in North Wales that provided the springboard

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102 Tac *Agr*, 17.

103 See W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 17 (1986), 88.

104 In connection with Ostorius Scapula.

105 In connection with Aulus Didius Gallus.

106 Since *eluctor* only occurs elsewhere in Tacitus at *Ann*, 4.31, and *Hist*, 3.59, it has special emphasis here.

107 Tac *Ann*, 12.33.

108 See B. Baldwin, 'Themes, personalities and distortions in Tacitus', *Athenaeum* 52 (1974), 71. The qualification given to Frontinus in the *Agricola* is not unique. A similar phrase is used of Memmius Regulus during the reign of Nero in *Ann*, 14.47: *auctoritate constantia fama in quantum praeumbrante imperatoris fastigio dantum clarus*. Frontinus was an exemplary figure. Like Tacitus, his rise had been under Vespasian. His virtues were acknowledged by Nerva and Trajan. He was a useful man to be on good terms with, hence this compliment was as judicious as it was deserved.

109 R. Ogilvie, *De Vita Agricolae*, 207, 17.2n, s.v. *Iulius Frontinus*.

for Agricola's campaigns, for it was into this area that Agricola marched initially.[110] Moreover, Frontinus may well have consolidated the Roman position in Brigantia, achieving the final surrender of Venutius or his supporters and advancing as far as the Forth/Clyde line.[111] It is certain that Agricola did not meet new tribes until his third year of campaigning.

It is evident that the governors preceding Agricola achieved a great deal more than might traditionally be attributed to them and that this can be deducted from the literary evidence available, although to some extent supplemented by archaeological evidence.

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110 See Tac *Agr*, 18.

111 See W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 17 (1986), 87, quoting E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, 15-16, 40-41.

Chapter 6: The Governorship of Agricola

The most famous governor of Britain is undoubtedly Gnaeus Iulius Agricola. Yet apart from the *De vita Iulii Agricolae* written by his son-in-law, Tacitus, he remains virtually unattested, except for a passing reference by one of Dio's epitomators.[1] Therefore, the *Agricola* must be considered with due care, since Tacitus cannot be regarded as a totally objective judge of his father-in-law's achievements.

For the most part the *Agricola* has been seen as a biography[2] but its form is such that classification within other literary genres has been suggested. It has been proposed that the work represents an extended *laudatio* or *encomium* (funeral oration).[3] Others have argued that the *Agricola* is a political pamphlet,[4] or that the digression on Britain and its inhabitants,[5] the summary of the successes of the governors preceding Agricola[6] and finally, his own governorship,[7] indicate that it was conceived in the manner of historiography. Such is the diversity and scale of this work. Attempts have been made to solve this diversity by suggesting that the *Agricola* is a combination of styles. F. Goodyear states that the work is an amalgam of biography and history;[8] B. McGing calls it an encomiastic biography[9] and W. Hanson valiantly calls it a laudatory, historical biography with an underlying political purpose designed to justify not only the actions of Agricola under Domitian but also those of Tacitus and Trajan, men able to survive under a

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1 Zonaras, 11.18, p. 496, 19-20 (p. 55, 28-30D) = Dio, 66.20. Xiphilinus makes no mention of Agricola.

2 Apparently accepted without question by A. Woodhead, 'Tacitus and Agricola', *Phoenix* 2 (1947-48), 45; I. Richmond, 'Gnaeus Iulius Agricola', *JRS* 34 (1944), 34; A. Birley, *Fasti*, 73; B. Dobson, 'Agricola's life and career', *SAF* 12 (1980), 12 *et al.*

3 See R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 125.

4 E.g., *OCD*, 1034, s.v. Tacitus.

5 Tac *Agr*, 10-12.

6 *Ibid.*, 13-17.

7 *Ibid.*, 18-39.

8 E. Kenney and W. Clausen (eds.), *Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, 2, 643.

9 B. McGing, '*Synkrisis* in Tacitus' *Agricola*', *Hermathena* 132 (1982), 15.

cruel régime.[10] Ultimately, however, whatever genre the *Agricola* is considered to represent, be it biography, *laudatio*, history or political pamphlet, this will affect the perception of the material contained within it. Perhaps the most balanced appraisal of the *Agricola*'s nature is that of R. Syme who states that the book goes beyond the theme of biography[11] and for this reason is 'best left to be defined in its own terms'.[12]

The primary concern of this chapter is those passages which cover the details of Agricola's governorship and are quite clearly historical both in subject matter and in style. It is no coincidence that these passages clearly reveal the influence of Sallust and Livy.[13]

Agricola was born on 13 June 40 A.D.[14] at Forum Iulii in Narbonensis Gaul.[15] He was the son of Iulius Graecinus, a man who had attained the rank of praetor and had gained some renown for his literary tastes since he had written a work on the cultivation of the vine.[16] His premature death at the hands of the Emperor Gaius because he had declined to prosecute M. Silanus was also well-known.[17]

As the son of a senator Agricola was therefore eligible to embark on the normal *cursus honorum* of a Roman senator. His first posting was in Britain under Suetonius Paulinus,[18] when he appears to have been made a military tribune.[19] Syme proposes that Agricola's legion at this time was the Second Augusta,[20] since Tacitus knows the name of the camp prefect, Poenius Postumus, who committed suicide after the suppression of the Boudican

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10 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 19. Cf. F. Goodyear, *Tacitus*, 4-5; *contra* R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 19, who denies that there is a specific political purpose to the work. Cf. *OCD*, *loc. cit.*

11 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 121.

12 *Ibid.*, 125; also considered by R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 39: 'it is no ordinary biography for within its brief compass it contains and integrates in a unique manner five or six different elements'.

13 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 23ff.

14 Tac *Agr*, 44.1

15 *Ibid.*, 4.1.

16 Columella, 1.1.14. The cognomen Agricola probably reflects this interest in agriculture.

17 Sen *Ep*, 29.6, and *De benef*, 2.21.5.

18 Tac *Agr*, 5.1.

19 The phrase *electus quem contubernio aestimaret* need not imply that Suetonius Paulinus appointed Agricola to his own headquarters staff. See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 74; *contra* R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 3.

20 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 764f.

revolt.[21] Tacitus next records Agricola's quaestorship in 64[22] which was followed by a tribunate in 66 and a praetorship in 68, as he proceeded to each office in the shortest time allowed.[23] Up until this point, however, A. Birley considers that Agricola's career had been undistinguished.[24] Although Agricola reached the praetorship apparently two years early this was due to the birth of two children which gained him a year's remission in each case.

Under Galba Agricola found himself requisitioning temple treasures[25] and after crossing over to Vespasian's side early on in the Civil War (no doubt a reason for securing the future emperor's favour), he was placed in charge of levying troops in Italy.[26] Shortly afterwards Agricola was appointed to the command of the Twentieth Legion stationed in Britain, with instructions to restore it to good order and discipline after the seditious activity of its former legate, Roscius Coelius.[27] Agricola saw little action under Vettius Bolanus but he remained in Britain into the governorship of Petillius Cerialis when his talents had scope for display.[28] On his return from Britain, most probably in 73,[29] Agricola was made a patrician by Vespasian and then granted the governorship of Aquitania from which he returned 'after less than three years'[30] to take up the consulship. Agricola was subsequently appointed governor of Britain with the added distinction of a priesthood.[31]

After two previous tours of duty in Britain it is possible that Agricola was regarded as something of a British specialist. A third appointment in the same province was an unusual occurrence[32] and evidently his previous experience (and loyalty to Vespasian) gave

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21 See Tac *Ann*, 14.37; *supra*, ch. 4.
22 *Agr*, 6.2.
23 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, App. 1, 317.
24 A. Birley, *Fasti*, 75.
25 *Agr*, 6.5
26 *Ibid*., 7.
27 *Ibid*., 7.3-8. See also Tac *Hist*, 3.45 and *supra*, ch. 5.
28 *Ibid*., 9.
29 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 74.
30 Tac *Agr*, 9.5.
31 *Ibid*., 9.6.
32 See A. Birley, *Fasti*, 74.

him the necessary credentials to govern this frustrating outpost of the Roman Empire. Tacitus' account of Agricola's governorship commences in chapter 18 of the *Agricola: Hunc Britanniae statum, has bellorum vices media iam aestate transgressus Agricola invenit, cum et milites velut omissa expeditione ad securitatem et hostes ad occasionem verterentur.* The date of Agricola's arrival in Britain has generally been assumed to have been 77, although a different school of thought ascribes the commencement of his governorship to 78.[33] J. Hind has stressed that whether the year is 77 or 78, neither affects the course of Tacitus' narrative nor the direction or 'relative length and severity' of Agricola's campaign.[34]

Tacitus is clear as to the time of year that Agricola arrived in Britain since he marks it out by hyperbaton: *media iam aestate.* The implication is that, as the normal campaigning season was from mid-May to mid-August,[35] then Agricola probably arrived sometime in late June or July and certainly well after the normally accepted beginning of the campaigning year. This is a view reinforced by the expression *cum et milites velut omissa expeditione,* which suggests that the summer up to this point had been fairly relaxing for the soldiers which would have been the result of the apparent *interregnum* between the governorship of Frontinus and that of Agricola. Tacitus records: *Ordovicum civitas haud multo ante adventum eius alam in finibus suis agentem prope universam obtriverat, eoque initio erecta provincia.* This sentence hints that Frontinus had campaigned against the Ordovices[36] and that on his departure they took the opportunity to attack a patrol operating in their territory. Probably this represents nothing more than a skirmish but Tacitus skilfully creates an air of calamity through the phrase: *prope universam obtriverat.* No details of the numbers killed or wounded are given and he continues with the ominous words *eoque initio erecta provincia* followed by *et quibus bellum volentibus*

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33 For a discussion of the date of Agricola's governorship, see Appendix 3.

34 J. Hind, 'Summers and winters in Tacitus' account of Agricola's campaigns in Britain', *Northern History* 21 (1985), 1.

35 See Veg, 4.39.

36 M. Jarrett, 'Early Roman campaigns in Wales', *ArchJ* 121 (1964), 34.

erat, probare exemplum ac recentis legati animum opperiri to suggest that there were the makings of a revolt on the scale of Boudica's.

This technique allows Tacitus the opportunity to portray Agricola as a man equal to a task of such magnitude. He is depicted as being beset by difficulties: *quamquam transvecta aestas, sparsi per provinciam numeri, praesumpta apud militem illius anni quies tarda et contraria bellum incohaturo, plerisque custodiri suspecta potius videbatur,* although in truth these are minor problems. The innocuous *media iam aestate* at the beginning of the chapter has been translated into the more emphatic *transvecta aestas,* implying a date very late in the year. Tacitus next underlines Agricola's resolve: *ire obviam discrimini statuit.* The preparations for battle then follow: *contractisque legionum vexillis et modica auxiliorum manu,* neatly presented in balanced phrases. In keeping with the characteristic of a good general Agricola led his army from the front, a fact marked out by the emphatic pronoun *ipse.* The outcome of the engagement is never in any doubt as Tacitus immediately states: *caesaque prope universa gente,* a phrase which underlines the extent of Agricola's victory. Some have accepted these words at face value[37] but their very phraseology underlines their rhetorical force, for *prope universa* is a blatant echo of *prope universam* a few lines previously. Without referring to names, places or figures, Tacitus has created a scenario in which Agricola, as an exemplary general, has exacted just retribution for the loss of Roman lives. It may be unfair to accuse Agricola of genocide since this was not the first occasion that a governor of Britain had faced trouble on his arrival in the province. Both Ostorius Scapula[38] and Aulus Didius Gallus[39] had also encountered early problems.

Indeed the description of Ostorius' activities in the *Annals* bears similarities to those of Agricola. He too moved late in the season (*coepta hieme*); he is regarded as a *novum ducem,* whilst Agricola is described as *recentis legati;* and he too had to gather his forces together (*cohortes rapit*) to crush the resistance. As B. Dobson has observed, the example of

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37 See P. Salway, *Roman Britain,* 139; J. Hind, *loc. cit.*

38 See Tac *Ann,* 12.31.

39 *Ibid.,* 40.

Ostorius shows just how conventional the praise attributed to Agricola is.[40] It may also represent an example of the creative imitation that D. West and A. Woodman argue is a feature of Latin literature when an author narrates similar incidents.[41] Furthermore, the words: *non ignarus instandum famae ac, prout prima cessissent, terrorem ceteris fore,* used of Agricola are equivalent to the *ille gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni* used of Ostorius, except that in the *Agricola* they precede the attack on Anglesey.

Tacitus makes much of this incident but as there appears to have been little campaigning otherwise, it must be argued that the Ordovices had been largely pacified by the governors before Agricola. There is, however, a clear reason for the detailed description of this episode. Tacitus is deliberately drawing a comparison with the only other governor to attack Anglesey, Suetonius Paulinus, and this incident provides the linking passage.

Tacitus does not waste an opportunity to remind his listeners of the failure of Suetonius to capture Anglesey: *Monam insulam, cuius possessione revocatum Paulinum rebellione totius Britanniae supra memoravi, redigere in potestatem animo intendit,* in direct contrast to the forthcoming success of Agricola. Furthermore, Tacitus is at pains to show that Agricola's onslaught was unplanned: *sed ut in subitis consiliis, naves deerant.* That the expedition was unplanned is unlikely, but saying so allows Tacitus to demonstrate the initiative of Agricola: *ratio et constantia ducis transvexit. constantia* is a word used of Suetonius in the *Annals* when Tacitus describes his march to London[42] and such determination is clearly a quality expected of a good general.

In keeping with this image Agricola quickly overcomes the problem of a lack of ships by employing *lectissimos auxiliarium,* his choice emphasised by the superlative. The phrase *patrius nandi usus* implies that these men were Batavians.[43] Their special capabilities are stressed by the triple listing: *seque et arma et equos.* The effect of this decision, which is

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40 B. Dobson, 'Agricola's life and career', *SAF* 12 (1980), 5.

41 See D. West and A. Woodman (eds.), *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature.*

42 Tac *Ann,* 14.33.

43 See M. Hassall, 'Batavians and the Roman Conquest of Britain', *Brit* 1 (1970), 135.

Agricola's own, is demonstrated in forceful fashion: *ut obstupefacti hostes, qui classem, qui naves, qui mare expectabant, nihil arduum aut invictum crediderint sic ad bellum venientibus.* The vivid verb *obstupefacti,* emphatic by position, is followed by triple listing combined with *epanaphora.* Significantly each noun governed by *expectabant, classem, naves* and *mare,* means the same; a crossing by sea. As R. Ogilvie states, this phraseology vividly expresses the thoughts in the minds of the islanders by means of a process of rhetorical amplification.[44]

The subsequent surrender of the island appears rather a simple matter compared to the resistance found by Suetonius in 60[45] but it is marked out by the alliterative *petita pace.* The effect is evident: Agricola has succeeded where Suetonius had failed. As B. McGing notes there is an element of *synkrisis* in the *Agricola*[46] and here is an important example. It goes back to chapter 14 where Tacitus has recorded of Suetonius: *Monam insulam ... adgressus terga occasioni patefecit.* Agricola, despite his need to improvise, has succeeded where another mighty general, the *concertator Corbulonis,*[47] had failed. For this reason Tacitus can claim, *clarus ac magnus haberi Agricola,* even if the phrase is a rhetorical commonplace.[48] Tacitus amplifies this praise by a more general example of *synkrisis.* Agricola preferred 'hard work and danger' (where *labor et periculum* is perhaps another rhetorical commonplace[49]) in comparison with others who spent their time ostentatiously and in a round of official functions. This is slightly unfair to 'the others' since a new governor would be expected to get to know his province and to meet other officials, tribal chiefs and civic dignitaries which, just as today, would involve a large number of social functions. Agricola was also in the fortunate position of already knowing the province since this was his third office in Britain.

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44 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 212, s.v. *qui mare.*

45 See Tac *Ann,* 14.30.

46 B. McGing, *op. cit., Hermathena* 132 (1982), 17.

47 Tac *Ann,* 14.29.

48 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 212, s.v.18.5 *clarus et magnus* where he gives as examples: Cic *De Orat,* 2.19; *Phil,* 14.33; Sall *Cat,* 53.1, where the phrase used of Cato is almost identical and may indicate that there is a conscious echo here; *Iug,* 92.1; Livy, 38.50.4.

49 Cf. Sall *Iug,* 44.1; *Or Macri,* 18.

Tacitus next remarks that Agricola did not boast of his success and did not even claim that the expedition was a victory, merely that he had contained those already defeated; emphasised by the alliterative phrase, *victoriam vocabat victos*. This would seem to reinforce the view that the Ordovices had already been pacified (by Frontinus) and that Tacitus is guilty of exaggerating a minor incident. Furthermore, no laurelled despatches were sent to Rome either. The last sentence of the chapter ends in a characteristically Tacitean manner: *sed ipsa dissimulatione famae famam auxit, aestimantibus quanta futuri spe tam magna tacuisset*. This flattering picture is amplified by the juxtaposition and repetition of *famae famam* while *tam magna* is employed as a strengthened form of *tanta*.[50] It is no coincidence that chapter 18 is the longest chapter of the *Agricola*. As the first chapter of Agricola's governorship, which Tacitus clearly regards as the pinnacle of his career, it establishes the character of Agricola as a great general, at least comparable to Suetonius, and this necessarily colours the listener's perception of Agricola's character in the following chapters and events.

Chapter 19 concentrates on Agricola's civil duties, and the comparison with Suetonius continues, as McGing has observed.[51] Previously, in describing the attitude of the Britons after the revolt of Boudica, Tacitus has stated: *quos conscientia defectionis et proprius ex legato timor agitabat, ne quamquam egregius cetera adroganter in deditos et ut suae cuiusque iniuriae ultor durius consuleret* ....[52] By implication, Suetonius was an insensitive governor and had taken liberal revenge on the Britons, a fact which is more clearly indicated in the narrative of *Annals* 14.[53] Agricola, to the contrary, understood the provincials: *animorum provinciae prudens*, which Tacitus highlights by way of alliteration. He had learnt from the experience of others (surely Suetonius is implied) that little was achieved by force if it were pursued with injustice. Therefore Agricola set about putting his own house in order.

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50 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 213, s.v. *tam magna*.
51 B. McGing, *op. cit.*, *Hermathena* 132 (1982), 17.
52 Tac *Agr*, 16.2.
53 Tac *Ann*, 14.38.

This is a common rhetorical claim made of a good legate[54] and in this area too, Agricola is favourably compared to others: *quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere.* In Tacitus' view it is to Agricola's credit that he did nothing using freedmen, who were extensively employed by the emperors of Rome,[55] or using slaves, elsewhere referred to by Tacitus as the 'instruments of the procurator'[56] and one of the causes for the outbreak of rebellion in 60. At this point, as Ogilvie notes, the inversion *publicae rei* is rare[57] but it establishes an emphatic chiastic arrangement with *non studiis privatis,* in turn part of a triple list with *ex commendatione*[58] and *precibus.* The final clause of the sentence is also emphatic through the superlatives *optimum* and *fidissimum,* perhaps characterising Agricola himself by implication.

This chapter contains an impressive series of historic infinitives,[59] *adscire* and *putare* being followed by *scire, exsequi, commodare, contentus esse, praeponere, damnare* and *mollire.* They are designed to give Agricola an appearance of decisiveness, energy and competence as he makes the various decisions. Other rhetorical devices also emphasise his qualities. There is the balanced, repetitive phrase, *omnia scire, non omnia exsequi* followed by the alliterative *parvis peccatis,* which is the only occasion on which Tacitus uses *peccatum* as a noun.[60] The next sentence is again well-balanced: *nec poena semper, sed saepius paenitentia contentus esse.* The alliteration and assonance of the letters s and p is immediately obvious. Indeed there is a whole series of words at this point commencing with the letter p: *parvis, peccatis, poena* and *paenitentia* are followed by *potius non peccaturos praeponere* and finally *peccassent.* The overall sound is made more striking with the key idea *peccatis* reiterated in *peccaturos* and *peccassent.*

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54 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 213.

55 See e.g., Suet *Cl,* 28-29. More specifically to do with Britain the use of Narcissus by Claudius in 43, see Dio, 60.19.2, or Nero's use of Polyclitus in 61, see Tac *Ann,* 14.39.

56 Tac *Agr,* 15.2. Cf. Tac *Ann,* 14.31.

57 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 214.

58 A rare word which only occurs here and at *Dial,* 18.6, and *Ann,* 3.75.11 in Tacitus.

59 J. Bews, 'Language and style in Tacitus' *Agricola*', *G&R,* 2nd series, 34 (1987), 209.

60 See Gerber and Greef, 1080, s.v. *peccatum.*

The use of rhetorical techniques and several rare Tacitean words (*commendatio, adscire, peccatum, commodare*) emphasise the qualities that Tacitus attributes to Agricola but his comments are always couched in very general terms and could be used as clichés of any good governor. However, it may be argued that Agricola did act in a way expected of a model governor, even if Tacitus' flattering words seem to indicate that he was more than this.

The final lines of this chapter shed interesting light on certain corrupt practices within the outposts of the Roman world. Agricola is said to have eased the strain imposed on tribes by the levying of grain and the tribute by evening out the burden (stressed by the phrase *munerum mollire*) through the excision of those methods that were employed for profit and which were harsher than the tribute itself. Tacitus does not explain how Agricola tackled this problem but the burdens faced by the provincials are clear enough. Firstly, if the Britons could not supply enough grain to a fort, they were forced to buy it from the military at an extortionate rate and then sell it back at a much reduced price. Tacitus refers to this as *per ludibrium*, because the grain actually remained where it was while the money changed hands. Secondly, if the natives could provide grain, they were compelled to transport it to a fort some distance away. This inconvenience is stressed by the Tacitean solitary *divortia*.[61] In order to escape this duty the Britons could pay their local fort a sum of money: *donec quod omnibus in promptu erat paucis lucrosum fieret*, where *lucrosum* is also a rare Tacitean word. Such abuses are well-known to have been an on-going problem as Cicero, *Verrines*, 2.3.170-180 and 188-190 demonstrates. It is surprising that they would have been tolerated under the governorship of a man of the calibre of Iulius Frontinus.[62] W. Hanson has suggested,[63] therefore, that the requisition of grain was in fact in the hands of the procurator and that this passage is directed at the procurator of the time or his immediate predecessors (perhaps including Iulius Classicianus, for whom Tacitus has little regard). This would then detract from the implied criticism of Frontinus. It is possible that

61 Perhaps an echo of Livy, 44.2.7; *divortia itinerum*.

62 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 50.

63 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 72.

Agricola's involvement could have arisen from an investigation into a corrupt army official, a man who would come directly under the governor's jurisdiction. This passage could then, as P. Salway suggests, represent an isolated incident.[64]

The following chapter commences with a sentence confirming Agricola's success in civil matters: *Haec primo statim anno comprimendo egregiam famam paci circumdedit, quae vel incuria vel intolerantia priorum haud minus quam bellum timebatur.* The contrast of the *egregiam famam paci* established by Agricola and the attitude of other governors, *incuria vel intolerantia priorum*, is emphasised through the archaic *incuria* and the Tacitean solitary *intolerantia*[65] combined with alliteration. This antithesis of peace and war leads neatly into Agricola's second campaigning season, clearly delineated by the phrase: *sed ubi aestas advenit.* J. Hind has suggested that the campaigning season started early[66] but Tacitus does not indicate this, and the phrase surely means that Agricola took to the field at the normal time of the year as opposed to his late start in his first year of office.

This chapter provides a military equivalent to chapter 19. It is also marked by a series of historic infinitives[67] and as R. Martin has stated, until the last sentence, almost every phrase is a commonplace detailing the sort of behaviour expected of a Roman general.[68] To reinforce this view he quotes the phrases: *multus in agmine ... multus adesse,* which parallels a phrase found in Sallust, *Iugurtha* 96.3: *in agmine ... multus adesse,* and *nihil interim apud hostes quietum pati* which is a clear borrowing from Sallust, *Iugurtha* 66.1: *nihil intactum neque quietum pati.*

Tacitus fails to give the precise whereabouts of Agricola's theatre of operations since this ensures that maximum credit may be attributed to his father-in-law by referring to everything in very general terms.[69] Agricola is portrayed praising the good discipline of

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64 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 141.
65 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 218; J. Bews, *op. cit.*, *G&R*, 2nd series, 34 (1987), 207.
66 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 3.
67 J. Bews, *op. cit.*, *G&R*, 2nd series, 34 (1987), 209.
68 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 42.
69 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 55.

his men but reproving any stragglers; the contrast of action being emphasised by chiasmus: *laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere.* The governor's prominent role is underlined in the phrase: *loca castris ipse capere, aestuaria ac silvas ipse praetemptare,* where Agricola's personal leadership is stressed by the reiteration of *ipse* and the rare *praetemptare* which only occurs again in Tacitus at *Annals* 1.73.2. These, too, are stock clichés of the good general.[70] D. Breeze has pointed out that Agricola was not the first to be praised for his capacity to select camp sites;[71] Livy so praised Hannibal (35.14.9) and Philopoemen (35.28.1-9). These duties were normally the responsibility of the *praefectus castorum* but there is no reason why Agricola, as the commander of the forces in Britain, should not have been involved in the decision-making process[72] (although it would be naive to suggest that this would have been the case all the time).

The reference to 'estuaries and forests' has often been taken to imply that Agricola was operating in the north-west of England,[73] a reasonable assumption since such features are most prevalent in this area of the country due to the scarring caused by glaciation. But the phrase is a cliché and B. Dobson has argued[74] that it is impossible to accept this and at the same time to argue that Tacitus actually regarded Agricola's theatre of operations as the north-west. Indeed from Anglesey, in Agricola's first year as governor, to the Tay in his third, Tacitus makes no mention whatsoever of any place-names.

Tacitus does indicate a northward advance, however: *quibus rebus multae civitates, quae in illum diem ex aequo egerant, datis obsidibus iram posuere et praesidiis catellisque circumdatae ....* It used to be assumed that the tribe referred to here is that of the

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70 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 218.

71 D. Breeze, 'Agricola the builder', *SAF* 12 (1980), 14, quoting R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 230-231.

72 *Ibid.*, 15-16. Cf. Veg, 2.10, and Tac *Ann*, 12.38.

73 So A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 51; R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 42; G. Jones, 'in principle it must be conceded that this suggests the west rather than the east side of the country', 'The Romans in the North-West', *Northern History* 3 (1968), 6; P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 145; S. Frere (1987), 90.

74 B. Dobson, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 5-6.

Brigantes.[75] Previously, however, at *Agricola* 17.1, Tacitus refers to them as a single *civitas* despite their confederate nature.[76] It is possible that here he is indicating the northernmost tribal units of Brigantia, but it is more likely that the tribes to be inferred are those north of the Brigantes such as the Votadini, Selgovae and Novantae. However, if as J. Hind argues, the phrase 'estuaries and forests' is purely rhetorical then other tribes may be meant: the Setanti, Textoverdi and Carvetii.[77] The degree of success of the governorships of Cerialis and Frontinus has already been discussed and the extent of their operations would seem to favour a scenario north of Brigantia. At *Agricola* 17.1, Tacitus states of Cerialis: *magnamque Brigantum partem aut victoria amplexus est aut bello.* Clearly the conquest of this region must largely be put down to him.[78] Furthermore, the phrase *sustinuitque molem* used of Frontinus would seem to indicate that he too campaigned in Brigantia and possibly beyond as the evidence of Pliny the Elder, writing in 77, suggests: *XXX prope iam annis notitiam eius [sc. Britanniae] Romanis armis non ultra vicinitatem silvae Calidoniae.* Therefore, it is not surprising that Tacitus writes: *ut <haec ut>*[79] *nulla ante nova pars inlacessita transierit.* As W. Hanson argues, 'Agricola's second campaign, like his first, was based almost entirely on the work of his predecessors'.[80]

The account of Agricola's governorship continues with *sequens hiems*, which J. Hind shows,[81] is a conventional formula for writing history dating back to Thucydides. Moreover, it balances chapter 20. As chapters 18 and 19 relate the summer and winter of Agricola's first year in office, so 20 and 21 refer to the summer and winter of his second year. These chapters are essential in establishing Agricola's apparently exemplary character

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75 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 51.

76 See I. Richmond, 'Queen Cartimandua', *JRS* 44 (1954), 45-46.

77 J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 3.

78 G. Jones, *op. cit., Northern History* 3 (1968), 6: The legionary fortress at York should be assigned to Cerialis, and since the whole of the South Pennines can hardly have ben left unguarded, a number of forts attributed to Agricola should rather date back to the mid-70s.

79 A reading by G. Murgia, '*Loci conclamati* in the minor works of Tacitus', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (1978), 159-160, to provide better sense: 'so that this, as no new part of Britain before this, had crossed over in peace'.

80 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 57ff.

81 J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 4.

and they set the tone for the whole book. Just as the previous chapters were full of rhetorical clichés so the trend continues. In a balanced sentence Tacitus states: *namque ut homines dispersi ac rudes eoque in bella faciles quieti et otio per voluptates adsuescerent, hortari privatim, adiuvare publice, ut templa fora domos extruerent, laudando promptos, castigando segnes: ita honoris aemulatio pro necessitate erat.* The British qualities of *dispersi ac rudes* are balanced by the Roman ideals of *quieti et otio*. There is juxtaposition and contrast in *hortari privatim, adiuvare publice,* combined with the triple listing *templa fora domos,* and there is also balance and antithesis in the phrase *laudando promptos, castigando segnes,* which reiterates Agricola's attitude whilst on the march in chapter 20: *laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere.* The effect is to create an impressive picture of Agricola's exemplary behaviour in his civil duties.

Although this is the only clear literary evidence for a policy of Romanisation, it would be impossible to assert that this represents a policy initiative by Agricola.[82] Archaeological evidence indicates that this was an ongoing process in a newly conquered province and there are other hints in literature. Tacitus himself employs the phrase *imbuendis sociis ad officia legum*[83] when describing the establishment of the colony at Colchester in 49. On the inactivity of Trebellius Maximus he remarks: *didicere iam barbari quoque ignoscere vitiis blandientibus.*[84] A phrase which is echoed further on in chapter 21: *paulatimque discessum ad delenimenta vitiorum,* which Tacitus points out, more specifically, are *porticus et balineas et conviviorum elegantiam.* Certainly, there was investment on a large scale in the provinces by private individuals, as the example of Seneca reveals,[85] and it is probable that central government (*adiuvare publice ut templa fora domos extruerent*) supplied funds and skilled help to encourage the growth of towns and the spread of Romanisation, since it was in its interest to do so.

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82 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 73.
83 Tac *Ann*, 12.32.
84 Tac *Agr*, 16.2.
85 *Supra*, ch. 4.

Agricola's name is directly attested within the context of Romanisation from an inscription commemorating the construction of the forum at Verulamium. This was probably in 79, but as the forum would have taken more than two years to build, as W. Hanson states,[86] any credit for its foundation should, in fact, go to Frontinus. Furthermore, the use of *domus* in the narrative of Tacitus should imply a town house but C. Walthew has shown[87] that if this passage represents a deliberate policy by Agricola (and it is not merely rhetorical) then in terms of attracting the wealthy to build town houses Agricola failed in his aim, since the majority of domestic properties are to be found in the surrounding countryside.

There were less tangible aspects of Romanisation: *iam vero principum filios liberalibus artibus erudire, et ingenia Britannorum studiis Gallorum anteferre, ut quo modo linguam Romanam abnuebant, eloquentiam concupiscerent, inde etiam habitus nostri honor et frequens toga.* In other parts of the Empire native leaders had sent their sons to Rome to be educated, a practice that dated back to the Republic.[88] Rhetoric, despite a decline during the Empire, was still an important tool for the Roman, both in the market place and in his public career. Evidence for the growing usage of the Latin language can be seen through graffiti, which implies that even the lower social classes spoke and wrote Latin[89] and in the last half of the first century Martial could boast that even the Britons read his verses.[90] The desire to make Britain a toga-wearing nation dates back to the earliest years, as Seneca ascribes it,[91] of the reign of Claudius.

More evidence for an imperial policy on Romanisation may also be derived from the pages of Plutarch[92] who refers to Demetrius, a grammarian. In 83 this man was conducting a

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86 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 75, quoting S. Frere, *Verulamium Excavations*, Vol. 2 (1983), 9.

87 C. Walthew, 'The town house and the villa house', *Brit* 6 (1975), 204.

88 D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King*, 12-17.

89 F. Haverfield, 'Notes on the *Agricola*', *CR* 28 (1914), 43.

90 Martial, 11.3.5.

91 Sen *Apoc*, 2.3. See W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 81.

92 Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*, 2 (410) A and (419) E: ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος ἔφη τῶν περὶ τὴν Βρεττανίαν νήσων εἶναι πολλὰς ἐρήμους σποράδας, ὧν ἐνίας δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων ὀνομάζεσθαι· πλεῦσαι δὲ αὐτὸς ἱστορίας καὶ θέας ἕνεκα πομπῇ τοῦ Βασιλέως εἰς τὴν ἔγγιστα κειμένην τῶν ἐρήμων ἔχουσαν οὐ πολλοὺς <τοὺς> ἐποικοῦντας ἱεροὺς δὲ καὶ

voyage of research into the remote islands which surround the coast of Britain at the behest of Domitian. Tacitus' comment on this policy is quite scathing: *paulatimque discessum ad delenimenta vitiorum, porticus et balineas et conviviorum elegantiam. idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset.* The tone adopted is similar to that used of the inactivity of Trebellius Maximus. Evidently Tacitus does not approve of this policy. S. Bastomsky argues that in Tacitus' view 'an efficient and morally irreproachable governor is clearly administering a most unethical policy'.[93] The reproach, however, is aimed not at Agricola,[94] but at the imperial government that implements such policy. The statement is part of the political theme observed in the *Agricola;* that good men have to adopt compromising policies in order to survive under bad emperors. Tacitus condemns this because it not only affected the way that Agricola acted but also his own actions.

Chapter 22 turns to Agricola's third campaign season: *Tertius expeditionum annus novas gentes aperuit, vastatis usque ad Taum (aestuario nomen est) nationibus.* It is now generally accepted that the manuscript reading *Tanuam* is a corruption of *Taum* which in turn is an error for *Tavum*, the River Tay.[95] However, G. Maxwell has recently argued[96] that the reading should be *Tamium*, the River Teith, on the basis of the identification of *Tamia* with the recently discovered fort at Doune, situated on the river. *Tam—* is the source of many modern river names and it was not unusual for a place to be referred to by the name of the river on which it stood. The difficulty in Maxwell's interpretation lies in the fact that it is not known what the Roman name for the River Teith was, although repetition of river names was not uncommon.[97] The identification is an attractive one, however, for Doune lies far closer to the Forth-Clyde isthmus, Agricola's halting point in the next year, than does

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ἀσύλους πάντας ὑπὸ τῶν Βρεττανῶν ὄντας. Demetrius is also known to have been in Britain from the dedications found at York: *RIB*, 662-663.

93 S. Bastomsky, 'The not so-perfect man: some ambiguities in Tacitus' picture of Agricola', *Latomus* 44 (1985), 392.

94 *Contra* S. Bastomsky, *ibid.*

95 See A. Rivet and C. Smith, 470, s.v. *Tava* or *Tavus*.

96 G. Maxwell, 'The Roman fort at Doune and its possible significance', *Brit* 15 (1984), 221-222.

97 A. Rivet and C. Smith, 476-477, s.v. *Trisantona*.

the Tay. A further drawback is the comment in parentheses, *aestuario nomen est*, because the Teith is not an estuary. As previously observed, it is likely that Agricola was close to the Forth-Clyde line at the end of his second year and it would not have taken him long to march this far. Furthermore, he is recorded as encountering new tribes. It is most plausible that he met these further north towards the Tay. The *novae gentes* could then be the Damnonii, Caledonii, Vacomagi and Taexali since the tribes to the south had already been met by the Romans in previous years.[98]

Tacitus states that the enemy was terrified and would not attack the Romans, although blighted by atrocious weather, a point of information which is marked by the chiasmus *conflictatum saevis tempestatibus exercitum*. Since the Romans were not attacked, they were able to use the opportunity to construct forts. Again, this allows Tacitus to praise Agricola's ability as a general, although here he does so through the words of others, thus distancing himself from reproach if the facts should be inaccurate: *adnotabant periti non alium ducem opportunitates locorum sapientius legisse, nullum ab Agricola positum castellum aut vi hostium expugnatum aut pactione ac fuga desertum. crebrae eruptiones; nam adversus moras obsidionis annuis copiis firmabantur*. Once more this represents a stock description of a good commander. The use of *periti* gives a misleading air of authority to this statement but it was not an uncommon means of emphasis and recurs frequently elsewhere in Tacitus.[99]

D. Breeze has stated[100] that Tacitus makes it clear that it was part of Agricola's campaign policy to construct forts. This would appear to have been the normal practice of a Roman army on the march in order to secure territory overrun. Whether Agricola was responsible for the innovations in the design of forts that appear during the Flavian period in Britain is doubtful.[101] They may represent the work of one or more *praefecti castrorum* since it was

98 *Contra* M. Todd, *Roman Britain*, 106.

99 Tac *Hist*, 3.37; *Ann*, 12.25. Cf. also *Ann*, 13.3: *adnotabant seniores*.

100 D. Breeze, 'Agricola the builder', *SAF* 12 (1980), 18.

101 *Idem*.

their job to build forts, Tacitus' assertion that forts were supplied all the year round is undoubtedly accurate but this was not new to Agricola's governorship, since troops would normally return to well-equipped forts at the end of the summer. However, it is this reference to *annuis copiis* that prompts Tacitus to return to the summer/winter theme that J. Hind has observed within the *Agricola* and which is very much present within this chapter.[102] Tacitus builds on a reference to what is clearly sound strategy — that forts were well-supplied all year round — and goes on to mention that every commander could not only protect himself but also bring the enemy to frustration and despair, *inritis hostibus eoque desperantibus*, for these reasons: *quia soliti plerumque damna aestatis hibernis eventibus pensare tum aestate atque hieme iuxta pellebantur.*

In the last few lines of this chapter, Tacitus proceeds to give a brief character sketch of Agricola. This balances the preceding narrative in a fashion similar to the paired chapters 18 and 19 and 20 and 21. His opening comment is an obvious cliché, *nec Agricola umquam per alios gesta avidus intercepit*, and it recalls 8.3: *nec Agricola umquam in suam famam gesta exultavit.* Agricola also showed no bias towards legionaries or auxiliaries which implies that the legionaries, as Roman citizens, were generally favoured. The phrase *incorruptum facti testem* hints at lawcourt imagery and sums up Agricola's irreproachable character. But now Tacitus insinuates that his father-in-law had a darker side to his character: *apud quosdam acerbior in conviciis narrabatur* and *ut erat comis bonis, ita adversus malos iniucundus*, where the balance and antithesis recall such phrases as *laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere*[103] and *laudando promptos castigando segnes.*[104] Although this more unlikeable facet to his character is emphasised, aided by the Tacitean solitary *iniucundus*, it is soon played down as only a temporary failing. In a typical end of chapter comment, Tacitus states: *honestius putabat offendere quam odisse*, in which

102 J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 5.
103 Tac *Agr*, 20.2.
104 *Ibid.*, 21.1.

offendere ('to give offence') contrasts with *odisse* ('to harbour a dislike').[105] The picture thus created is of a harsh but fair individual.

At the start of the succeeding year Tacitus records: *Quarta aestas obtinendis quae percucurrerat insumpta; ac si virtus exercitus et Romani nominis gloria pateretur, inventus in ipsa Britannia terminus,* again highlighting the campaigning season by a reference to *aestas.* The areas already overrun must refer to the territory of the Votadini, Selgovae and Novantae, if not to other tribes further north as has been observed above. W. Hanson's statement that the last part of the sentence is 'strangely worded'[106] is true enough but Tacitus is writing with hindsight. He knew that Agricola would resume the advance. Imperialism was part of the Roman ethos and therefore he states that the Roman sense of virtue would not allow the army to remain on the isthmus. This halt may have been sensible strategy on Agricola's part. He was due to be recalled within the year, and consequently he was making preparations for the incoming governor. Having reached a suitable stopping point he was consolidating Rome's position within Britain; as Tacitus attractively describes: *namque Clota et Bodotria diversi maris aestibus per inmensum revectae, angusto terrarum spatio dirimuntur: quod tum praesidiis firmabatur atque omnis propior sinus tenebatur, summotis velut in aliam insulam hostibus.*

This description seems to come from an accurate source for it has been confirmed by archaeology. It is possible that Agricola favoured this plan[107] because it gave him an opportunity to claim that he had conquered the whole island, also the strain on resources that his northward advance had caused,[108] may have compelled the Emperor Titus to restrain him.[109] Moreover, Titus may have received his fifteenth salutation at this time[110] which would coincide quite neatly with this halt and the claim that Britain had

105 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 233.
106 W. Hanson, 'Agricola on the Forth-Clyde isthmus', *SAF* 12 (1980), 64.
107 W. Hanson, *Agricola,* 108.
108 *Ibid.,* 107.
109 B. Dobson, *op. cit., SAF* 12 (1980), 7-8; W. Hanson, *op. cit., SAF* 12 (1980), 64.
110 See Dio, 66.20.

been conquered. Evidence for Agricola's occupation of the isthmus is slight since attention has been centred on the line of the later Antoine Wall, when it now seems almost certain that any forts built by Agricola did not lie beneath the later constructions.[111] It is possible the Agricolan constructions may never have been intended to be permanent, for in the following year the advance recommenced.

Tacitus narrates: *Quinto expeditionum anno nave transgressus ignotas ad id tempus gentes crebris simul ac prosperis proeliis domuit.* Here he employs similar terminology to that used at 22.1 but does not refer to the summer, although the season is clearly implied by the use of *expeditionum*. The phrase *nave prima*, however, has provoked some debate as being unusual in a passage which does not stress Agricola's personal leadership qualities.[112] Moreover, Agricola's name has not been mentioned since 22.4 and does not recur until 24.3. A number of emendations have, therefore, been propounded: *vere primo* (Peter); *aestate prima* (Peerlkamp); *navigatione prima* (Semple); *nave in proxima* (Rigler); *nave primum* (Boot); *nave una* (Bury); *Britanniam* (Peerlkamp); *Sabrinam* (Madvig); *maritima* (Ulrichs); *in Clotae proxima* (Nipperdey).[113] Another suggestion that has found favour in recent years is that the phrase hides a misreading of *Anavam*, the River Annan. Proposed readings could then be in the form *nave prima Anavam* (Richmond)[114] or *anno Anavam transgressus* (Wellesley)[115] and more recently C. Murgia has suggested *anno Anavam amnem transgressus*.[116] In the previous year, however, Agricola had discovered a frontier 'within Britain itself' on the Forth-Clyde isthmus. Presumably he had overrun the area to the south of this line since it was not wise to leave an enemy at his rear. Some have suggested that Agricola had by-passed the Novantae[117] (there is some evidence to suggest that the

111 W. Hanson and G. Maxwell, 'An Agricolan *praesidium* on the Forth-Clyde isthmus', *Brit* 11 (1980), 48 *et al.* *Contra* R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, App. 3, 323-324.

112 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 7.

113 Quoted by W. Lacey, 'Some uses of *primus* in naval contexts', *CQ* n.s. 7 (1957), 121.

114 I. Richmond, *Roman Britain*, 58.

115 K. Wellesley, 'Review of *Cornelii Taciti: De vita Agricolae* by R.M. Ogilvie and Sir Ian Richmond', *JRS* 59 (1969), 267.

116 G. Murgia, *op. cit.*, *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (1978), 162.

117 A Robertson, 'Agricola's campaigns in Scotland and their aftermath', *SAF* 7 (1975), 5; B. Dobson, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 8.

Lake District had been largely ignored)[118] and in this year returned to pacify them. If this were the case, however, it is difficult to understand Tacitus' use of the phrase 'tribes unknown up to this time'. An alternative reading of this troublesome passage is possible.

If *nave prima* does indeed refer to a voyage by ship, and such a voyage over the River Annan seems unlikely, then J. Hind proposes[119] that possibly Tacitus with his usual brevity has introduced an innovatory phrase for *navigatione prima*[120] 'at the beginning of the sailing season' (that is, the beginning of summer) which the trained Roman ear would expect to hear. This reading of the text as it stands is preferable since, despite the reservations of modern historians, reference back to the previous chapter would seem to indicate that the most likely crossing by ship would be across the River Clyde.[121] A possible alternative to this would be a voyage towards the Mull of Kintyre or Arran and the other islands dotted around the Scottish coast.[122] This could then have been the occasion on which Demetrius' voyage of inquiry took place[123] and the unknown tribes defeated could have included the Epidii and others whose names are lost. However, the terrain of South Argyll and Kintyre would make archaeological confirmation of this difficult.

Agricola's next step was to marshal his troops on the coast facing Ireland. A. Birley, assuming a northward voyage, has suggested that this occurred on the Mull of Kintyre,[124] presuming, as most do, that one part of the campaign followed on directly from the next. N. Reed has argued,[125] however, that *eamque partem Britanniae quae Hiberniam aspicit copiis instruxit* refers to a separate manoeuvre by Agricola during which his troops were drawn up on the coast of Galloway. As he rightly observes, the *Epidii promontorium* (the

118 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 95-96.
119 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 8.
120 W. Semple, '*Agricola* 24', *CR* 43 (1929), 214.
121 A. Henderson, 'Agricola in Caledonia', *EMC* 29 (1985), 320.
122 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 52.
123 Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*, 2 (419) E.
124 A. Birley, in B. Levick (ed.), *The Ancient Historian and His Materials*, 144.
125 N. Reed, 'The fifth year of Agricola's campaigns', *Brit* 2 (1971), 146. Cf. R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 235-236.

Mull of Kintyre) on Ptolemy's map, which presumably represented the standard Roman conception of Britain, faces away from Ireland. It is possible that after his campaigns further north, Agricola returned south into the territory of the Novantae ready to winter his troops. This would solve the problem of the Novantae who could then be envisaged in the light of a nation friendly towards Rome. Furthermore, the location of this event at the end of Agricola's campaigning season is logical, since, although Tacitus makes no mention of winter in this chapter, neither does he refer to any more campaigns but proceeds to digress about Hibernia.

The importance of Ireland to the Romans is made clear by Tacitus: *si quidem Hibernia medio inter Britanniam atque Hispaniam sita et Gallico quoque mari opportuna valentissimam imperii partem magnis in vicem usibus miscuerit.* This distorted view of world geography may already have led the Romans to conquer Wales in the expectation of invading Ireland from Anglesey. Tacitus stresses the feasibility of this venture through the superlative *valentissimam*. Spain was certainly rich in resources, and Gaul, like Spain, provided a good recruiting ground. The inclusion of Britain under this epithet serves to emphasise her position since elsewhere at *Histories* 3.53.3 the similar phrase *validissimam terrarum partem* is applied only to Gaul and Spain. Tacitus is fairly accurate as to the physical appearance of Ireland. Its size is described as larger than the islands round the coast of Britain but smaller than Britain. Tacitus also refers to its similarities with Britain in paired phrases: *solum caelumque et ingenia cultusque hominum.* The succeeding *[in melius] aditus portusque per commercia et negotiatores cogniti* has been disputed because the immediate sense is that its approaches and harbours were better known than those of Britain. However, as C. Murgia has shown,[126] this is no reason to reject *in melius* since the phrase occurs regularly in Tacitus;[127] one particular example being *Annals* 12.33: *ut aditus abscessus, cuncta nobis inportuna et suis in melius essent,* which also refers to 'approaches'. A possible solution is that proposed by N. Reed: 'The fact that

126 C. Murgia, *op. cit.*, *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (1978), 162-164.

127 Gerber and Greef, 143, s.v. *bonus, melior, optimus* B) 1) b) α). It occurs eight times in total.

Britain and Ireland are being compared blinds us into assuming that this is the only comparison to be made'.[128] Tacitus could be implying that its harbours were known better than the nature of its climates and its inhabitants.

By means of this digression Tacitus stresses the strategic importance of Ireland and he reveals that Agricola had the opportunity to invade: *Agricola expulsum seditione domestica unum ex regulis gentis exceperat ac specie amicitiae in occasionem retinebat.* The chiasmus *expulsum seditione domestica unum* emphasises the importance of this event which is clearly designed to recall the examples of Dumnobellaunus and Tincommius who fled to Augustus, the flight of Adminius (Arminus) to Gaius and Verika (Berikos) to Claudius. Tacitus gives no name to the Irish chieftan who is only styled as 'one from the ruling household'. He need not have been a very important individual and whether this really provided a pretext for invasion is doubtful. The following sentence provides the only direct evidence in the *Agricola* that Tacitus made use of his father-in-law's information: *saepe ex eo audivi legione una et modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hiberniam posse.* This is employed to give validity to the claim that the conquest of Ireland was a viable prospect at this time. A similar claim had been made by Strabo with respect to Britain[129] and perhaps it should not be taken too seriously.[130] The final sentence of the chapter considers the benefits of the conquest of Ireland. It would have aided the subjugation of Britain because Roman arms would have been everywhere: *velut e conspectu libertas tolleretur,* an interesting idea just as Roman troops were about to invade the very north of Britain. Tacitus appears to consider that the conquest of Ireland was seriously contemplated[131] but although Agricola had the opportunity to invade he was unable to do so because of imperial policy, thus there is an implied criticism of Domitian.[132] W. Hanson has pointed out[133] that when so much of Britain was still left unconquered, it is improbable

128 N. Reed, '*Agricola* 24.2', *CR* 26 (1976), 115.
129 Strabo, 4.200.
130 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 238.
131 Cf. N. Reed, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 2 (1971), 146 *et al.*
132 B. Dobson, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 8.
133 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 94.

that an invasion of Ireland at this time was seriously contemplated, either by Agricola or by the Emperor.

The introduction to chapter 25 is somewhat grander than the introductions used for previous chapters: *ceterum aestate, qua sextum officii annum habebat*. It unequivocally places the campaign in Agricola's sixth year of office[134] and not only does it firmly establish the date but also the situation of the action: *amplexus civitates trans Bodotriam sitas*. The reasons for this action are explained: *quia motus universarum ultra gentium et infesta hostili exercitu itinera timebantur, portus classe exploravit*. Tacitus clearly perceives the action to take place on the east side of the country, as the references to *Bodotria* (the River Forth) at 25.1 and 25.3 reveal.[135] Tacitus later identifies the tribes he mentions as *Caledoniam incolentes populi* (25.3). These people are always referred to by the area[136] in which they live and not by tribal names by Tacitus. They evidently lived in a region north of the Forth[137] and it appears they were a conglomeration of tribes.[138] It is possible that the grouping included nations such as the Venicones, Vacomagi and Taexali.[139]

Agricola's use of the fleet in this campaign is particularly emphasised by Tacitus who states that it was being used for the first time by him to supplement his land forces and that its addition created a grand spectacle. The use of *primum* here is ambiguous. R. Ogilvie,[140] like many modern historians, takes this to mean that the fleet was being used for the first time *in history* as part of a strike force. Yet there are numerous instances prior to this where the fleet was used in military operations. For example, when Vespasian was operating in the south-west in 43 he must have employed the fleet to attack Anglesey. Elsewhere, combined movements are attested in Caesar when he used the fleet for

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134 J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 9.
135 A. Henderson, *op. cit., EMC* 29 (1985), 322.
136 See Tac *Agr*, 29 and 31.4.
137 J. Hind, 'Caledonia and its occupation under the Flavians', *PSAS* 113 (1983), 373.
138 *Idem* and J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 9.
139 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 125.
140 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 234. Cf. A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 54.

reconnaissance,[141] and also in the campaigns of Drusus, Tiberius and Germanicus.[142] A more preferable reading of *primum* in this instance would be that this was the first time that Agricola himself had used the fleet in combined operations.

The effect of the fleet's presence is narrated in balanced phrases: *cum simul terra, simul mari bellum impelleretur* followed by the triple listing *ac saepe iisdem castris pedes equesque et nauticus miles mixti copiis;* to emphasise the joint use of army and navy, further stressed by the Tacitean solitary *nauticus*. Even the very sight of the fleet amazed the Caledonians: *Britannos quoque, ut ex captivis audiebatur, visa classis obstupefaciebat.* The reference to *ut ex captivis audiebatur* adds authenticity to this story and the whole effect is further emphasised by the strong verb *obstupefaciebat.* The use of the following *tamquam* expresses vividly the thoughts of the Britons,[143] that, by opening up the sea (*aperto maris sui secreto* is a chiasmus) the last refuge of the defeated was closed to them. This drove the enemy to act: *ad manus et arma conversi Caledoniam incolentes populi magno paratu, maiore fama, uti mos est de ignotis, oppugnare ultro castella adorti, metum ut provocantes addiderant.* For the first time here the enemy is named. As has already been observed the situation of the action must be to the east of the Highlands due to the references to the River Forth, although the actual identification of Caledonia is uncertain.[144] There is an implication through the reference to *castella* that some fort building had already taken place north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus[145] since the Caledonians are unlikely to have encroached on the well-garrisoned province south of this line.

Agricola's own balanced attitude at this time is heightened by the reference to 'rumour'. For it is ignorant people who 'are prone to exaggerate with regard to things they do not

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141 Caes *BGall*, 4.21.

142 See W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 175-176.

143 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 241.

144 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *PSAS* 113 (1983), 373; A. Henderson, *op. cit.*, *EMC* 29 (1985), 323-324; W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 116f.

145 See W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 121; *contra* D. Breeze and B. Dobson, 'A view of Roman Scotland in 1975', *Glasgow Archaeological Journal* 4 (1976), 128; D. Breeze, *The Northern Frontiers of Roman Britain*, 53.

know'[146] and this is picked up in the next sentence: *regrediendumque citra Bodotriam et cedendum potius quam pellerentur ignavi specie prudentium admonebant, cum interim cognoscit hostis pluribus agminibus inrupturos.* The force of this comment is further heightened by *ignavi specie* which is an obvious contrast to the *egregiam specie* referring to Agricola's fleet (where *egregia* also reflects on Agricola himself) used earlier in the chapter. The effect of this episode is of *synkrisis* as Agricola's actions are seen in contrast to the attitude of these men, and his attitude is to act: *ac ne superante numero et peritia locorum circumiretur, diviso et ipse in tres partes exercitu incessit.* Emphatically, this sentence rounds off the chapter. As previously observed, the division of an army into three sections is probably rhetorical[147] and this comment should not be taken literally as it provides a neat contrast to the disorganised Caledonians whose attacks are *pluribus agminibus.*

The Caledonians reacted violently to Agricola's action. They had a sudden change of plan (*mutato repente consilio*) and attacked the Ninth Legion. In actual fact their plan seems to have been well-conceived since this legion was the weakest of the legions (*maxime invalida*) that Agricola had with him and they also launched their onslaught at night. Inscriptions reveal that in 83 detachments from all four British legions were in Germany[148] in preparation for Domitian's German war. In addition, there was another detachment from the Ninth commanded by its senior tribune.[149] In this instance, contrary to the normal practice of sending equal sized detachments from each legion stationed in the same province, the losses had fallen disproportionately on the Ninth.[150] The fact that Agricola seems to have made no effort to protect the weakest part of his forces[151] makes no difference to Tacitus who turns the misfortune to Agricola's advantage.

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146 I. Schatzman, 'Tacitean rumours', *Latomus* 23 (1974), 552.
147 Cf., Caes *BGall*, 5.10; Dio, 60.19; 62.8.
148 *ILS* 9200.
149 *ILS* 1025.
150 B. Dobson, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 9.
151 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 176.

The battle was being fought inside the very camp: *iamque in ipsis castris pugnabatur*, when Agricola intervened *cum Agricola iter hostium ab exploratibus edoctus et vestigiis insecutus, velocissimos equitum peditumque adsultare tergis pugnantium iubet, mox ab universis adici clamorem; et propinqua luce fulsere signa.* The superlative *velocissimos*, combined with the vivid and poetic *adsultare* stresses the apparent speed of the governor's action. The clauses begin to shorten as the narrative approaches its climax. The Britons were terrified by a double-edged fear.[152] The Ninth Legion, on the other hand, regained heart: *ac securi pro salute de gloria certabant*, doubly emphatic because of its Sallustian echo.[153] The Romans began to strike back (*erupere* used here is a strong verb). The battle was 'terrible' (*atrox* is a favourite word of Tacitus for such scenarios) in the very entrance to the camp and the Britons were crushed (*pulsi hostes*). Then the only struggle was between the two sections of the Roman army: *utroque exercitu certante, his, ut tulisse opem, illis, ne eguisse auxilio viderentur.* The chapter ends with a clear echo of Livy, *quod nisi paludes et silvae fugientes texissent*,[154] in keeping with Tacitus' reliance on him and on Sallust throughout the narrative sections of the *Agricola*.[155]

Tacitus attributes much to the outcome of this battle: *debellatum illa victoria foret.* R. Ogilvie argues that the name *Victoria* given to a fort situated in the territory of the Damnonii by Ptolemy is evidence of the importance of this victory.[156] A. Henderson, however, prefers to regard *Victoria* as referring to the legionary fort at Inchtuthil and the victory of the following year.[157] A. Rivet and C. Smith also regard the site of *Victoria* as Inchtuthil but because the legion occupying it was the Twentieth *Valeria Victrix*.[158] S.

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152 *ancipiti malo* is also found at Sall *Iug*, 67.1; *Cat*, 29.1. Cf. also Livy 3.28.9; 21.41.13.

153 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 25, quoting Sall *Iug*, 114.2.

154 Cf. Livy, 3.22.9: *deletusque exercitus foret ni fugientes silvae texissent.*

155 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 25.

156 *Ibid.*, 243, where *Victoria* is said to refer to Strageath or Dalginross. Cf. A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 55.

157 A. Henderson, *op. cit.*, *EMC* 29 (1985), 324.

158 A. Rivet and C. Smith, 499, s.v. *Victoria.*

Frere has pointed out that *Victrix* would actually yield *Victricensis*,[159] hence he prefers Dalingross as its location based on this victory, and the *portarum angustiis* would then refer to its Stracathro-type gates. However, it is argued that *Victoria*, whatever its derivation, is unlikely to refer to what was a relatively minor victory at a marching camp. In the succeeding year there was a far more substantial victory, after which a legionary fortress was begun at Inchtuthil. This site, therefore, as A. Henderson suggests, has far greater claim to the name *Victoria*.[160]

Chapter 27 marks the end of Agricola's sixth campaign and, in typical Tacitean manner, has a moralising tone.[161] His army was in high spirits because of the knowledge and renown of this victory and clamoured (*fremebant* is an evocative word and combined with the alliterative *fama ferox* demonstrates the strength of the army's passion) that the limit to Britain must at last be found through a continuing series of battles: *inveniendumque tandem Britanniae terminum continuo proeliorum cursu fremebant*. This statement both recalls and contrasts with the end of chapter 23: *inventus in ipsa Britannia terminus*. Ironically, too, Tacitus states: *atque illi modo cauti ac sapientes prompti post eventum ac magniloqui erant*. These were the men who had been so pessimistic at 25.3. Their change of heart is marked out by the pairing of *cauti* and *prompti* and *masgniloqui* heightened by the hyperbaton of *prompti post eventum* and the Tacitean solitary *magniloqui*, 'a highflown word'[162] rarely used in prose. This is followed by a common Tacitean *sententia*,[163] introduced by a forceful superlative: *iniquissima haec bellorum condicio est: prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversi uni imputantur*.

The following lines refute the notion that the Caledonians had been almost defeated (*debellatum*) in their previous encounter with the Romans. They still retained some *virtus*

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159 S. Frere, 'Naming Roman Britain: a review of *The Place-names of Roman Britain* by A.L.F. Rivet and C. Smith', *Brit* 11 (1980), 421.

160 A. Henderson, *op. cit.*, *EMC* 29 (1985), 324.

161 J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 10.

162 J. Bews, *op. cit.*, *G&R*, 2nd series, 34 (1987), 207.

163 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 294. Cf. Tac *Ann*, 3.53.3; 14.38.3; Sall *Iug*, 53.8; Aesch *Sept*, 4-8; Dem *De cor*, 212; Nep *Alc*, 8.4.

(a Roman quality) for they had been defeated *occasione et arte ducis*. Tacitus does not waste this opportunity to praise Agricola but without belittling the strength of his opponents. The enemy retained their arrogance (*adrogantia*), a quality typical of barbarians. This is followed by a tricolon describing their preparations for war: *quo minus iuventutem armarent, coniuges ac liberos in loca tuta transferrent, coetibus et sacrificiis conspirationem civitatum sancirent*. The last clause, which implies the formation of a Caledonian confederation, contains emphatic assonance and alliteration of the letter, as their strength has to be seen as a match for that of Agricola. The final sentence of this chapter ends ominously, also marked out by alliteration and assonance: *atque ita inritatis utrimque animis discessum*. The phrase is later echoed at *Annals* 13.56.1[164] and *inritatis ... animis* is Livian in tone[165] and thus it has a familiar ring to it and the stage is set for Agricola's last season as governor. Before Tacitus commences, however, he digresses to relate an incident that occurred during Agricola's sixth year in office in order to create a dramatic pause and so heighten tension before the start of the final campaign. This reflects the practice of Sallust and Livy who would mark off major sections of their work in a similar manner.[166]

Tacitus commences: *Eadem aestate cohors Usiporum per Germanias conscripta et in Britannam transmissa magnum ac memorabile facinus ausa est*. The Usipi mentioned here may not have been part of the Roman Empire at this time since Germany had not yet been conquered but they may have lived close enough to Roman power to have been conscripted as auxiliaries. The enormity of their treacherous action is emphasised by the alliterative couplet *magnum et memorabile*. Tacitus next expands on his opening comment: *occiso centurione ac militibus, qui ad tradendam disciplinam inmixti manipulis exemplum et rectores habebantur, tres liburnicas adactis per vim gubernatoribus ascendere; et uno remigante, suspectis duobus eoque interfectis, nondum vulgato rumore ut miraculum*

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164 *atque ita infensis utrimque animis discessum.*

165 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 244.

166 *Ibid.*, 245; R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 43-45.

praevehebantur. The phrase *uno remigante* has posed some difficulties here.[167] *remigans* ('rower') only occurs once elsewhere in Tacitus at *Agricola* 10 where it refers, in the plural, to the rowers of a ship. It is, therefore, difficult to accept that in the singular it should be the equivalent of *gubernator* ('helmsman'), as B. Baldwin contests.[168] R. Ogilvie has rejected C. Lynch's *uno re negante*[169] but the reading does make sense and would seem to agree with Dio's version of the tale: περιέπλευσαν τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν αὐτῆς, ὡς που τό τε κῦμα καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτοὺς ἔφερε[170] which implies that the Usipi had no helmsmen at all.

Tacitus describes their voyage in considerable detail. The Usipi put in for water and supplies and, interestingly, fought with the Britons who were defending their property from these deserters. It was not long before the Usipi, lacking the benefit of Roman leadership[171] were reduced to a pitiful state: *ut infirmissimos suorum mox sorte ductos vescerentur*. This gruesome comment is stressed by the Tacitean solitary *vescor*. Despite this, however, the Usipi managed to circumnavigate Britain (*atque ita circumvecti Britanniam*) although in the course of this they lost two ships as the plural *amissis ... navibus* must imply since they only began with three. In due course the Usipi found themselves cast on to the German coast. Regarded as pirates they were intercepted first by the Suebi and them the Frisians. Consequently, the remainder of these deserters were sold into slavery and reached the Roman side of the Rhine, which was within the Roman province as *in nostram usque ripam* implies,[172] where they became infamous because of their story.

Indeed the Romans were so captivated by this intriguing tale that no fewer than four accounts of it were written in antiquity.[173] One of these survives in Dio, who records:

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167 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 246; C. Lynch, '*Agricola* 28', *AJPh* 65 (1944), 246.
168 B. Baldwin, 'The hapless helmsman', *CJ* 65 (1970), 322-323.
169 C. Lynch, *op. cit.*, *AJPh* 65 (1944), 246.
170 Dio, 66.20.2.
171 See J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 10.
172 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 249.
173 *Ibid.*, App. 2, 321.

στρατιῶται γάρ τινες στασιάσαντες, καὶ ἑκατοντάρχους χιλίαρχόν τε φονεύσαντες, ἐς πλοῖα κατέφυγον καὶ ἐξαναχθέντες περιέπλευσεν τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν αὐτῆς, ὥς που τό τε κῦμα καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτοὺς ἔφερε, καὶ ἐλαθον ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὰ ταύτῃ ὄντα προσσχόντες.[174] Evidently the traditions surrounding the story varied. Dio's account may stem from a source used by Pompullus.[175] He first differs from Tacitus in the date. Dio places the event in the year 79, as revealed by his references to the fifteenth salutation of Titus which is mentioned at the end of the chapter. This may be an error due to Dio's compression of events, which was subsequently misinterpreted by his epitomator and it is preferable to accept Tacitus' dating since he did have a first-hand source.

Another difference between the two versions is that Dio never even mentions the Usipi. Moreover, he states that 'centurions' (the plural as opposed to Tacitus' singular) and a tribune (which Tacitus does not record at all) were killed. This makes perfect sense and seems to imply that a milliary cohort was involved in this action but 1,000 men would be too large a number for three Liburnian galleys to hold,[176] so probably, only a part of the cohort was concerned.[177] Dio's account also suggests that their circumnavigation was from west to east since the Usipi 'put into bases on the first side again', which would have been the east side of Britain since Agricola's campaigns were directed along this coast. This interpretation would make logical sense since the Usipi eventually landed on the coast of Germany. If they had rounded the western coast the drift of the tide would eventually have taken then down to Spain.

Dio's version of events ends abruptly but Tacitus is far more dramatic, retelling those parts of the story that made it so dramatic; circumnavigation, cannibalism and, finally, capture. However, to a certain degree both authors complement each other. Perhaps each has

174 Dio, 66.20.1-2.
175 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, App. 2, 321.
176 *Idem*.
177 *Ibid.*, 245-246.

chosen the areas of the story that he found most striking.[178] Dio finally draws a comparison with the later circumnavigation of Britain by Agricola: κἀκ τούτου καὶ ἄλλους ὁ Ἀγρικόλας πειράσοντας τὸν περίπλουν πεμψας ἔμαθε καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων ὅτι νῆσός ἐστιν. Tacitus does this too, but in a more skilful manner. The disorganised voyage of the Usipi is eventually contrasted with Agricola's official and organised expedition at the end of his seventh year, although to some extent the success of the deserters detracts from that of Agricola.[179]

The narrative concerning Agricola's sixth campaign is by far the most substantial up to this point, covering three chapters, 25-28.[180] Its main purpose, however, is to provide a springboard into the events of the following year; the climax of the book and of Agricola's career.

In dramatic fashion Tacitus introduces the scenario: *Initio aestatis Agricola domestico vulnere ictus anno ante natum filium amisit. quem casum neque ut plerique fortium virorum ambitiose neque per lamenta rursus ac maerorem muliebriter tulit; et in luctu bellum inter remedia erat.* Despite the proposal that *sequentis* or the Roman numeral *vii* or *septimae* has dropped out,[181] the sense of this as the next year is clear by reference to the summer. Agricola bore the loss of his son in a Stoic manner but without a Stoic's ostentatious behaviour (there is an implied criticism of Stoics at this juncture).[182] Nor did Agricola react in the manner of a woman, the adverb *muliebriter* contrasting with *virorum*[183] to emphasise Agricola's moderation even at a time of grief. The tone of this passage is tragic, but, in true heroic manner, Agricola overcomes his grief and finds release in his work — fighting a war.

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178 *Ibid.*, 322.

179 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 176.

180 The impression is of a long drawn out campaign. See, J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 10.

181 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 250; J. Hind, *op. cit.*, *Northern History* 21 (1985), 11.

182 T. Dorey, '*Agricola*', in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 7.

183 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 250.

Tacitus' account of the preceding campaign is not as clear as his narrative of the sixth season[184] and as in other instances he covers his vagueness by means of various rhetorical devices. He opens with a series of words commencing with the letter p (*praemissa, pluribus, praedata*) combined with the weighty hendiadys and homoeoteleuton of *magnum et incertum terrorem*. This may indicate a continuation of Agricola's previous activity whereby he had used the fleet in 25.3 to terrify the Britons. The army too had a role to play: *expeditio exercitu, cui ex Britannis fortissimos et longa pace exploratos addiderat, ad montem Graupium pervenit, quem iam hostis insederat.* Tacitus includes the interesting detail that Britons were found in the Roman forces. These men were *fortissimos et longa pace exploratos*, thus providing a sharp contrast to the Caledonians. It is likely that they had been recruited from the more hospitable areas in the south of Britain.

The site of Mons Graupius has long been discussed. The correct version of its name should probably be *Craupius* which is derived from the old Welsh *crup* (W. crwb) meaning 'hump' or 'haunch'.[185] This led W. Watson to identify the hill with *Dorsum Crup* (the modern Duncrub[186]). However, such a name need not be exclusive since Celtic names for geographical features often recur.[187] Indeed, the hill Duncrub is a rather insignificant landmark and, as L. Keppie has stated,[188] too small to be of strategic importance. Furthermore, this particular hill is rather farther to the south than Tacitus' narrative would seem to indicate. Later in the text there are hints that the action took place far to the north.[189] Agricola did not return south until the end of the summer (38.2) and in the speeches of both Calgacus and Agricola reference is made to the limit of the world and the boundaries of Britain (30.1; 30.3; 33.3; 33.6). Hence, more suitable sites have been suggested. Raedykes is one possibility,[190] although once more this seems too far south since marching

184 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 56.
185 W. Watson, *The History of the Celtic Place-names of Scotland*, 55.
186 *Ibid.*
187 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 131.
188 L. Keppie, 'Mons Graupius: the search for a battlefield', *SAF* 12 (1980), 82.
189 A. Henderson, *op. cit.*, *EMC* 29 (1985), 330.
190 Proposed as long ago as in W. Maitland, *The History and Antiquities of Scotland*, London, 1757.

camps of a Flavian date have been discovered further north.[191] The location of a camp at Auchinhove led A. Burn to propose[192] that this was Agricola's camp and that Mons Graupius was Knock Hill. This view was also accepted by D. Henderson-Stewart and R. Ogilvie and later reaffirmed by A. Burn himself.[193] However, the difficulty with this suggestion is that the proposed camp sites at Auchinhove or Muiryfold are in the wrong position and probably too small to be considered as Agricola's battle camp.

Since the proposals above were made, a camp of 144 acres has been discovered at Durno, Aberdeenshire. The size of this camp is unique and suggests a special concentration of forces, such as would have been present at Mons Graupius. This led J. St. Joseph to propose that the nearby hill of Bennachie, a fairly imposing landmark, around which there are no fewer than six hill-forts, 'a remarkable concentration',[194] was the site of the battle. As he also noted, there would have been plenty of space for the large native forces that Tacitus indicates and the terrain would suit the tactics of the battle as described by the historian. There was also a good water supply in the form of the River Urie, which would have flowed between the camp and the hill. Noteworthily the sum areas of the nearest two series of marching camps equals the acreage of Durno (although there is some doubt as to whether they are in fact Agricola's). All of this strongly argues for the suitability of the site.[195] However, as L. Keppie has stated, until the site is located by some more positive archaeological means, such as a mass burial or a hoard of weapons, the battle site must remain disputed.[196]

Tacitus begins his account of the battle by describing the attitude of the Caledonian forces: *nam Britanni nihil fracti pugnae prioris eventu et ultionem aut servitium expectantes,*

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191 L. Keppie, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 82.

192 A. Burn, 'In search of a battlefield: Agricola's last battle', *PSAS* 87 (1953), 127-133.

193 D. Henderson-Stewart, 'The battle of Mons Graupius', *TAMS* n.s. 8 (1960), 83; R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 252; A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 56.

194 J. St. Joseph, 'The camp at Durno, Aberdeenshire, and the site of Mons Graupius', *Brit* 9 (1978), 282.

195 *Ibid.*, 286-287.

196 L. Keppie, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 85; W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 136-137.

tandemque docti commune periculum concordia propulsandum, legationibus et foederibus omnium civitatium vires exciverant. Tacitus refers back to the events of chapter 26 but emphasises the unbroken nature of the Britons in order to create the picture of an adversary worthy of the Romans. This is a good opportunity for an attack on the Roman imperial government which Tacitus does not waste, for if the Britons fail they can only expect servitude. The hyperbaton of *commune periculum concordia propulsandum* marks out the unusual occurrence of an alliance between the tribes[197] already hinted at in 27: *coetibus et sacrificiis conspirationem civitatum sancirent,* although it should be noted that this was not a unique occurrence.[198] This united force is emphasised by Tacitus who even mentions a figure: *super triginta milia armatorum aspiciebantur,* for he wants to add glory to Agricola's eventual victory.[199] Moreover, the men in the British ranks are portrayed in flattering terms for the same reason. The old men are *cruda ac viridis senectus,* a striking poetic borrowing from Vergil who uses it of the Stygian boatman, Charon,[200] so there may be a hint of Tacitean humour here. Furthermore, the Britons as a whole are described as *clari bello* and wearing decorations. The latter may be a reference to their torques, as R. Ogilvie suggests,[201] although a parallel with the decorations worn by the Roman troops on parade is more likely.

As is his custom, Tacitus prefaces the battle with speeches given by each of the opposing generals. The first speech, as usual, is presented by the enemy and losing general,[202] Calgacus. His name means 'swordsman'[203] and it is likely that this was probably a title rather than a name. He is described as *virtute et genere praestans,* a man possessing the

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197 See, D. Henderson-Stewart, *op. cit., TAMS* n.s. 8 (1960), 80.

198 Cf. the Catuvellauni, Caes *BGall,* 5.9ff.; Caratacus who had connections with other tribes, *supra,* ch. 3; the Iceni who allied themselves with the Trinovantes and others during the Boudican Revolt, Tac *Ann,* 14.31.2.

199 B. McGing, *op. cit., Hermathena* 132 (1982), 20, who states that the figure is probably an exaggeration (see W. Hanson, *Agricola,* 138). But if Agricola himself had c. 20,000 troops then this may not be too far-fetched, assuming that there would have been more Britons than Romans.

200 Cf. Verg *Aen,* 6.304. *viridis* is a rare word in Tacitus, only occurring elsewhere in *Dial,* 29.1.

201 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 253.

202 B. Cherniak, 'The length of the concluding sentences in the paired speeches of Tacitus', *VDI* (1983), 61-62.

203 W. Watson, *The History of the Celtic Place-names of Scotland,* 7.

Roman quality of *virtus* and of high birth, important attributes in Roman eyes, thus implying his worth as an opponent of Agricola.

The use of speeches was a convention of ancient historiography but in his later works Tacitus employed the device less and less, often putting speeches into *oratio obliqua*.[204] Here the speech of Calgacus, covering seventy lines of text, is a regular *declamatio* as the formula *in hunc modum locutus fertur* suggests.[205] Its impressive length (Agricola's speech only has 39 lines) and its 'real fire and vigour'[206] are again designed to increase his stature as an adversary worthy of Agricola. The speech opens with an echo of Sallust, *Catiline* 58.18: '*Quotiens causas belli et necessitatem nostram intueor, magnus mihi animus est hodiernum diem consensumque vestrum initium libertatis toti Britanniae fore*'. It has a weighty feel due to the alliteration and assonance of the letters n and m, and the common theme of liberty is soon introduced. Tacitus echoes, through Calgacus, his previous words (in 25) that the Roman fleet was now causing the Britons great alarm, for it had laid open their innermost recesses so that not event he sea was now safe. The synonyms *proelium* and *arma* combined with the superlative *tutissima* emphasise Calgacus' appeal to the safest course of action for the Britons. Having resisted the Romans already — he refers back to chapter 26 — they still had hope, as the alliterative doublet *spem ac subsidium* emphasises. His people are *nobilissimi*, another superlative combined with the noteworthy assonance of the letter s in the phrase *in ipsis penetralibus siti nec ulla servientium litora aspicientes*, to denote their remoteness from servitude. The theme of enslavement is now linked to the theme of despotism. The *dominationis* of the following clause, while *inviolatos* continues the imagery of a temple as suggested by *penetralibus* prior to this.[207]

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204 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 43, n. 7.
205 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 253-254.
206 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 43.
207 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 255.

The freedom/slavery theme continues in the following sentence and the phrases become shorter for heightened rhetorical effect as Calgacus emphasises that there is no further retreat for the Britons, that they have to stand and fight: *'nunc terminus Britanniae patet, atque omne ignotum pro magnifico est; sed nulla iam ultra gens, nihil nisi fluctus ac saxa, et infestiores Romani, quorum superbiam frustra per obsequium ac modestiam effugias'*. This returns to the political theme in the *Agricola* of the necessity for moderation under bad emperors and it is followed by a scathing attack on the imperialism of Rome. The phrase *raptores orbis* is evocative, for *raptores* only occurs once elsewhere in Tacitus at *Histories* 2.86.11. The greed of the Romans is emphasised by the balanced chiastic clause *postquam ... defuere terrae, mare scrutantur*. Calgacus argues 'What can possibly be gained from the sea?' He continues: *'si locuples hostis est, avari, si pauper, ambitiosi, quos non Oriens, non Occidens satiaverit: soli omnium opes atque inopiam pari adfectu concupiscunt'*. The points are emphatic: that nothing can satiate the Romans' greed, neither the wealth of the rich nor of the poor, nor all the riches of the East or West. The chapter ends dramatically: *'auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium atque ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant'*. Imperialism so praised under Augustus[208] becomes the subject of attack in the latter half of the first century[209] and this statement is clearly made in this chapter. The harmful effects of imperialism are to some extent borne out by archaeological evidence. At Caerleon, for example, a native settlement appears to have been dismantled in order to make room for the construction of a Roman fort.[210]

Calgacus continues his speech introducing pathos by reference to children, the dearest (*carissimos* an emphatic superlative) possessions of a man who are sold into slavery by the Romans. This theme of the unjust treatment of the weak and helpless recurs when Calgacus refers to the shameful treatment of British women (and children) at the hands of men who

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208 Tacitus' comments at this point would seem to be the antithesis to Verg *Aen*, 6.851-853. See H. Benario, 'Vergil and Tacitus', *CJ* 63 (1967), 24.

209 E. Sanford, *'solitudinem faciunt'*, *CIPh* 32 (1937), 368, quoting Martial, 3.44.2-3.

210 A. Robertson, *op. cit.*, *SAF* 12 (1980), 9.

come in the name of 'friends and guests': the doublet combined with the emotive *hostilem libidinem* and the strong verb *polluuntur* is very emphatic. He goes on demonstrating the continual loss of liberty[211] and how each man must pay the Romans not only materially but also with his very body. Tacitus may be influenced by what he knew of the causes of the Boudican revolt at this point.[212] The servitude motif is stressed by means of words which only occur here in Tacitus' extant works: *emuniendis, conteruntur, conservis, famulatu,* the use of which would have been very striking. Tacitus even includes a passing reference to the revolt of Boudica: *'Brigantes femina duce exurere coloniam, expugnare castra, ac nisi felicitas in socordiam vertisset, exvere iugum potuere'*, although the tribe is wrongly identified.[213] Calgacus is also made to stress the differences between the Caledonians and the rest of the Britons who were now under Roman authority and even serving in the Roman army as observed above: *'nos integri et indomiti et in libertatem non in paenitentiam †parati †'*,[214] a sentiment already uttered in chapter 30.

The final chapter of Calgacus' speech attacks the nature of the Roman army, commencing with the rhetorical question: *'An eandem Romanis in bello virtutem quam in pace lasciviam adesse creditis?'* This is a bold onslaught on the Roman ideal of *virtus*. The preceding chiasmus and alliterative doublet: *illi dissensionibus et discordiis clari* is very emphatic and leads Calgacus to point to the multi-national character of the Roman army; the dangers of which both Polybius and Vegetius comment on,[215] although the Caledonian army itself was probably a doubtful union.[216] In addition, the Romans have no incentive to win unlike the Caledonians who have their wives to inspire them and their parents to reproach them if they should flee. Moreover the Romans are in a land strange to them: *'caelum ipsum ac mare et silvas, ignota omnia circumspectantes'* and their opposition to the

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211 A theme which W. Liebeschuetz sees as running through the whole of the *Agricola*. See W. Liebeschuetz, 'The theme of *libertas* in the *Agricola* of Tacitus', CQ n.s. 16 (1966), 138.

212 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 14.29ff.; *Agr*, 15.

213 See, *supra* in ch. 4.

214 C. Murgia's reading for † *laturi* †. See *op. cit., California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 2 (1978), 164.

215 Polyb, 1.76.4-6; Veg, 3.4.

216 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 147.

Britons will consist of: *'vacua castella, senum coloniae, inter male parentes et iniuste imperantes aegra municipia et discordantia'*. Here the 'empty fortresses' is an interesting comment to make. It presumably refers to those forts vacated as Agricola's army advanced northwards, thinning out the garrisons already depleted by Domitian's preparations for his German campaign. It is hard to imagine Colchester (*coloniae* is clearly a rhetorical exaggeration) ever being threatened by a tribe from Caledonia. The statement is evidently made for rhetorical effect alone. Passionately Calgacus states: *'hic dux, hic exercitus'*, which is contrasted by *'ibi tributa et metalla et ceterae servientum poenae'*, the trappings of servitude. The speech ends with a commonplace plea for the Britons to remember their ancestors and to think of their heirs.[217]

Once Calgacus finishes his speech full of rhetorical flourishes and worthy of a noble Roman speaking in the Senate, the Britons who were previously *clari bello* revert to a barbarian status: *Excepere orationem alacres, ut barbaris moris, fremitu cantuque et clamoribus dissonis*. Their singing and shouting is typical of Celtic battle cries,[218] although this type of noise before a battle dates back to Homer.[219] The arrangement of the forces is introduced at this point: *iamque agmina et armorum fulgores* and the superlative *audentissimi* emphasises the position of the bravest men at the front. This provides the cue for Agricola's speech: *quamquam laetum et vix munimentis coercitum militem accendendum adhuc ratus, ita disseruit*, a sentence which is probably a literary cliché for Suetonius Paulinus also addresses his men as the battle line is being drawn up in *Annals* 14.36 and in Dio 62.9.[220]

Tacitus now firmly places the action in Agricola's seventh year: *'septimus annus est, commilitiones, ex quo virtute et auspiciis imperii Romani, fide atque opera nostra Britanniam vicistis'*. As observed before, a general's address to his 'fellow soldiers' was a

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217 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 264. Cf. Curt, 4.14.25.

218 Cf. Polyb, 2.29.5; Caes *BGall*, 5.37.3; Livy, 5.37.8; Dio, 62.12.

219 Cf. Homer, *Iliad*, 3.2.

220 συντάττων δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστὰς προσπαρῆναι, λέγων.

common one[221] and as R. Ogilvie states, the rest of the sentence is an expansion of the technical formula stating the legal nature of Agricola's command.[222] He refers to the Roman qualities of *virtus* and *fides*, the former applied to the soldiers, the latter, unusually, to himself.[223] Agricola is made to stress the achievements of the soldiers (and hence, his own) for they have surpassed the success of all others by their bravery, endurance and hard work in overcoming the enemy. Rhetorically, the general announces: *'finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore sed castris et armis tenemus: inventa Britannia et subacta'*. Here *castris et armis* balance *fama nec rumore* as well as being the antithesis, for they are hard fact as opposed to mere rumour. The word *subacta*, however, is optimistic because it is dependent on the ensuing battle which has not been won yet.[224] Agricola also refers to the clichéd aspects of the geography of Britain and the elusiveness of its inhabitants: *'paludes montesve et flumina ... quando dabitur hostis? quando † animus †?'*[225] Again Agricola returns to the valour of his troops. They have overcome the natural features of the forests and estuaries, emphatically described by the superlative *periculosissima*, and he appeals to them to rely on their sword arms (*manus et arma*), for it is better to die gloriously at the ends of the Earth than to live the live of a coward: *'proinde et honesta mors turpi vita potior, et incolumitas ac decus eadem loco sita sunt: nec inglorium fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine cedidisse'*, another rhetorical commonplace.

Agricola goes on to argue that his men are facing a familiar and, as R. Ogilvie has remarked, 'therefore contemptible army':[226] *'Si novae gentes atque ignota acies constitisset, aliorum exercituum exemplis vos hortarer: nunc vestra decora recensete, vestros oculos*

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221 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 263, cites Tac *Hist*, 1.29.2 for a similar address.

222 *Ibid.*, 266.

223 *Idem.*

224 *Ibid.*, 267.

225 R. Ogilvie suggests that *animus* conceals *acies <veniret>* but proposes that the best reading would be *in manus venient*. P. Kolaklides, 'On a textual problem in the *Agricola* of Tacitus', *Hermes* 100 (1972), 125-126, altered this to *in manibus* after comparison with Caes *BGall*, 2.19; Verg *Aen*, 10.276-284; Silvius, 12.196-197. More recently W. Watt, 'Two notes on the text of Tacitus' *Agricola*', *Brit* 14 (1983), 294, has suggested *vincimus*.

226 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 268.

interrogate.' He claims that in the previous year they had defeated these men 'with a shout' when they had attacked a legion. Tacitus' own version of the incident differs slightly, for the enemy 'had been within the very camp'[227] and, accordingly, the Romans' victory cannot have been as easy as Agricola tries to make out here. Again Agricola refers to the elusive nature of the Britons: they are *ceterorum Britannorum fugacissimi* (where *fugax* is a vivid poetic word)[228] and he also mentions the natural features of the region in the alliterative *silvas saltusque* which have poetic overtones.[229]

Agricola also emphasises the weak character of the remaining Britons. The bravest (stressed by the superlative *acerrimi*) have already fallen before the Roman advance; all that are left are *numerus ignavorum et metuentium*. Their panic-stricken cowardice is further stressed: *'novissimae res et extremo metu torpor defixere aciem in his vestigiis, in quibus pulchram et spectabilem*[230] *victoriam ederetis'*. The frozen battle line is an idea also found at *Annals* 14.30 but here there is clear rhetorical exaggeration. Tacitus has already stated that the Britons were demanding battle and had received the speech of Calgacus with their usual raucous singing and shouting.[231] Agricola's oration ends on a positive note: *'transigite cum expeditionibus, imponite quinquaginta annis magnum diem, adprobate rei publicae numquam exercitui imputari potuisse aut moras belli aut causas rebellandi'*. Once more Tacitus indirectly criticises the Roman government, perhaps referring to the lack of support from Rome in terms of extra troops and supplies for his father-in-law's campaigns in Britain, especially at this time when Domitian's German campaign was going ahead.

In comparison to Calgacus' speech, that of Agricola has a tautness and business-like approach which suits the picture of a Roman military man[232] and contrasts with the more

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227 Tac *Agr*, 26.1.
228 See *OLD*, 742, s.v. *fugax-acis*.
229 Cf. Verg *Georg*, 3.40.
230 This is yet another poetic word which occurs in Tacitus only here and at *Ann*, 16.21.6.
231 *Agr*, 33.
232 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 44.

disorganised rambling of a barbarian. Although the speech may have a basis in fact, here it has clearly been designed to contrast sharply with that of Calgacus.

Agricola's forces, like the Caledonians, received their general's speech enthusiastically. The Roman response, of course, is more disciplined and less frenetic. They did not dissolve into a raucous chorus of war cries but their battle lines were drawn up in an orderly fashion. The Roman army is described graphically as *instinctos ruentesque* to stress their readiness for action. During his description of the battle formation Tacitus unusually gives figures. There were 8,000 auxiliary infantry in the middle of the battle line, while 3,000 cavalry were situated on the wings. The legions stood in front of the camp and behind the auxiliaries. With hindsight Tacitus gives the reason for this: *ingens victoriae decus citra Romanum sanguinem bellandi, et auxilium, si pellerentur*. This is the opinion of Tacitus but it is not necessarily to assume that Agricola or the Roman administration considered that the lives of Roman legionaries were more special than those of the Roman citizens.[233] The concept of saving Roman lives was probably, as R. Ogilvie states,[234] a rhetorical commonplace. Furthermore, this was not a new tactic. Ostorius had used auxiliary troops extensively in his governorship[235] and on Trajan's Column battles are depicted where legionaries stand by as auxiliaries fight. In Tacitus, *Histories* 5.16 the general Cerialis, fighting Civilis, composed his front line entirely of auxiliaries and his second of legionaries, although in this instance he was forced to use his legionaries.[236] In this episode, too, Tacitus clearly states that the legionaries would have been used if necessary: *auxilium, si pellerentur*. Therefore, this should not be regarded as a new tactic, although I. Richmond does note that 'operationally this battle is the first large scale test on record of the auxiliary arm'.[237]

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233 See A. Woodhead, 'Tacitus and Agricola', *Phoenix* 2 (1947-48), 52.

234 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 272; cf. Tac *Ann*, 12.17.1; *Germ*, 33.1.

235 See Tac *Ann*, 12.31; also *Ann*, 12.39 and *Hist*, 3.45 where auxiliaries are employed by Aulus Didius Gallus.

236 S. Rainbird, 'Tactics at Mons Graupius', *CR* 19 (1969), 11.

237 I. Richmond, 'Gnaeus Iulius Agricola', *JRS* 34 (1944), 42.

Significantly, in contrast to the Romans, the British battle line is said to be drawn up *in speciem simul ac terrorem* to emphasise that they are a formidable foe. Their appearance as Tacitus records it may be the recollection of Agricola himself, for it is very graphic: *ut primum agmen in aequo, ceteri per adclive iugum conexi velut insurgerent; media campi covinnarius eques strepitu ac discursu complebat.* The effect of this depiction is heightened by the use of the unusual *adclivis*[238] and *velut insurgere.* The word *covinnarius* is also rare, apparently only occurring in Tacitus[239] and probably coined by him from the Celtic word *covinnus.*[240] It represents part of his extensive technical vocabulary. These unusual features are combined with the strong hendiadys *strepitu ac discursu* to complete the vivid figure.

In reply to the challenge of the enemy, Agricola spread his line so that there would be no danger of the Caledonians enveloping his rear. This was carried out despite the warnings of his advisers to call up the legions to strengthen a dangerously thin line. Again, as McGing has noted,[241] this is another example of *synkrisis,* and in contrast to his advisers Agricola is portrayed as *promptior in spem et firmus adversis,* a phrase also to be taken as a general characteristic of the man — a man who did not shirk responsibility[242] but who was willing to take a chance. In addition, Tacitus remarks: *dimisso equo pedes ante vexilla constitit* to demonstrate Agricola's generalship, leading from the front. This is clearly rhetorical,[243] for it is unlikely that Agricola would actually have led his troops into battle.[244]

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238 This word is only found here and at *Ann,* 1.63 in Tacitus.

239 This word only occurs once more, at *Agr,* 36.4.

240 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 272 derives the Celtic word *covinnus* from *co-* and *vignos* (W. gwain meaning 'wagon'). Cf. *OLD,* 455, s.v. *covinnus;* Mela, 3.5.2; Luc, 1.426; Silius Italicus, 17.417; Martial, 12.24.

241 B. McGing, *op. cit., Hermathena* 132 (1982), 16.

242 Cf. Tac *Agr,* 5.

243 Cf. *ibid.,* 18, *ante agmen,* also Caes *BGall,* 1.25.1 and Sall *Cat,* 59.1.

244 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 210.

Tacitus' account of the battle is well detailed. He commences: *Ac primo congresso eminus certabatur; simulque constantia, simul arte Britanni ingentibus gladiis et brevibus caetris missilia nostrorum vitare vel excutere, atque ipsi magnam vim telorum superfundere.* The opening manoeuvre of the battle is similar to that employed by Suetonius Paulinus against Boudica[245] but here the Britons avoid the weapons and reply with their own. Interestingly, Tacitus uses the word *constantia* to describe the Britons. This is a word also applied to Agricola and to Suetonius Paulinus[246] and a quality of a sound general. In turn, this is balanced by *arte* and, likewise, *ingentibus gladiis* is balanced by *brevibus caetris. caetra,* which only occurs here in Tacitus, is another example of his specific technical vocabulary.[247]

Tacitus continues, describing the activity of the Roman forces: *donec Agricola quattuor Batavorum cohortes ac Tungrorum duas cohortatus est, ut rem ad mucrones ac manus adducerent.* This particular tactic is marked out by the repetitive *cohortes/cohortatus* and the alliteration of *rem ad mucrones ac manus.* The reference to specific units, however, is rare in Tacitus' writings on Britain. Some of these Batavians may have served in Britain for a number of years[248] (although eight cohorts had been withdrawn by Nero in 67[249]) since Tacitus states: *quod et ipsis vetustate militiae exercitatum et hostibus inhabile.* It would not be unreasonable to equate these units with those whom Tacitus describes swimming the Menai Straits in Agricola's first season.[250] The following phrase: *parva scuta et enormes gladios gerentibus* is probably an editor's interpolation. It is preferable to accept that *nam Britannorum gladii sine mucrone complexum armorum et in arto pugnam non tolerabant* comes next, since *sine mucrone* neatly picks up the *ad mucrones* of the previous

245 Cf. Tac *Ann*, 14.37.
246 See Tac *Agr*, 18.4; *Ann*, 14.33.
247 On *caetra*, see R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 272.
248 See M. Hassall, 'Batavians and the Roman conquest of Britain', *Brit* 1 (1970), 135.
249 *Ibid.*, 131; see Tac *Hist*, 1.6 with 1.59 and 2.27; cf. also *Hist*, 4.15.
250 See Tac *Agr*, 18.

sentence and gives the reasons why fighting at close-quarters was unsuitable for the Britons without unnecessary repetition.[251]

Tacitus continues the progress of the battle with a series of historic infinitives: *miscere, ferire, fodere, coepere, caedere,* and, accompanying the Roman advance, are a number of words beginning with the letter c: *colles;* the weighty alliteration *coepere, ceterae cohortes; conisae; caedere.* These techniques add to the vividness and speed of the action. Such was the Romans' onslaught that many Britons were left half-dead (*semineces*[252]) or even unharmed (*integri*). In the meantime the cavalry had put the British charioteers (Tacitus again uses the rare *covinnarius*) to flight and now joined the infantry battle. This out-of-character action is marked by the alliterative *peditum se proelio miscuere.* But the cavalry found themselves hampered by the close-packed ranks of the enemy and the uneven terrain: *densis*[253] *tamen hostium agminibus et inaequalibus*[254] *locis haerebant.* The resultant effect is described by Tacitus, echoing Livy:[255] *minimeque equestris ea pugnae facies erat, cum aegre in gradu stantes simul equorum corporibus impellerentur.* The sense is that the Roman infantry, finding it difficult to hold their position on the slope against the Caledonians, who had the advantage of higher ground, were now being buffetted from behind by their own cavalry.[256] The last sentence of the chapter also contains a literary echo, this time of Tacitus' other favourite author in his narrative sections, Sallust:[257] *ac saepe vagi currus, exterriti sine rectoribus equi ut quemque formido tulerat, transversos aut obvios incursabant.* The effect of this for the listener is to add an interesting detail, immediately recognisable through the Sallustian echo.

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251 See R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 274-275.

252 A rare word which only occurs again at *Hist,* 3.28.5 in Tacitus.

253 The British ranks have already been described as *conexi* in ch. 35.

254 Another rare word which only occurs once more in Tacitus at *Ann,* 2.16.4.

255 Cf. Livy, 22.47.1: *minime equestris more pugnae.* Cf. also Sall *Iug,* 59.3: *non uti equestri proelio solet.*

256 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 277.

257 Cf. Sall *Hist fr,* 1.139 M: *equi sine rectoribus exterriti aut saucii consternantur.*

According to Tacitus, just as Agricola had kept his legionaries in reserve, so the Britons had left a number of men on the hilltops: *Et Britanni, qui adhuc pugnae expertes summa collium insederant*. These men, who were unengaged (*vacui*), scorned the small number of Romans (*paucitatem nostrorum*). This comment has relevance to the narrative as a whole because, despite a lack of troops, Agricola was still able to overcome the enemy. These Britons then began to inch their way down the hillside to encircle the Romans who at this point are described as *vincentium* although they are not yet successful. This again gives Tacitus an opportunity to praise Agricola who had foreseen such an event by keeping back four wings of cavalry. The general is almost granted the power of prophecy at this point, as *veritus* and *ad subita belli retentas* suggest, although this was in fact sound strategy. The favourable outcome for the Romans is described in an ascending tricolon: *ni ... venientibus opposuisset, quantoque ferocius adcucurrerent, tanto acrius pulsos in fugam disiecisset.* Indeed this action proved immensely successful for the British action was turned against them and the Roman cavalry attacked the British rear.

The result of the ensuing rout is graphically narrated by Tacitus, albeit through a passage modelled on Sallust:[258] *tum vero patentibus locis grande et atrox spectaculum: sequi vulnerare capere, atque eosdem oblatis aliis trucidare, iam hostium, prout cuique ingenium erat catervae armatorum paucioribus terga praestare, quidam inermes ultro ruere ac se morti offerre. passim arma et corpora et laceri artus et cruenta humus; et aliquando etiam victis ira virtusque.* The pathos of the scene is eloquently described.[259] The use of historic infinitives and the omission of a verb in the last two clauses are crucial in setting the pace and vividness of this passage, as too is the pathos of the murdered captives and unarmed men voluntarily surrendering themselves to their deaths. J. Bews has noted[260] that here

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258 Cf. Sall *Iug*, 101.11: *tum spectaculum horribile in campis patentibus sequi fugere occidi capi: equi atque viri adflicti ac multi volneribus acceptis neque fugere posse neque quietem pati: niti modo ac statim concidere. postremo omnia qua visus erat constrata telis armis cadaveribus et inter ea humus infecta sanguine.*

259 R. Martin, *Tacitus*, 217.

260 J. Bews, *op. cit.*, *G&R*, 2nd series, 34 (1987), 206.

the Britons display *virtus* in their rout and, thus, they are seen to have been worthy opponents of the Roman forces.

Despite this crushing rout the Britons still manage to put up some resistance. On reaching the woods (and again Tacitus refers to this well-known natural feature of Caledonia) the Caledonians surround the first reckless pursuers but Agricola comes to the rescue and interposes his heavy and light-armed cohorts: *indaginis modo*[261] *et, sicubi artiora erant, partem equitum dimissis equis, simul rariores silvas equitem persultare iussisset.* As always Agricola has a clear reason for his action, which emphasises his leadership qualities: *acceptum aliquod vulnus per nimiam fiduciam foret.* When the pursuit is once more taken up Tacitus stresses the British reaction contrasting the Romans' *compositos firmis ordinibus* with the British *in fugam versi, non agminibus, ut prius, nec alius alium respectantes: rari et vitabundi in vicem longinqua atque avia petiere.* Here, as he has done elsewhere, Tacitus introduces a rare word, *vitabundus,* perhaps originally coined by Sallust,[262] to bring even more emphasis to bear. The end of the battle and the vivid imagery of the preceding lines is finally announced: *finis sequendi nox et satietas fuit.* A calm is brought to the narrative at this point.

Finally, Tacitus sums up, recording the numbers killed: 10,000 of the enemy, 360 Romans. The latter may be an accurate figure but 10,000 is probably an estimate, although, as R. Ogilvie states,[263] it does appear moderate with regard to other figures. For example, the number of rebels killed by Suetonius Paulinus is recorded as 70,000.[264] The last reference to the death of Aulus Atticus is comparable to the reference to the death of Poenius Postumus after the defeat of Boudica in the *Annals.*[265] Aulus Atticus is the only subordinate officer

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261 This perhaps recalls Livy, 7.37.14: *cum praemissus eques velut indagine dissipatos Samnites ageret. indaginis* only occurs here and at *Ann,* 13.42.19 in Tacitus; it is most often used in poetry, although Hirtius (in Caes *BGall,* 8.18.1) and Florus (4.12.48) use it.

262 Cf. Sall *Hist,* 3.19; *Iug,* 38.1; 101.9. The word only occurs elsewhere in Livy, 25.13.4, and Tac *Hist,* 3.37.

263 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae,* 280.

264 See Tac *Ann,* 14.37.2.

265 *Ibid.,* 37.3.

of Agricola to be mentioned in the work.[266] It is possible that he was a family friend of Agricola and Tacitus. More than this, however, he represents the ardour of the Roman soldiers led by Agricola but, unlike his leader, he had not learnt restraint (he had *iuvenili ardore*). Partly for this reason and partly because he was unable to control his horse (*ferocia equi*) he was borne to his death. This episode may be synonymous with the political theme of the *Agricola* — that a man had to learn restraint in order to survive.

For the Romans Tacitus depicts the ensuing night as *gaudio praedaque laeta victoribus,* in sharp contrast to the Britons who are described in more detail. In six lines there are ten historic infinitives: *trahere, vocare, deserere, incendere, eligere, relinquere, miscere, seperare, frangi, concitare.* This is remarkable[267] but it is not the only device employed by Tacitus to emphasise the pathos and confusion of the Britons after their defeat. There is chiasmus, for example, *mixto, virorum mulierumque ploratu* where *ploratus* is a very rare word in Tacitus, only occurring elsewhere at *Annals* 3.4.6. There is alliteration in *deserere domos* and the reference to the defenceless, women and children, adds pathos. Most poignant, however, is the comment: *satisque constabat saevisse quosdam in coniuges ac liberos, tamquam misererentur.* The phrase *satisque constabat* suggests that the story is not verified by Tacitus but nonetheless the effect is striking.

In sharp contrast to the Roman celebrations and the Caledonians' confusion of the previous night, the following day was bleak and silent: *proximus dies faciem victoriae latius aperuit: vastum ubique silentium, secreti colles, fumantia procul tecta, nemo exploratoribus obvius.* The phrase *aperire faciem* is novel[268] and the description of the Britons is further emphasised by tricolon and a series of evocative nouns and adjectives.[269] The action at Mons Graupius and the ensuing hunt for fugitives would appear only to have taken a few days, but Tacitus now states: *exacta iam aestate spargi bellum nequibat, in fines Borestorum*

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266 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 280.
267 *Ibid.*, 281.
268 *Ibid.* Cf. Tac *Hist*, 4.29.3: *aciem dies aperuit.*
269 See J. Bews, *op. cit.*, *G&R*, 2nd series, 34 (1987), 208.

exercitum deducit. This indicates the end of the summer season and it is possible that the seventh year only involved a short campaign,[270] which had perhaps been delayed by fort-building and consolidation after an extensive sixth season, although A. Burn argues that this campaign was drawn out by a 'wearisome succession of deployments and re-deployments, marches and countermarches'.[271] The tribe of the Boresti are otherwise unattested but they may have been situated near to the Moray coast. However, the verb *deducit* may imply a southerly march towards winter quarters[272] not necessarily a march from high to low ground as R. Ogilvie suggests.[273] Hence, it has been argued that Boresti is a corruption of Voretii, meaning 'dwellers on the Forth' (= Voretia; W. Watson[274] derived the name Forth from Bodortii[275]). A. Rivet and C. Smith, however, do not find this suggestion attractive.[276] A more plausible proposal is that Boresti is derived from the Greek βορέας. In Ptolemy the *Oceanus Hyperboreas* is taken to be the westerly extension of the *Oceanus Duecaledonius* to the north of Britain. The Boresti could then be taken to be an unspecified tribe living in the north and might be identifiable with one of the tribes mentioned by Ptolemy: the Cornovii, Decantae, Smertae or Lugi. This would explain Tacitus' reference to *novarum gentium* a few lines later. Tribes to the south of Mons Graupius would already have been encountered by Agricola.

After receiving hostages from the Boresti, Agricola sent his fleet on a circumnavigation of Britain: *praefecto classis circumvehi Britanniam praecipit*. This was probably prompted by the example of the Usipi in the previous year. The need to prove that Britain was an island was clearly of some importance for the Romans as Tacitus records: *tunc primum Romana classis circumvecta insulam esse Britanniam adfirmavit*,[277] and this is the only detail that Dio preserves of Agricola's governorship: καὶ πρῶτός γε Ῥωμαίων ὧν ἡμεῖς

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270 See J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 12.
271 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 56-57.
272 Cf. *contra* R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 282.
273 *Ibid*. Cf. A. Rivet and C. Smith, 273.
274 W. Watson, *The History of the Celtic Place-names of Scotland*, 52.
275 J. Hind, *op. cit., Northern History* 21 (1985), 15.
276 See A. Rivet and C. Smith, 272, s.v. Boresti.
277 Tac *Agr*, 10.4.

ἴσμεν ἔγνω τοῦθ' ὅτι ἡ Βρεττανία περίῤῥυτος ἐστιν.[278] The voyage is placed during the time of Agricola's return from the territory of the Boresti, while his land forces were terrorising the 'new tribes' as mentioned, the Cornovii, Smertae and Lugi,[279] before they were placed in winter quarters. The time of year is borne out by the testimony of chapter 10: *quia hactenus iussum et hiems adpetebat*. The direction of this voyage presumably began on the east coast since Agricola had been operating here. However, the identification of the port of return, *Portus Trucculensis* is not known. This name only occurs in Latin literature at this point and there is a likelihood that the text is corrupt here.[280] It is certain from Tacitus' account that the fleet rounded the northern tip of Scotland, discovering the Orkneys (*Orcadae*) and passing the Shetlands which he wrongly identified as Thule (Iceland): *ac simul incognitas ad id tempus insulas, quas Orcadas vocant, invenit domuitque, dispecta est et Thule ...*[281]

A reading of *Rutupiensem* (Richborough) for *Trucculensem* has been favoured as the finishing point of the voyage[282] but for the fleet to have reached a port so far south during the winter season is unlikely. The voyage would have taken many weeks and it would not have been possible for the fleet to have reached this point at the same time (*simul*)[283] as the army reached winter quarters. A nearer port should therefore be sought. A. Burn proposed that the fleet came to Droma, at the head of Loch Broom.[284] N. Reed followed Burn[285] but assumed that the last sentence of 38: *[sc. classis] Trucculensem portum tenuit, unde proximo Britanniae latere praelecto omnis redierat*, refers to the expedition by ship in Agricola's fifth campaigning season and that there was no real circumnavigation, the fleet having progressed as far as *Portus Trucculensis* and from there sailed back around the north coast to an unnamed starting point. He places *Trucculensis* at *Ugrulentum*, originally E.

278 Dio, 66.20.1; cf. 39.50.
279 A. Henderson, *op. cit.*, *EMC* 29 (1985), 330, 332.
280 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 281.
281 Tac *Agr*, 10.4.
282 First by Lipsius and accepted by R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 282-283.
283 *Agr*, 38.4.
284 A. Burn in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 59.
285 N. Reed, 'The fifth year of Agricola's campaigns', *Brit* 2 (1971), 148.

Hübner's hypothesis, which was regarded as an unidentified port north of Loch Broom. J. Hind, however, has argued that *Trucculensis* is a corruption of *Tunnocelensis*[286] which may be derived from *Tun(n)ocelum*, the name of a fort in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, perhaps located at Moresby or some other unknown position on the Cumbrian coast. Furthermore, he argues that *Tun(n)ocelum* is derived from *Itunokelon*, 'the headland by the River Ituna' (= the River Eden) and that the whole of the Solway estuary went by this name.[287] This would mean that a circumnavigation had indeed taken place (*contra* N. Reed *et al.*) as the use of *circumvehi* should imply.

At this point Agricola's tenure of office was effectively at an end. He sent the customary end of year report to the Emperor Domitian, whom Tacitus portrays as jealous of the achievements of his father-in-law, because his own German victory had been a sham: *inerat conscientia derisui fuisse nuper falsum e Germania triumphum*. It was only because Agricola was still governor that he was voted *triumphalia ornamenta*, the distinction of a statue and the other trappings of a triumph, plus many fine words of distinction (there is irony in Tacitus' words at this point) as well as the hint of a governorship in Syria. Despite Tacitus' attack on Domitian, these were the highest honours available to a man outside the imperial family. Agricola was evidently regarded as a successful governor. He had been the longest serving legate of Britain up to this time, a distinction in itself, and nowhere does Tacitus argue that he had been recalled too soon. He had been the first to penetrate so far north in Britain, expanding the empire and overcoming new tribes. Yet, as has been observed above, the rhetorical techniques that Tacitus brings to bear amplify the real achievements of his father-in-law. It is a fact that Agricola did no more than any other governor would have done in following the orders of the Emperor. Tacitus, however, attempts to argue that Agricola was worthy of more, even suggesting that his retirement into civilian life was forced upon him.[288] Eight years later, however, Agricola passed

286 J. Hind, 'Agricola's fleet and *Portus Trucculensis*', *Brit* 5 (1974), 285-288.
287 *Ibid.*, 287.
288 See Tac *Agr*, 40; 42.

away at the age of 53. This suggests that the years of hard work in Britain and elsewhere had taken their toll and that he had probably chosen to retire. But Agricola does deserve special mention because it was under his auspices that Roman power was really consolidated in Britain by means of a series of forts throughout England, Wales and Scotland. Truly, because of the work of Agricola could Tacitus claim *perdomita Britannia*.[289]

289 Tac *Hist*, 1.2.

Conclusion

This thesis has been a comprehensive study of the main literary sources for Romano-British history from 39 to 84 A.D. The emphasis has mainly been on the historical content of the work of Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio, how the authors employ the language to depict this, and on the views of the pertinent secondary sources. However, it is evident that a full historical survey of Roman Britain is incomplete without reference to other literary sources and to archaeology, although where such evidence has been required it has been included within the work.

The work has attempted to show how the main historians for the period heighten and influence their listener's perception of events by means of various rhetorical devices. The *Agricola* is one obvious example where this occurs,[1] but Dio, too, a writer not noted for his literary skill, employs rhetorical devices for effect. For example, there is his description of Boudica,[2] where the series of superlatives summons up a picture of Boudica that is immediate and full of colour. Aside from the actual narrative, speeches provide a vehicle by which an author may express his views and in what terms he perceives the Roman conquest. Tacitus does this very successfully. Although he has moved away from his models of Livy and Sallust in that he employs a greater percentage of indirect than direct speech,[3] and has developed the former into an important feature of Latin historiography. For example, in *Agricola* 15 or in *Annals* 14.35 and 36 (the reported speeches of Boudica and Suetonius Paulinus). His use of direct speech does not lack power, as in the oration of Caratacus in *Annals* 12[4] which is the only direct speech in that book, or the speeches of Calgacus and Agricola in the *Agricola*.[5] All of these examples are filled with a 'profusion

1 See ch. 6 *passim*, and B. McGing, '*Synkrisis* in Tacitus' *Agricola*', *Hermathena* 132 (1982), 15-25.
2 Dio, 62.2.2f.
3 N. Miller, 'Dramatic speech in the Roman historians', *G&R* 22 (1975), 45.
4 Tac *Ann*, 12.27.
5 Tac *Agr*, 30-32 and 33.2-34.

of formal rhetorical devices' which N. Miller sees[6] as the main differences between the style of Tacitus' speeches and that of his narrative. Moreover, they all dwell on the commonplace themes of freedom and slavery; or barbarian emancipation and Roman imperialism. As has been seen, it is frequently the Roman who comes off worse in this encounter, for by the late first century imperialism was being attacked by the writers of the day and this is no better displayed than in Tacitus who disparages the boorish nature of the Roman administration in dealing with new peoples. Britain, as a relatively new province and one still being conquered during his lifetime, gives him an opportunity to vent his feelings on the subject, particularly in the speeches but also within the body of his narrative as well.

Dio also dwells on such themes in the speeches of Boudica[7] and Suetonius Paulinus.[8] His arguments, however, are not as well presented since he has used Tacitus extensively for them and he is far less subtle in their presentation. His narrative, therefore, is not heightened by their use as it is in the case of Tacitus.

Dio has had a bad press, often justifiably, as his confusing narrative concerning the 'sea-shell incident'[9] or his placing of events in the wrong year, show.[10] Yet the former is evidently drawn from the source used by Suetonius, who bears Dio out at this point,[11] and their accounts, as we have seen, may have a rational explanation. As a source for Roman Britain it is clear that Dio, despite his deficiencies, should not be underrated. More attention should be paid, as here, to his narrative although the style is sometimes clumsy and in Greek. His picture of the final battle with Boudica is plainly purely rhetorical[12] but there is no good reason to dispute earlier details of his account of the revolt, for

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6 J. Adams, 'The vocabulary of the speeches in Tacitus' historical works', *BICS* 20 (1973), 124.

7 Dio, 62.3-6.

8 *Ibid.*, 8-11.

9 *Ibid.*, 59.25.2-5a.

10 E.g., Titus is said to have saved his father Vespasian in 47 when he was only eight years old; Dio, 60.30.

11 Suet *Cal*, 46.

12 Dio, 62.12.

instance, the involvement of Seneca[13] or his description of Boudica.[14] Indeed elsewhere, where Dio is our only source of evidence, as in the case of the Claudian invasion, his account has long been accepted to be a fair interpretation of events. In other instances the accuracy of his narrative is attested by the evidence of Tacitus or Suetonius as in the description of the omens[15] or the circumnavigation of Britain by the Usipi,[16] or the 'expedition' of Gaius[17] or Claudius' journey to Britain.[18]

Suetonius is a major source for the period only on two counts: with regard to the 'sea-shells' and the Claudian invasion. There are only a few other minor references which add to our understanding of the history of the period. He has an eye for the sensational and concentrates on the anecdotal material which creates 'a good story'. This is clearly seen in his portrayal of Gaius as a 'mad' emperor. Likewise, when discussing the Claudian invasion, he relates no details about the conquest itself under Aulus Plautius but concentrates on the voyage of Claudius, that it was delayed and that the emperor was almost sunk twice. However, useful details are added with regard to the achievements of Vespasian in the south-west[19] but these, too, are sensationalised to enhance the image of Vespasian, related in his *Life of Vespasian* and not under Claudius.

As we have seen there are inconsistencies not only between the different authors but even within their own work. For example, Tacitus, normally regarded as an accurate source, has possibly repeated himself at *Annals* 12.40 and at *Histories* 3.45; his accounts of the Boudican revolt in the *Agricola* and *Annals* 14[20] differ; and he makes a mistake over the tribe involved in *Agricola* 31.4. However, the point of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the literary evidence cannot be overlooked even with its discrepancies. The

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13 *Ibid.*, 2.1.
14 *Ibid.*, 2.2f.
15 *Ibid.*, 1. Cf. Tac *Ann*, 14.32.1.
16 *Ibid.*, 66.20.1-2. Cf. Tac *Agr*, 28.
17 *Ibid.*, 59.25.2-5a. Cf. Suet *Cal*, 46.
18 *Ibid.*, 60.21-22. Cf. Suet *Cl*, 17.
19 Suet *Vesp*, 4.
20 Tac *Agr*, 15-16.2, and Tac *Ann*, 14.31ff.

rhetorical devices designed to influence a listener's impression, either favourably or unfavourably, of a character or of a passage in history ultimately have an effect on that person's perception of the historical character or event in question.

To a certain extent the literary sources can stand on their own, as has been demonstrated. This may not be enough in terms of a fully comprehensive view of the history of the province but this thesis should have shown that despite the pressing need for archaeological evidence to support and to extend the knowledge gleaned from the literary sources, the literary evidence and the way in which it is presented is crucial to our understanding of the history of Roman Britain in the first century A.D.

Appendix 1: Tiberius Claudius Cogidubnus

Cogidubnus, or –dumnus as Tacitus refers to him, is one of the most outstanding of Romano-British personalities. Yet, in the literary sources, he is mentioned only once: *quaedam civitates Cogidumno regi donatae (is ad nostram usque memoriam fidissimus mansit) vetere ac iam pridem recepta populi Romani consuetudine, ut haberet instrumenta servitutis et reges.*[1] This sentence is, however, supported by epigraphic evidence: *[N]eptuno et Minervae/ templum [pr]o salute do[mus] divinae / [ex] auctoritate [Ti] (beri) Claud(i) / [Co]gidubni Re[g(is) M]agni Brit (anniae) / [colle]gium fabror[um] et [q]ui in e[o / sun]t d(e) s(uo) d(ant), donante aream / [Pud]ente Pudentini fil(io).*[2]

Many scholars have attempted to pinpoint the position of Cogidubnus in British history. In particular, they refer to line five of the above inscription which was originally considered to read: *[Co]gidubni r(egis) lega[ti] Aug(usti) in Brit(annia)*, a title that would have been unique for a client-king. J. Bogaers has since argued convincingly for the reading: *[Co]gidubni Re[g(is) M]agni Brit(anniae)* or *(–anniorum)*.[3] For, as E. Birley has commented on the original reading: 'It seems hardly conceivable that Claudius would have conferred such a rank on a British king however loyal and co-operative'.[4] Therefore, after careful reinterpretation of the text, Bogaers arrived at the now generally accepted reading of *Regis Magni*. This phrase is only found on two other Latin inscriptions[5] but during the Hellenistic period the Greek equivalent Βασιλεύς μέγας was widely used of the Parthian monarchs. Therefore, normally it carried the implication of rule over more than one kingdom[6] just as Tacitus seems to suggest for Cogidubnus.

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1 Tac *Agr*, 14.1.
2 *RIB*, 91. See Appendix 5, fig. 2.
3 J. Bogaers, 'King Cogidubnus in Chichester: another reading of *RIB* 91', *Brit* 10 (1979), 243-254.
4 E. Birley, 'The adherence of Britain to Vespasian', *Brit* 9 (1978), 2.
5 J. Bogaers, *op. cit.*, 252-253, quoting *ILS* 8957 and 8958.
6 *Ibid.*, 253.

The discovery of the inscription at Chichester has naturally led historians to suppose that the town itself and the surrounding area came under the domain of Cogidubnus. To some extent this suggestion is supported by the expulsion of Verica[7] from his native kingdom of the Atrebates, whose territory lay in this area.[8] For it has been proposed that Cogidubnus was a relative of Verica and had fled into exile with him,[9] or that he had left even earlier (with Tincommius, perhaps) to be brought up in Rome.[10] A. Barrett cites other examples of foreign kings sending their sons to Rome to be educated[11] and in the context of Britain he notes that the Atrebatic kings had no hesitation in seeking refuge in Rome.[12] S. Frere feels that Cogidubnus may have succeeded his aged predecessor, who had been reinstated by Claudius after the invasion only to die shortly afterwards.[13] Another theory proposed by C. Hawkes[14] and B. Cunliffe[15] is that Cogidubnus sailed with the Romans to accept the throne in 43. Others have considered that he may even have been king before the invasion.[16] More controversially, P. Salway has argued that Cogidubnus was not British at all, but was a Gaul.[17] Archaeological excavation of a temple on Hayling Island, built in around 50-60, has demonstrated that it was built by means of a technique which is paralleled not in Britain but in Gaul.[18] This style is also reflected in the construction of the great palace at Fishbourne. An additional argument adduced to support this view is that, in 48, Claudius introduced Gauls from *Gallia Comata* into the Senate.[19] It seems unlikely that any Britons gained such rapid advancement but it may be possible that, in the year of

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7 Dio, 60.19.

8 A. Barrett, 'The career of Tiberius Claudius Cogidubnus', *Brit* 10 (1979), 229.

9 S. Frere (1987), 53.

10 B. Cunliffe, *Fishbourne*, 13.

11 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 229.

12 *Ibid.*, 230.

13 S. Frere (1987), 53.

14 C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 59-60.

15 B. Cunliffe, *Fishbourne*, 13.

16 J. Wacher, *Roman Britain*, 239.

17 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 750.

18 R. Downey, A. King and G. Soffe, *The Hayling Island Temple: third interim report on the excavation of the Iron Age and Roman temple. 1976-1978.*

19 Tac *Ann*, 11.23-25; *ILS* 212.

Aulus Plautius' *ovatio*, those Britons who had supported the invasion, as Cogidubnus may have done,[20] were rewarded in some manner, perhaps with Roman citizenship.

Tacitus clearly regards the accession of Cogidubnus to be pre-52, for his name is closely linked with the formation of Britain into a province under Aulus Plautius and Ostorius Scapula. There is no need to assume that Cogidubnus was appointed immediately before the arrival of the subsequent governor for, as Barrett has observed, the Latin word *mox* in this instance means 'next' or 'afterwards', not 'soon'.[21]

Tacitus implies that Cogidubnus was rewarded for his initial part in the conquest in the phrase: *quaedam civitates Cogidumno regi donatae.* Barrett notes, with examples, that 'almost everyone assumes that Tacitus is speaking of the addition of territory'.[22] This, however, presumes that Cogidubnus was already considered to be king when the grant was made. Barrett argues that the phrase could be taken to mean that the *civitates* were given to Cogidubnus 'to be king over them'.[23] Ogilvie suggests that this could imply that Cogidubnus was imposed as a king from outside,[24] which would accord with Salway's conjecture that he may not have been British. Alternatively, this could just mean that Cogidubnus was not king before the invasion: that he received his kingdom after the tribes of Southern Britain had surrendered to the Romans. The major tribal group at this time may have been the Reg(i)ni who had superseded the Atrebates after the demise of Verica. This would explain Cogidubnus' presence at Chichester which was their tribal capital and named *Noviomagus Reg(i)norum.*[25] Barrett argues that 'it is a reasonable assumption that the grant of territory must have been large and significant'. Otherwise, Tacitus would not have considered it worthwhile to mention in his brief summary of the history of Roman-

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20 C. Hawkes, in *Bagendon*, 59-60; B. Cunliffe, *op. cit.*, 13; H. Heubner, *Romisches Herrschaft in West Europa*, 16-20.

21 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 233.

22 *Ibid.*, 230-231.

23 *Ibid.*, 232-233.

24 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 189.

25 A. Rivet and C. Smith, 427, s.v. *Noviomagus Reg(i)norum;* A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 232.

Britain prior to Agricola. He has argued that the territory may not have been contiguous[26] and that the areas may have been geographically separate and ruled over by different kings. In support of this he gives examples: Diviciacus, King of the Suessiones, who had also held power in Britain;[27] Cassivellaunus, who was able to call on four Kentish kings to attack Caesar;[28] and elsewhere in his works Tacitus refers to the single state (*civitas*) of the Brigantes[29] but which, apparently, comprised different tribal units with their own rulers.[30] The problem of identifying the extent of this kingdom is intensified by the lack of coins attributable to Cogidubnus.[31] The *civitates* of Cogidubnus would have included the *civitas Reginorum*, the *civitas Atrebatorum* and the *civitas Belgarum*.[32] The latter, however, seems only to have been established by the end of the first century A.D. out of the old Atrebatic kingdom. It may have seemed more natural for Tacitus to regard this area in terms of the plural *civitates* instead of the simpler *regnum*.[33] Certainly he regards this grant of territory as the founding of a client kingdom, as his cynical statement *vetere ac iam pridem recepta populi Romani consuetudine, ut haberet instrumenta servitutis et reges* shows.[34]

The date of Cogidubnus' death is not known but it is often linked with the date of the construction of the grand palace at Fishbourne, three miles west of Chichester, c. 75-80.[35] If the palace were built for Cogidubnus, this would suppose that he had a very long reign and it has been argued that the statement *ad nostram usque memoriam fidissimus mansit* refers to the Boudican revolt and that Cogidubnus died shortly afterwards in the mid-60s. Yet, as

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26 A. Barrett, 'The *civitates* of Tiberius Claudius Cogidubnus', *EMC* 26 (1982), 45f.

27 Caes *BGall*, 2.4.

28 *Ibid.*, 5.2.

29 Tac *Ann*, 12.40.3.

30 I. Richmond, 'Queen Cartimandua', *JRS* 44 (1954), 44ff., esp. 46, and the implication of Tac *Hist*, 3.45, where Venutius appears to be the head of a party opposed to Cartimandua.

31 See D. Allen, in I. Richmond, *Hod Hill*, vol. 2 (1968), 53-54. The two silver coins reading *CRAB* cannot read *Cogidubnus Rex Atrebatorum Britannorum* since Celtic coins do not use abbreviations in this way.

32 J. Wacher, *The Towns of Roman Britain*, 26 ff.; A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 233-234.

33 *Ibid.*

34 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 231-232.

35 J. Bogaers, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 254.

P. Salway argues,[36] Cogidubnus might only have been in his 70s at the end of Agricola's governorship. If this were so, then the impressive palace, far superior to any other building in Britain, would almost certainly belong to Cogidubnus and it would be totally in keeping with the image of him as a *Rex Magnus*. In support of the argument for his survival into the 80s, Bogaers argues[37] that the Chichester inscription itself must date from the reign of a later Roman emperor, for example, Titus, since the phrase *domus divina* would not be found on an inscription from the reign of Vespasian[38] as he did not belong to the house of a deified Emperor (although this does not preclude the possibility of the inscription dating from an earlier reign (e.g. Nero's)). The palace could, therefore, represent a reward to Cogidubnus for his long and faithful service to Rome.[39] Barrett's suggestion that Tacitus would have mentioned that Cogidubnus was still alive during the governorship of Agricola[40] need not be assumed. Tacitus was concerned with eulogising his father-in-law and Cogidubnus has no part in that story. Moreover, on the death of Cogidubnus, his kingdom was, as in the case of Prasutagus, incorporated into the Roman province[41] and then divided into the self-governing states of the Regini, Atrebates and Belgae.[42] This division would have left no one ruler of sufficient importance to whom the palace at Fishbourne might be allocated. At present, its most likely occupant was Cogidubnus who must, therefore, have ruled from sometime in the 40s to the mid-80s.

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36 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 749.

37 J. Bogaers, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 254.

38 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 235. See also G. Webster, 'The military situation in Britain between A.D. 43 and 71', *Brit* 1 (1970), 182, n. 19, and S. Frere (1987), 314; *contra* S. Frere (1978), 363.

39 P. Salway, *Roman Britain*, 750.

40 A. Barrett, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 241.

41 *Ibid.*, 242.

42 See also J. Bogaers, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 10 (1979), 254, noting A. Rivet, 'The British Section of the Antonine Itinerary', *Brit* 1 (1970), 50; J. Wacher, *The Towns of Roman Britain*, 26; S. Frere (1978), 225.

Appendix 2: Venutius and Cartimandua: the problem of Tacitus' *Annals* 12.40 and *Histories* 3.45.

Venutius and Cartimandua appear twice in the works of Tacitus, at *Annals* 12.40 and at *Histories* 3.45. Despite the location of these passages under different years — the former takes place in 52 to 57 during the governorship of Aulus Didius Gallus; the latter in 69 — and narrative differences, the overall similarity of the two passages has led to a division of opinion as to whether Tacitus is referring to one, or to two separate incidents.

Annals 12.40 relates that, after the capture of Caratacus, Venutius was the Briton foremost in the art of war. For a long time (*diu*) he had been faithful to Rome and was protected by her as long as he was married to Cartimandua. However, when they had divorced, he had immediately (*statim*) turned against the Romans. At first there was only internal trouble, during the course of which Cartimandua managed to capture the brother and relatives of Venutius. Incensed by this, Venutius gathered together his troops and invaded the kingdom. This possibility had been foreseen by the Romans, who sent some auxiliaries to aid Cartimandua. After a struggle, they were eventually successful. This was also the case with a legion operating under Caesius Nasica.

Histories 3.45, on the other hand, records that the Britons were inspired by Venutius, who had an innate ferocity and hated the Romans, and in particular resented Cartimandua (whom Tacitus describes as *pollens nobilitate*). She had increased her power after capturing Caratacus by treachery, through which she had gained wealth and, thus, the extravagance which accompanies good fortune. This had led to her rejection of Venutius and to a marriage with his armour-bearer, Vellocatus, which, in turn, had caused a rift in the Brigantian kingdom. Thereupon, Venutius summoned help from outside Brigantia. Cartimandua, in fear of her life, sought aid from the Romans who sent in their auxiliary

troops. Cartimandua was saved, but Venutius gained the kingdom and the war continued: *regnum Venutio, bellum nobis relictum.*

In a review of these passages, S. Mitchell has noted[1] that there are three probable points of view: (a) that there are two incidents where the later event took almost exactly the same course as the earlier except for points of detail; (b) that the passages refer to the same events and Tacitus has misplaced one or the other; and (c) that the passage in the *Histories* summarises Brigantian history of the 50s (contained in *Annals* 12.40) and takes the story on to its conclusion in 69.

As Mitchell points out (supported by D. Braund[2]), many modern historians accept both stories at face value and neglect to comment fully on what he regards as a major problem in the literary sources for Roman-Britain.[3] One of the few authors to address the problem was E. Harrison who presented a comparison of reasons as to why the passages do refer to different years.[4] He put forward these objections: (a) In the *Histories* the Romans send in auxiliary cavalry and infantry but in the *Annals* cohorts (i.e. auxiliary infantry) and then a legion commanded by Caesius Nasica are employed; (b) In the *Histories* there is the ambiguous phrase *variis proeliis* ('in doubtful battles' or 'in different battles'), whereas in the *Annals* the auxiliaries fight one battle which began doubtfully and ended favourably, then the legion had a similar result; (c) In the *Histories* Venutius is left on the throne and the war continues but in the *Annals* the affair ends favourably and Cartimandua keeps her kingdom; (d) The passages are clearly dated to 69 (the *Histories*) and the mid-50s (the *Annals*).

More recently D. Braund has addressed this problem.[5] He realises that events in *Annals* 12.40 are firmly set in the 50s by the mention of Aulus Didius Gallus, and to accept the

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1 S. Mitchell, 'Venutius and Cartimandua', *LCM* 3 (1978), 216.
2 D. Braund, 'Observations on Cartimandua', *Brit* 15 (1984), 1.
3 He cites I. Richmond, 'Queen Cartimandua', *JRS* 44 (1954), 43-52; S. Frere (1987), 67f. and 82f.
4 E. Harrison, 'A passage in British history', *CQ* 1 (1907), 305-307.
5 D. Braund, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 15 (1984), 1-6.

viewpoint of S. Mitchell that 'they are there erroneously' must be kept back as a last resort.[6] Furthermore, since the *Annals* is the later work, it is more likely to contain the correct version of events as has been observed elsewhere. Therefore, Braund feels that the problem must lie with *Histories* 3.45, and, in particular, the phrase *spreto Venutio (is fuit maritus)*. He considers that it is not necessary to presume that there had been a reconciliation (which would have been a considerable feat) between the 50s and 69. The participle *spreto* can have the meaning of 'scorned' or 'disregarded' and this phrase coming precisely at the break between events of the 50s and 69 could be attributed to either with this meaning. Therefore, no reconciliation need be inferred.[7] In support of his argument, Braund cites A. Woodman[8] who has shown that Tacitus was liable to self-imitation, describing similar events in similar terms. However, the unusual feature of these events is that they concern exactly the same characters.

The most recent discussion of the problem has been by W. Hanson and D. Campbell.[9] They consider the dissimilarities put forward by Harrison and those emphasised by Braund, stating that self-imitation 'applies to elaboration of detail and ways in which a story is told, not to its basic fabric'.[10] Moreover, they point out that two versions of a story written several years apart are unlikely to be identical. They also reject the idea that the events of 69 could represent a summary of events over several years because of the speed of the narrative of both passages. No time lapse is indicated, and, additionally, there is no indication of what had happened to Venutius in the intervening years. For the Boudican Revolt would have provided the ideal opportunity for Venutius to attack Cartimandua. Hanson and Campbell conclude that Tacitus has made a mistake, giving in evidence his renowned inaccuracy with regard to geographical details and especially with regard to the Brigantes. They do not even get a mention during Agricola's second campaign. In response to

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6 *Ibid.*, 3.

7 *Ibid.*, 4.

8 A. Woodman, 'Self-imitation and the substance of history', in D. West and A. Woodman (eds.), *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature*, 143-155.

9 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, 'The Brigantes: from clientage to conquest', *Brit* 17 (1986), 58-89.

10 *Ibid.*, 78.

this, however, as has already been noted, the Romans had 'reached the neighbourhood of the Caledonian Forest'[11] prior to Agricola's governorship and he did not meet any new tribes until his third season. There was in fact no need for Tacitus to mention a tribe which had caused Agricola little or no trouble. Hanson and Campbell also refer to the confusion between the Brigantes and the Iceni at *Agricola* 31.4. This is by no means conclusive since both were well-known tribes that had had female rulers and this may have caused Tacitus some temporary confusion.

Hanson and Campbell, however, attribute the events to 69 and not to the 50s.[12] They argue that there is no action from the time of Aulus Didius Gallus until the year of the four emperors, whereas afterwards there was plenty of campaigning by successive governors in the North (Vettius Bolanus, Petillius Cerialis and Iulius Frontinus). To explain Tacitus' mistake they refer to Caesius Nasica, possibly the elder brother of Petillius Cerialis,[13] who had been operating in the North in the late 50s.[14] Tacitus attached the story of Venutius and Cartimandua to his activities as it was one of the few pieces of information concerning the Brigantes that he had.

There are objections to these conclusions. Firstly, *Annals* 12.40 does not imply any further action. In fact, the impression is of a favourable outcome and a relatively stable position after a series of battles. The *Histories*, however, specifically states that there was more action when Venutius had been left on the throne. Secondly, an important clause unconsidered by modern historians is *ut supra memoravi* regarding Venutius. This implies that Tacitus knew of Venutius in a context prior to 47 probably in connection with the Claudian invasion. This would create a problem if, as Hanson and Campbell suggest, there was no incident in the 50s. For it would be difficult to see why a Roman legion should have been operating in Brigantia in the 50s, if, as Tacitus states, Venutius was *fidus diu*. Perhaps

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11 See Pliny *NH*, 4.102.

12 W. Hanson and D. Campbell, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 17 (1986), 79.

13 A. Birley, 'Petillius Cerialis and the conquest of Brigantia', *Brit* 4 (1973), 181; *Fasti*, 66.

14 See D. Braund, *op. cit.*, *Brit* 15 (1984), 405, where he suggests that a passage of Sen *Apoc*, 12.13-18 indicates that there was action in Brigantia in the late 50s.

there is a clue in the sentences: *mox orto discidio et statim bello etiam adversus nos hostilia induerat. sed primo tantum inter ipsos certabatur* ...[15] The length of time that this internal strife lasted is not made clear. Within the context of *Annals* 12.40 Venutius did not turn on the Romans at all, but they sent forward some auxiliary cohorts and a legion because he had attacked Cartimandua (*quod nobis praevisum, et missae auxilio cohortes* ...). This clearly differs from the account in the *Histories* where Venutius does attack the Romans, for this was to happen in the future. In the meantime, however, the situation was settled satisfactorily, perhaps with the assistance of Roman garrisons, until affairs got out of hand once more, twelve years later. The garrison of Britain had been weakened by troop movements to the continent during the 60s. With the onset of civil war, Venutius probably felt that now was the time to descend from his refuge in the North and to take advantage of the situation.

The evidence is far from conclusive for any point of view to prevail. A tentative reconstruction might be that, in the 50s, Cartimandua divorced Venutius, marrying his armour-bearer, Vellocatus. This caused a rift, during which Cartimandua captured Venutius' brother and relatives. Venutius, therefore, assembled a select band of men to rescue his kinsmen but was eventually put to flight by a Roman force. During the next twelve years Venutius was kept at bay and Cartimandua's influence increased. Venutius bided his time until, in 69, he decided to attack, encouraged by news of the Civil War. Cartimandua was rescued by the Romans and Venutius regained his throne. The war continued until the final defeat of Venutius sometime in the 70s.

15 Tac *Ann*, 12.40.

Appendix 3: The date of Agricola's governorship

The date of Agricola's governorship has been seen to hinge on the Latin words: *inerat conscienta derisui fuisse nuper falsum e Germania triumphum.*[1] R. Syme[2] and R. Ogilvie[3] both consider that this implies that the battle of Mons Graupius must have occurred in the year after Domitian's victory over the Chatti, i.e. in 84, since Domitian's triumph was held in 83. A. Burn emphatically states 'Agricola's seventh and last campaign must have come after Domitian's German campaign'.[4] Counting back from this would mean that Agricola came to Britain in 78. However, while the date of Agricola's governorship may depend on this statement, it is just as probable that Mons Graupius occurred in 83. For A. Birley has shown that news of Agricola's victory, which came at the end of the campaigning season (September),[5] would not have reached Rome until December,[6] after Domitian's triumph. Furthermore, the dating of the payment of the *congiarium* to 84 does not create a problem, for these payments often did not coincide with the actual celebration of the triumph.[7]

Another argument often cited as evidence that Agricola became governor in 78 is the reference in chapter 26 to the Ninth Legion as *maxime invalidam*. J. Anderson considered that Domitian's German campaign was not conceived in advance[8] and, thus, detachments from the Ninth Legion could not have been on the continent prior to 83. This is unlikely, as A. Birley shows.[9] In fact, Domitian's preparations were probably well under way in 82.

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1 Tac *Agr*, 39.2.
2 R. Syme, *Tacitus*, 22, n. 6.
3 R. Ogilvie, *De vita Agricolae*, 319.
4 A. Burn, 'Tacitus on Britain', in T. Dorey (ed.), *Tacitus*, 50.
5 Tac *Agr*, 38.2: *et exacta iam aestate.*
6 A. Birley, 'The date of Mons Graupius', *LCM* 1 (1976), 12-13; also *Fasti*, 77.
7 *Ibid.*
8 J. Anderson, 'When did Agricola become governor of Britain?', *CR* 34 (1920), 161.
9 A. Birley, *op. cit.*, *LCM* 1 (1976), 14. See also R. Knox McElderry, 'The date of Agricola's governorship of Britain', *JRS* 10 (1920), 74.

Another issue which would seem to support those who argue for a later date is the reference to a cohort of the Usipi who mutinied during Agricola's sixth season.[10] Officially this tribe did not become part of the Roman Empire until Domitian's victory in Germany. Therefore, it is argued, the year must be no earlier than 83. To levy a tribe so soon (before the conquest had been achieved), however, would have been contrary to normal Roman practice. As R. McElderry observed, a portion of this tribe lived fairly close to the Roman border and they may well have come under the sphere of Roman military activities in 77,[11] if not before. It would not have been unusual for a tribe that had contact with Rome, but was not directly under her power, to be levied.

If the arguments for a later date were to be accepted, another problem arises. For in chapter nine of the *Agricola* Tacitus records: *minus triennium in ea legatione detentus ac statim ad spem consultatus revocatus est.*[12] Since Agricola took up his governorship in Aquitania in 73 he must have returned late in 75 or in 76. If his appointment in Britain did not commence until 78, then there would have been a substantial time lapse, even if his consulship were in 77 (as most suggest[13]) and why he came to Britain *media iam aestate* finds no satisfactory answer. Indeed Tacitus implies that the succession of events was prompt: that after his consulship his daughter was married to Tacitus and he was immediately placed in charge of Britain.[14] The first two consuls of 77 were Vespasian and Titus. It has been variously argued that they held office for two, four or six months.[15] There are examples of all three during Vespasian's reign and without direct evidence the duration of the office of the *consules ordinarii* cannot be assumed for the year 77. It is certain that the marriage of Agricola's daughter cannot have taken place during May and the first half of June as this

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10 Tac *Agr*, 28.

11 R. Knox McElderry, *op. cit.*, *JRS* 10 (1920), 71ff.

12 Tac *Agr*, 9.5.

13 But cf. K. Wellesley, 'Review of *Cornelii Taciti: De Vita Agricolae* by R.M. Ogilvie and I.A. Richmond', *JRS* 59 (1969), 266-269.

14 Tac *Agr*, 9.5.

15 R. Knox McElderry, *op. cit.*, *JRS* 10 (1920), 69; J. Anderson,*op. cit.*, *CR* 34 (1920), 159; W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 44, respectively.

was an unlucky time for a marriage.[16] Therefore even if Agricola had held the consulship in March/April or May/June, the earliest he would have left Rome was at the end of June. He would then have arrived in Britain in early August. This chronology becomes suspect on the grounds of what Tacitus meant by the 'middle of the summer'. It has been proposed that this would be considered to be mid-June/July. Therefore, recently, W. Hanson has suggest that the date of Agricola's consulship was late in 76, perhaps September/October, since the consuls for November/December are known.[17] The marriage and appointment to the priesthood could then have taken place in the first four months of 77 and Agricola could have left Rome in late April or May to arrive in Britain sometime in June, *media aestate*.

Obviously the grounds for accepting either 77 or 78 as the starting date for Agricola's governorship are by no means certain but, in favour of the earlier date is the statement of Dio: ἐν μὲν τῇ Βρεττανίᾳ ταῦτ' ἐγένετο καὶ ἀπ' αὐτων ὁ μὲν Τίτος αὐτοκράτωρ τὸ πεντεκαιδέκατον ἐπεκλήθη,[18] who assigns the fifteenth acclamation of Titus to 79. If 77 is accepted, then this would coincide with Agricola's third year during which he had advanced to the River Tay. Anderson rejects this, arguing that this would in fact fit with Agricola's second year,[19] yet nothing of significance was achieved during Agricola's second campaign, as previously observed.[20] There are reservations concerning this statement of Dio, as B. Dobson observes: 'Dio's account as a whole does not inspire confidence'.[21] True it occurs in the same passage as that referring to the mutiny of the Usipi, dated to Agricola's sixth campaign by Tacitus, but Dio, through the work of his epitomator, Xiphilinus, does add useful details. It would not be unreasonable to see 79-81 as reflecting imperial policy, where in 79 Titus halts the advance after the gains made by Agricola and his own acclamation. Then in 81 Agricola makes his report concerning Ireland to Titus, who subsequently dies in September of that year. This is sufficient news for Domitian to order

16 A. Birley, *op. cit.*, *LCM* 1 (1976), 14.
17 W. Hanson, *Agricola*, 44.
18 Dio, 66.20.3.
19 J. Anderson, *op. cit.*, *CR* 34 (1920), 160.
20 See above, in ch. 6.
21 B. Dobson, 'Agricola's life and career', *SAF* 12 (1980), 11.

that the advance continue in 82. As A. Birley has suggested, this might go some way to explain Tacitus' attitude to Domitian if, under his rule, Agricola had only had another two years instead of the normal three when the conquest of the North had almost been completed.[22]

22 A. Birley, *op. cit.*, *LCM* 1 (1976), 14.

Appendix 4: Maps

1. The tribes of Roman Britain and known or probable tribal capitals.

2. Proposed routes of advance for the invasion of 43.

3. Claudius' expedition to Britain.

4. The formation of a province: Aulus Plautius and Ostorius Scapula.

5. The campaigns of Aulus Didius Gallus.

6. The military operations of Quintus Veranius.

7. The governorship of Suetonius Paulinus and the course of the Boudican revolt.

8. Military operations during the years 69 to 77.

9. The campaigns of Agricola.

Map 1.


CAERENI
CORNOVII
SMERTAE
LUGI
CARNONACAE
BORESTI
TAEXALI
VACOMAGI
CREONES
CALEDONII
VENICONES
EPIDII
DUMNONII
VOTADINI
SELGOVAE
NOVANTAE
CARVETII
LUGUVALIUM
ISURIUM
BRIGANTES
PARISI
N
DECEANGLI
ORDOVICES
CORNOVII
VIRICONIUM
CORITANI
RATAE
ICENI
VENTA ICENORUM
DEMETAE
MORIDUNUM
SILURES
VENTA SILURUM
DOBUNNI
CORINIUM
CATUVELLAUNI
VERULAMIUM
CAMULODUNUM
TRINOVANTES
CAESAROMAGUS
ATREBATES
CALLEVA
DUROVERNUM
DUROTRIGES
VENTA BELGARUM
BELGAE
CANTIACI
REGNI
NOVIOMAGUS
DUMNONII
ISCA DUMNONIORUM
DURNOVARIA

Map 2.


Lindum
Viriconium
Corinium
Camulodunum
Londinium
Pontes
Regulbium
Rutupiae
Durovernum
Portus Dubris
Portus Lemanis
Isca
Noviomagus
VECTIS
Gesoriacum
N
OCEANUS BRITANNICUS
Juliobona
KEY:
Major settlements.
Other settlements.
Generally accepted routes.
Possible routes of Plautius' three landing forces.
Route as based on J.G.F.Hind.
Advance of the Second Legion under Vespasian.
Advance of the Fourteenth Legion.
Advance of the Ninth Legion.

Map 3.


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Major settlement.
Other settlements.
Claudius paene demersus est.
Outward journey.
Return journey.
Alternative route.
MARE GERMANICUM
OCEANUS ATLANTICUS
CAMULODUNUM
Rutupiae
Gesoriacum
Augusta Treverorum
Argentorate
Lugdunum
Vienna
Mediolanum
Cremona
Arelate
Forum Iulii
Massilia
Stoechades
LIGURIA
Ravenna
ROMA
Ostia
MARE TYRRHENUM
N

Map 4.


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Movements of Roman forces.
Movements of Caratacus.
Campaigns after the capture of Caratacu
Roads.
Legionary forts.
Battle site(?).
Major settlements:
I. Isurium.
V. Venta.
R. Ratae.
C. Camulodunum.
Ve. Verulamium.
Co. Corinium.
M. Minchinhampton
Lo. Londinium.
Is. Isca.
Forts:
1.Rhyn Park.
2.Viriconium
3.Uxecona.
4.Pennocrucium.
5.Wall.
6.Brompton Park.
7.Greensforge
8.Leintwardine.
9.Metchley.
10.Hindwell Farm, Walton.
11.Alcester.
12.Clifford.
13.Abergavenny.
14.Butrium.
15.Venta.
16.Cardiff.
N
BRIGANTES
DECEANGLI
Deva
Lindum
ORDOVICES
SILURES
Mancetter
Watling Street
Fosse Way
Ermine Street
ICENI
Kingsholm
Co
Ve
Lo
Is
R
V
C
M

Map 5.


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Movements of Roman forces.
Incursions of Venutius.
Legionary forts.
Other forts: 1. Isurium.
2. Old Winteringham.
3. Rossington Bridge.
4. Templeborough.
5. Chesterfields.
6. Newton-on-Trent.
7. Osmanthorpe.
8. Trent Vale.
9. Littlechester.
10. Viriconium.
11. Clyro.
12. Gobannium.
13. Burrium.
14. Coed y Caerau.
N
BRIGANTES
GAVRANTICI
SETANTII
PARISI
Lindum
Glevum
SILURES

Map 6.


KEY:
Movements of Roman forces.
Legionary forts.
Other forts
N
Deva
Rhyn Park
Viriconium
Caersws
Penllwyn
Pumpsaint
Clyro
Llandovery
Y Gaer
Burrium
Glevum

Map 7.


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Major settlements.
Ports.
Legionary forts.
Battle sites (?).
Initial operations of Paulinus' governorship.
Movements of Boudica's forces.
Possible routes taken by Paulinus to London.
Movement of the Ninth Legion.
Punitive measures of Paulinus.
Flight of Caius Decianus.
N
MONA
Deva
Viriconium
Mancetter
Longthorpe
Venta
Glevum
Bürrium
Verulamium
Camulodunum
Abonae
Londinium
Rutupiae
Durovernum
Isca
Gesoriacum

Map 8.


KEY:
Campaigns under Vettius Bolanus and Petillius Cerialis.
Campaigns under Julius Frontinus.
Battle site (?).
Legionary forts.
Other forts:
1.Blatobulgium.
2.Castra Exploratum.
3.Fanum Cocidi.
4.Pons Aelius.
5.Luguvalium.
6.Brocavum.
7.Glanoventa.
8.Mediobogdum.
9.Galava.
10.Brough-under-Stainmore.
11.Lavatris.
12.Cataractonium.
13.Alauna
14.Lancaster.
15.Whitby.
16.Lease Rigg.
17.Cawthorne.
18.Derventio.
19.Verbeia.
20.Stamford Bridge.
21.Camulodunum.
22.Barwick-in-Elmet.
23.Heyton.
24.Peluaria.
25.Danum.
26.Templeborough.
27.Rossington Bridge.
28.Chesterfield.
29.Mediolanum.
30.Llanfor.
31.Caergai.
32.Rhydymain.
33.Brithdir.
34.Forden Gaer.
35.Caerswa.
36.Penllwyn.
37.Trawscoed.
38.Castell Collen.
39.Walton.
40.Bremia.
41.Luentinum.
42.Gobannium.
43.Cicucium.
44.Moridunum.
45.Caelbren.
46.Pen y Darren.
47.Leucarum.
48.Nidum.
49.Gellygaer.
50.Burrium.
51.Cardiff.
Stanwick
Eboracum
Deva
Lindum
Isca
N

Map 9.


(THULE)
KEY:
1. Campaigns by Agricola.
(Numbers refer to successive seasons.)
Voyage of the Usipi.
ORCADES
BORESTI(?)
Bennachie
CALEDONIA
MONAVIA
HIBERNIA
MONA
ORDOVICES
N

Appendix 5: Figures

1. The tombstone of the imperial procurator Julius Classicianus found in London.

2. Inscription from Chichester commemorating the establishment of the temple dedicated to Neptune and Minerva by King Cogidubnus.



Figure 1.



Figure 2.

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